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Abstract
A constituent feature of adaptive complex systems are non-linear feedback
mechanisms between actors. This makes it often dicult to model and
analyse them. Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) uses com-
puter simulation methods to represent such systems and analyse non-linear
processes.
The aim of this thesis is to explore ways of modelling adaptive agents in
ACEmodels. Its major contribution is of a methodological nature. Articial
intelligence and machine learning methods are used to represent agents and
learning processes.
In this work, a general reinforcement learning framework is developed
and realised in a simulation system. This system is used to implement
three models of increasing complexity in two dierent economic domains.
One of these domains are iterative games in which agents meet repeatedly
and interact. In an experimental labour market, it is shown how statistical
discrimination can be generated simply by the learning algorithm used. The
results resemble actual patterns of observed human behaviour in laboratory
settings. The second model treats strategic network formation. The main
contribution here is to show how agent-based modelling helps to analyse
non-linearity that is introduced when assumptions of perfect information
and full rationality are relaxed. The other domain has a Health Economics
background. The aim here is to provide insights of how the approach might
be useful in real-world applications. For this, a general model of primary
care is developed, and the implications of dierent consumer behaviour
(based on the learning features introduced before) analysed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Economies can be seen as complex dynamics systems: Many autonomous
agents interact locally, giving rise to global phenomena such as price levels,
growth rates, etc. As Tesfatsion (2006) notes, the study of these macro phe-
nomena require strong abstractions and simplications, which, if removed,
quickly make the system intractable. For example, what would happen
if the Walrasian Auctioneer would be removed in a standard Walrasian
model? Because of this `small' perturbation, the modeller now has to `come
to grips with challenging issues such as asymmetric information, strategic
interaction, expectation formation on the basis of limited information, mu-
tual learning, social norms, transaction costs, externalities, market power,
predation, collusion, and the possibility of coordination failure (convergence
to a Pareto-dominated equilibrium)' (Tesfatsion 2006). Agent-based com-
putational economics (ACE) is a method that has emerged as a novel way
to look at the evolution of such equilibria and global phenomena by gen-
erating, or `growing' them endogenously (Epstein and Axtell 1996). It is
a way to computationally study articial worlds modelled as dynamic sys-
tems of interacting entities. The entities are typically individuals or social
1
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groups such as consumers, rms or players in games. Furthermore, physi-
cal entities such as infrastructure or spatial settings might be represented
in a computational model. Models are analysed by simulating them in a
computer, and interpreting the results that are generated.
A system is called complex if it is composed of interacting units and if
has emergent properties, that is, properties arising from the interactions of
the agents. Following Tesfatsion (2006), a system is complex adaptive if the
units of the system have some form of pro- and reactive capabilities. There
are basically three denitions of complex adaptive systems:
Denition 1. A complex adaptive system is a complex system that in-
cludes reactive units, i.e., units capable of exhibiting systematically dierent
attributes in reaction to changed environmental conditions.
Denition 2. A complex adaptive system is a complex system that includes
goal-directed units, i.e., units that are reactive and that direct at least some
of their reactions towards the achievement of built-in (or evolved) goals.
Denition 3. A complex adaptive system is a complex system that includes
planner units, i.e., units that are goal-directed and that attempt to exert
some degree of control over their environment to facilitate achievement of
these goals.
Essentially, economic systems can be dened as complex adaptive sys-
tems, composed of intelligent agents. Some form of cognition and goal-
directedness is essential to most models. However, the degree of goal-
direction and cognitive capabilities of agents varies strongly. The simplest
models, for example, represent only reactions to neighbouring agents' states
(e.g. Schelling 1971). In game theory, simple reinforcement learning (RL),
as well as mixed systems, combining cognitive learning mechanisms with
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experience-based learning, have been widely applied (for details, see chap-
ter 3; for an overview see Brenner (2006)). There is no simple rule which
models should use which sort of learning; this typically depends on the na-
ture of the domain. For example, in environments where habitualisation
is a prominent feature, e.g. in repeated game situations, simple reinforce-
ment learning matches actual behaviour usually reasonably well. On the
other hand, if decisions are less frequent and more important, simple learn-
ing mechanisms are not accurate representations. For instance, it could
be argued that choosing a doctor (see chapter 4) is a very conscious deci-
sion, thus RL would be inappropriate and some mechanism for representing
beliefs and judgements would be the more natural choice.
While the role of ACE as a tool for simulating complex systems is
straightforward, its role as a paradigm for economic modelling is contro-
versial. Typical criticisms of ACE models regard the following points (e.g.
Fagiolo et al 2007; Leombruni and Richiardi 2005; Richiardi 2003):
{ The lack of standardisation and formalism of ACE models. The sheer
mass and heterogeneity of models makes unclear what this approach
actually stands for. In general, there are almost no standardised tech-
niques to analyse agent-based models, for example, whether and when
sensitivity analyses should be conducted, how timing should be inter-
preted and so on.
{ The lack or impossibility of empirical validation of many models.
Many simulations use some stylised facts to establish the validity of
the model. Calibration is typically an iterative process where the
modeller reduces the parameter space to smaller ranges which gen-
erate the most plausible results, or where detailed data exists, to a
dataset. However, since one of the advantages of ACE models is the
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integration of more `realism' in the form of exact agent specications,
there is always a trade-o between descriptive accuracy and analytical
tractability. Naturally, the more degrees of freedom a model has, the
more dicult it is to map it to available empirical evidence (due to
the number of parameters to calibrate).
{ The lack of generality and unclear approach to handle results. Whereas
it is straightforward to estimate, say, reduced forms, or calculate tran-
sition probabilities on empirical data, articial data can only be cal-
ibrated against some empirical benchmark. A result derived from
articial data can only be as good as the underlying simulation is
able to replicate the actual real-world process. Furthermore, agent-
based models are likely to underidentify actual trends. ACE models
are richer, and therefore, create more noise. Another aspect of this
problem is `equinality'. Equinality describes the case when a num-
ber of dierent models may generate similar data, that is, they may
equally well explain the same phenomenon but by dierent processes.
Some ACE modellers view agent-based modelling as a new way of do-
ing science (Epstein and Axtell 1996). The main interest of researchers in
this area is to discover new rules, theories and test hypotheses about the
processes that generate certain phenomena, and only later derive analytical
better models that explain larger classes of phenomena (e.g. Edmonds and
Moss 2005). As these modellers typically use their simulations on a mere
qualitative basis, as thought-experiments or support for generating new hy-
potheses, there is no rationale for testing such models against empirical
data. Although immunised against empirical falsication, some forecast-
ing exercises might still be possible, but results have to be treated with
caution. More importantly, there is a danger that 'one ends up building
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auto-referential formalisations that have no link to reality' (e.g. Fagiolo
et al 2007).
The aim of this thesis is to apply RL methods as a means to model
adaptive feedback processes. The overall contribution is of a methodological
nature. The models presented have the main purpose to demonstrate this
method and show how it can be applied to a range of problems. In that
sense, the models discussed in the thesis fall into the last category of models:
They are mainly of a qualitative nature; empirical validation is not the main
interest of the simulations.
The focus of this thesis is reinforcement learning. Reinforcement learn-
ing is a very simple experience based learning approach; agents learn by
trial and error. It has often been used in the ACE literature, but often
ad-hoc or in simple models. Moreover, there are only few approaches which
integrate experience-based learning with cognitive elements such as beliefs.
The objectives of the thesis are to
1. Develop a new computational approach that integrates RL with sim-
ple cognitive elements. It shall provide a new approach of modelling
human decision processes.
2. Apply RL to economic, mainly game-theory models and contribute to
the learning literature in this eld. As the use of simulations allows
to build more complex models, an important aspect of this thesis is to
build a 'bridge' between pure game theory and empirical results of ex-
perimental game theory. A recurring topic is therefore the comparison
with experimental evidence.
3. Analyse the impact of dierent learning approaches in more complex
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domains. Here, the question is how RL can be used to enrich the
analysis of more applied, real-world models.
As the methodological basis, chapter 2 reviews RL in the economic liter-
ature and develops a general learning framework, combining reinforcement
and rule learning. The motivation is to provide an alternative, generic way
of representing agent decision mechanisms in a unied framework for several
classes of models. It tries to go beyond simplistic fomalisations of adaptive
capabilities such as simple RL, but to keep computational complexity within
bounds. Chapter 3 applies this approach to a model of statistical discrimi-
nation. It is shown that the framework is capable of reproducing patterns
of actual human behaviour in game-theoretic experiments. Chapter 4 is an
application of RL to network formation. Results of the learning process are
compared with axiomatic results for perfectly rational players. A modied
version of the model is then used to reproduce an experiment and to com-
pare its behaviour with observed human behaviour. A very dierent model
is presented in chapter 5. While the purpose of the rst chapters is to apply
and analyse learning in rather simple settings, the purpose of this chapter
is to use it in a complex setting with many inuencing variables. The re-
quirements for adaptation in this application are very dierent from that
discussed before: In the model, doctors decide about treatment patterns,
quality and their own workload. Patients choose doctors based on their own
experience and recommendations of other consumers. Several simulations
using dierent learning and choice scenarios are compared.
The models have been implemented in their own software framework,
providing the learning features used in the thesis. Appendix A describes
the architecture and implementation of the software.
This work contributes in several ways to the ACE literature:
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{ It adds a novel algorithm for representing learning in articial agents.
This approach has been published in Schuster (2012).
{ It applies RL to statistical discrimination games. It belongs thus to
the few dynamic models in this area, and is to the knowledge of the
author the rst using an RL approach.
{ It applies RL to strategic network formation games. So far, adaptation
in the strategic network formation literature has received almost no
attention. Here, adaptation is applied for the rst time to the well-
known connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
{ It provides one of the rst applications of ACE in the eld of health
care system modelling. So far, only few agent-based models in this
area have been proposed, and in fact, there has been no ACE model
of primary care.
Chapter 2
A Computational Framework
for Modelling Learning
2.1 Introduction
The perfectly informed and rational homo oeconomicus has often been crit-
icised as too unrealistic - humans would not have the computational power
to calculate the best decisions, taking into account all information and all
possible outcomes. Already Simon (Simon 1956b) argued to use simpler,
psychologically more plausible algorithms. While the argument of bounded
rationality is frequently used as critique of the standard economic model, the
argument remains, however, vague (Simon 2000) - meaning usually every-
thing that is not classical economics, ranging, for example, from systematic
errors people make in judgements to the research on decision heuristics as
an alternative form of decision making.
Common to all critiques of perfect rationality is that humans are not
capable of doing the computations required by a homo oeconomicus, but are
bound to commit errors and misjudgements. As some psychologists (e.g.
8
CHAPTER 2. A COMPUTATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MODELLING
LEARNING 9
Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996; Lopes 1994) point out, most alternative
models are still based on the fundamental assumption that expected utility
and Bayesian reasoning are the basis for all human decision making under
uncertainty. For example, subjective expected utility theory acknowledged
that individuals are not fully informed, and replaced objective probabilities
with subjective; however, the basis for reasoning remained the same.
In the sociological and psychological literature, a vast amount of evi-
dence has been collected to show experimentally how this classical model
can fail. Formalisation, however, is rare. An example is Prospect Theory
(Kahnemann and Tversky 1979). The main argument of Prospect Theory is
that people value future losses more highly than potential gains. Prospect
theory proposes an S-shaped value function that is concave for gains, and
convex for losses. That is, individuals become risk avoiding the higher the
potential losses, and risk seeking the greater the potential gains. Another
aspect of the value function has been characterised by loss aversion, which
is usually represented by a steeper slope of the curve in the loss area. These
aspects have been used to explain apparently irrational, as well as loss avoid-
ing behaviour in many psychological experiments. Psychologists have also
emphasised that humans process information not as the Bayesian paradigm
postulates, but rather crudely by using decision heuristics and cues from
their environment. In the eld of cognitive psychology bounded rational-
ity became almost exclusively associated with this perspective in cognitive
psychology. The behavioural aspect of bounded rationality (like learning
by doing) has been neglected or not seen as a subject for this discipline
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996).
In the economic literature, the most common way of modelling bounded
rationality is to postulate deviations from perfect rationality - for exam-
ple, by introducing an error term or some random noise (Auman 1997).
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With RL approaches a more behavioural dimension has become available in
(behavioural) game theory. In pure stimulus-response models, agents learn
by trial and error without any explicit knowledge representation (e.g Roth
and Erev 1995). Some authors combine experience learning with foresight
in mixed models as in ctitious play (Camerer and Ho 1999). Some ACE
models are based on similar concepts (see Brenner (2006) for an overview);
especially classier systems have received interest to represent a simple form
of rule learning (e.g. Kirman and Vriend 2001a; LeBaron et al 1999).
Another angle of decision making can be seen in cognitive architectures.
Architectures such as ACT-R (e.g. Anderson 1993) and Soar (e.g. Lehman
et al 2003) try to simulate human decision-making as a computer program.
Most of them focus on the working of the mind when solving, say, math-
ematical problems and model in detail what processing steps are involved
in solving such problems. More recently, Sun showed how his cognitive ar-
chitecture CLARION (Sun and Slusarz 2005) can be connected with social
simulation. In this approach, the environment of an organism can, in con-
trast to the classical architectures, be represented in an agent's mind (Sun
and Naveh 2007).
In this chapter, a computational model of bounded rationality is devel-
oped that addresses the tension between simplifying representations as pure
stimulus-response learning on the one end of the spectrum, and often com-
plex higher levels of cognition on the other end. It is most closely related to
mixed models and classier systems, and has analogies with Sun's applica-
tion of CLARION. However, there is no distinct social or economic approach
to individual learning. The algorithm described in this paper attempts to
ll this gap.
In the remainder of the chapter, the related literature is reviewed in
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some detail. Then, a simple conceptual framework based on Simon's con-
cept of bounded rationality (Simon 1956b) is described, before outlining
concept and algorithm in more detail. The algorithm is then related to the
existing approaches in the literature. A simple simulation illustrates how
the algorithm works. The conclusion also outlines how the framework is
related to the learning problems in the applications in chapters 3 to 5.
2.2 Experience-based Learning
Humans learn through a variety of sources, such as own experience, ob-
servation, imitation or cognition. According to Brenner (2006), learning
in Economic models can be distinguished according to the degree of con-
sciousness in decisions. On the one end of the spectrum, humans learn in a
very simple way by reacting to stimuli. This type of learning happens au-
tomatically on an unconscious level; in routine situations, humans are often
incapable of explaining why they are doing things in a certain way. On the
other end, learning happens in a conscious way by reecting, e.g. about own
experiences or about observations. Actions resulting from such deliberation
originate from the mental model humans have about the world, and is dis-
connected from immediate stimuli. In between, there are several modes of
learning, which can be characterised as routine learning. They have in com-
mon that they usually use some kind of experience. Brenner subsumes many
kinds of learning under experience-based learning: Reinforcement learning,
learning by imitation, satiscing (searching for satisfactory problem solu-
tions) or collecting and analysing experience. Fictitious play, a common
learning technique in game theory, is the typical example for the latter. In
ctitious play, players remember their payos and strategies and compare
them with payos and strategies of other players in the game. Using this
information, they compute what they would have earned if they played the
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other strategies. If the other strategies fare better, the player can then
switch his behaviour. While experience is necessary to learn in ctitious
play, it requires also a cognitive component, namely the reection upon
other players' actions. Pure belief-based approaches do not use the feed-
back coming from own activities. A typical example is Bayesian learning,
which updates beliefs about future states an agent will be in. Cognitive
architectures from Psychology can be seen as a similar example. These
approaches aim to model mental processes in the brain, and as such are
typically independent of concrete experience.
The aim of this chapter is to develop an algorithm that can be ap-
plied to a wide range of ACE modelling problems. Thus, approaches that
do not require prior knowledge about the domain are the most relevant.
Experience-based learning methods are a natural candidate for this, since
they acquire knowledge incrementally and base decisions on that knowl-
edge. The literature reviewed here looks therefore mainly at experience
learning, in particular reinforcement learning, but not pure belief-based
learning. Furthermore, throughout the thesis, RL will be used as a syn-
onym for any experience-based learning method that is based on RL.
In RL, agents learn to choose actions that were successful in the past
more often, while they avoid actions that led to unsatisfactory outcomes.
This is referred to as the `Law of eect'. A basic learning model was rst
formalised by Bush and Mosteller (BM) (Bush and Mosteller 1955). Ac-
cording to BM, the choice probabilities p of an action at a given time can
be computed according to
Qp = p+ a(1  p)  bp (2.1)
where a; 0  a  1 describes rewards, and b; 0  b  1 punishments. Q
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is a mathematical operator that describes the new quantity of p after the
reward is applied. It is a short form to describe the stepwise update of
reinforcements. Most learning models generalise the BM idea to a time-
discounted version. The main components typically are:
{ An action set A from which an action a is chosen, and payos 
associated with them;
{ An action strength function that updates the experience over time.
The typical function is introduced in Roth and Erev (1995):
qk(t+ 1) = qk(t) + (t) (2.2)
which updates the strength q of the k-th action with the current payo
(Roth and Erev 1995).
{ A selection function that selects successful actions based on the qk.
This selection function is usually based on Luce's choice theorem (Luce
1959):
pk =
qkP
qj
(2.3)
This function computes the choice probability of action k relative to
its strength qk.
Thus, BM-type models accumulate experience. There exist several prob-
lems with this simple type of learning. For example, after long periods of
playing a single action, the learner will react to a change in payos extremely
slowly, and hence possibly play inferior actions. On the other hand, if the
learner reacts reasonably fast, it might be that it never locks in into opti-
mal choices. Several RL models have addressed these problems dierently.
They can roughly be characterised as follows:
CHAPTER 2. A COMPUTATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MODELLING
LEARNING 14
{ Cumulative RL without aspirations (Roth and Erev 1995; Erev and
Roth 1998; Laslier et al 2001; Laslier and Walliser 2005; Beggs 2005;
Rustichini 1999; Camerer and Ho 1999), which are all based on the
original BM model described above. Many analytical approaches
use the simple version in combination with simple decision problems
where adjustment to changing environments does not play a role; the
problem does not exist in this case. Other models, mainly of are
more empirical nature, vary the base model by adding forgetting and
experimentation parameters (Erev and Roth 1998) or simple beliefs
(Camerer and Ho 1999) to counterbalance the eect of excessive cu-
mulation.
{ Averaging mechanisms (Karandikar et al 1998; Mookherjee and So-
pher 1994; 1997; Sarin and Vahid 2001; Gilboa and Schmeidler 1996).
In principle, average reinforcements can be interpreted as a form of be-
lief learning, namely as an expected future reward. The advantage is
that agents can adjust reasonably fast to changes in the environment.
{ Aspiration level models with cumulative RL (e.g Boergers and Sarin
2000) or averaging mechanisms (e.g. Karandikar et al 1998; Bendor
et al 2001b; Napel 2003; Gotts et al 2007); see also Bendor et al
(2001a) for an overview. In models of this type, action strengths are
updated with respect to the dierence to an exogenously set or en-
dogenously evolving aspiration level. If the payo is below this level,
the reward is subtracted, otherwise added. Some models base the cal-
culation of action probabilities on the distance from the actual payo
to the aspiration level. The probability distributions that determine
action selection can be skewed to choose an action with a probability
close to 1 if the reward is above, or close to 0 if the reward is below the
aspiration level. When payos decrease, agents tend to play strategies
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proportional to their expected payos, thereby achieving a similar ex-
ploration eect once their environment changes and payos decrease.
The advantage of this approach is that lock-in into optimal choices
is supported, at the same time not being deterministic if payos fall
below the aspiration level.
2.2.1 Experimental Games Using Simple RL Models
One main motivation of many models has been the search for learning rules
that predict experimental data better than the standard equilibrium predic-
tion under full information (e.g. Roth and Erev 1995; Erev and Roth 1998;
Mookherjee and Sopher 1994; 1997; Chen and Tang 1998).
In their seminal work, Erev and Roth (Roth and Erev 1995) consider
three variants of the base model (equations (2.2) and (2.3)); later referred to
as ER models). The rst uses cuto parameters for high and low selection
probabilities: Actions above the upper cuto are played with probability
1, below the lower with probability 0. In the second model, a parameter 
sets the probability with which a random action is chosen. This allows for
persistent experimentation. The third variant includes a recency parameter
; 0 <  < 1, which weights the importance of past payos whenever the
action strengths are updated: qk(t + 1) = qk(t) + (t). These models are
applied to a large number of games, as the main motivation for RL here is
to nd a learning model that predicts well over as many classes of games
as possible. Erev and Roth use ultimatum games, bargaining (market)
games, and simplied best-shot games. Except for ultimatum games, they
nd that all three RL models predict actual behaviour well, which also
happens to converge to equilibrium predictions. In the ultimatum games
however, subgame perfect equilibrium (where the rst mover demands the
greatest possible share for himself) is not reached. Predicted as well as
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actual behaviour did not converge to equilibrium. Moreover, experimental
data showed dierences in medium- and long-term outcomes. The RL model
could replicate such switches.
Later, in Erev and Roth (1998), they apply simple RL to a wider col-
lection of experimental data based on mixed-strategy games; this makes
convergence more dicult, since no player has an incentive to stick to a
pure strategy. Additional to the simple model, they allow for alternatives
with more sophisticated learning. Three models are compared: Model (1)
is simple RL as in equations (2.2) and (2.3). Model (2) combines forgetting
and generalisation, i.e. qk(t + 1) = (1  )qk(t) + Ek(j; (t)), where E is a
function determining how playing strategy k aects similar strategies j. In
the considered 2-player games, they set Ek(j; (t)) = (1  ) if j = k and
Ek(j; (t)) = (t)=(M   1) (where M is the number of pure strategies)
otherwise. That is, depending on , players generalise rewards in a way
that leads to experimentation among similar strategies. In model (3) some
simple beliefs are integrated in the form of limited (only own payos are
known) and full information (also opponents' payos are known) ctitious
play. In the rst case, the update function is augmented by an expected
payo parameter, in the latter the action probability is determined consid-
ering the value of alternative strategies. After tting the data, they nd
that adding more knowledge in the form of beliefs and expectations does
not add to the predictive power of RL. Usually, the simplest models pre-
dict behaviour accurately. Adding adaptation parameters like recency and
experimentation improves the t of simple RL, but ctitious play does not.
Sarin and Vahid (1999) describe the Payo Assessment learning model
(PA), which uses average payos instead of cumulative payos, and chooses
deterministically the action with the highest expected payo. Applying it
in Sarin and Vahid (2001) to the same data as Erev and Roth did in Erev
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and Roth (1998), they nd that this model predicts the data at least as well
as simple RL.
Mookherjee and Sopher (Mookherjee and Sopher 1994; 1997) conducted
experiments with constant sum games. In their early experiment only two
choices were available. Players learnt to play their minimax strategies. In
Mookherjee and Sopher (1997) they nd that experimental results devi-
ate considerably from equilibrium predictions in games with at least four
strategies. Instead of cumulative payos, here qk is some average measure
of action k. Furthermore, they use the exponential selection function
pk(t+ 1) =
eqkP
eqj
(2.4)
(where  is a choice parameter). After comparing also belief-based learn-
ing rules, they further conclude that the RL predictions match the reality
closest. Using dierent averaging mechanisms, their data suggest that play-
ers' memory is rather short, and that they form expectations about future
payos.
Chen and Tang (1998) use a cumulative reinforcement function as in
equation 2.2 with an exponential selection rule as in equation 2.4. Ap-
plying it to public good provision games, they compare its performance in
predicting experimental data with ctitious play as well as the equilibrium
prediction. They nd that the empirical results deviate from the equilib-
rium prediction, which predicts the data worst. The RL mechanism ts
data better than ctitious play.
Arthur (1993) proposes a model similar to the ER type of models. The
action strengths q are updated according to equation 2.2. Actions are chosen
according to 2.3. However, the sum of probabilities in the denominator is
normalised to a pre-chosen constant C. Let et be the random unit vector
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dened as
et =
8><>:1; x is played at t0; x is not played at t,
. The cumulative update function in equation 2.2 can be written as
qk(t+ 1) = qk(t) + (t)et (2.5)
.
Then, let the cumulative payo until time t be vt =
P
s<t s. Let
p(t) = p(t + 1)   p(t) denote the incremental change in the probabil-
ity vector e at time t. Because of equations 2.5 and 2.3 one can write
p(t) = (t=vt)(et p(t)), that is the incremental impact of new experience
diminishes over time at a rate of the order of 1=t. Arthur proposed a model
of the form p(t) = [(t)=(Ct+(t))][etp(t)]. In that model, the incremen-
tal impact of the current payos on the action probabilities decreases over
time at a rate of the power of t, which is estimated from data. This is an-
other way of solving the problem of just accumulating experience over time
without possibilities to revise choices. Arthur ts the model to single person
multi-armed bandit experimental data and nds no systematic dierences
between simulated and human learning (from Young (1993),pp.11-13).
2.2.2 Experimental Games Using Combined Belief and
RL models
Camerer and Ho (1999) argue that there are two fundamental types of learn-
ing, experience- and belief-based learning. They propose a more complex
approach to experience learning by combining ctitious play with RL. Their
experienced-weighted attraction model (EWA), is described by two central
equations:
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N(t) =  N(t  1) + 1 (2.6)
and
Aji (t) =
N(t  1)Aji (t  1) + [ + (1  )I(sji ; si(t))](sji ; s i(t))
N(t)
(2.7)
N(t) denotes the experience weight, and Aji (t) the attraction of strategy
j for individual i. si(t) is i's strategy at time t, and s i are the strategies
of all other players. The function I(sji ; si(t)) is an indicator function and
equals 1 if sji = si(t), and 0 otherwise. The payo  is obtained by player
i if he chooses sji , given the behaviour of the other players s i(t). , , and
 are the parameters of the model. The initial values of N(t) and Aji (t) are
priors and may be initialised with some experience level the players already
have.
For N(0) = 1 and  =  = 0, the model reduces to pure cumulative
reinforcement learning. For  > 0, experience collection is expanded to
actions not played by observing the other players in the game. If  =  and
 = 1, the model reduces to weighted ctitious play; for other parameters,
the learning represents a mix of RL and ctitious play.
The action selection function has an exponential form and is given by
P ji (t+ 1) =
eA
j
i (t)Pmi
k=1 e
Aki (t)
(2.8)
where the choice parameter  determines how strongly dierences in the
attractions translate into choice probabilities, and mi is the number of pos-
sible actions player i can use. If  is very large, small dierences result in a
high probability relative to the smaller attractions. If  is small, dierences
are ignored until the distance becomes reasonably large.
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Camerer and Ho test this model with data from constant-sum games,
among them the games from Mookherjee and Sopher (1997), and com-
pare EWA with random, simple RL and belief-based outcomes. The results
show that belief-based learning predicts better than EWA in the simpler
4-strategies games, but worse in more complex 6-strategy games. Contrary
to Mookherjee and Sopher (1997), they nd that belief-based learning con-
verges better than RL learning, which they attribute to dierences in the
model. For example, Mookherjee and Sopher allowed similar strategies to
inuence each other, and they used average instead of cumulative reinforce-
ments; both factors favour their RL rule, while in EWA, these aspects are
reected in the belief component.
EWA has been criticised as being too complex and requiring overly many
parameters. Therefore, Camerer and Ho developed in Camerer et al (2007)
a simplied version of EWA, `self-tuning EWA', by xing most of the pa-
rameters and only estimating  and  with dynamic functions. If a player
detects a change in opponents' play,  is adjusted to allowing more experi-
mentation, and vice versa (becoming pure RL in stationary environments).
The attention function sets  to 1 if the foregone payos are higher than
the actual received payo, so that alternative strategies are reinforced, and
the agent eventually may switch to one of the superior actions. If there
is no better choice available,  is set to 0, thereby supporting an RL-like
lock-in into the best response strategy. Comparing the predictive power of
full and simple EWA, they nd that self-tuning EWA is not as good as the
original approach, but produces very similar results. This applies especially
if parameters are estimated for the same class of games. Self-tuning EWA
predicts better if parameters are estimated jointly for dierent games.
Chen and Khoroshilov (2003) compare dierent learning models - EWA,
the PA model and simple ER learning - in coordination and cost-sharing
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games with two players. They nd that PA ts best to the data, followed by
EWA and RL. When estimating parameters over dierent games (pooling)
PA does best. An exception is cost-sharing games with an average-cost
distribution among players. Under this mechanism, the cost is distributed
evenly, and thus experimentation in one agent triggers experimentation in
the other players. None of the models converged to the observed data.
Stahl (2000) develops a model in which players learn to choose among
dierent strategies following simple decision rules. Players know the strate-
gies played by their opponents. Analogously to other learning models, rules
in the rule space that were successful in the past are more likely to be se-
lected. The rule space can be thought of as composed of basic, or `archetyp-
ical', rules, from which more complex behaviour can be constructed. The
evidence of every rule is assessed, and the probability of choosing that rule
is derived using an exponential selection rule. This evidence is, e.g., the ex-
pected payo given the opponent's strategy in t-1. Based on such reasoning,
Stahl denes ve strategies (e.g. strictly dominated vs. Nash equilibrium
strategies) which are rst tested in experiments, and then tted to the data.
He nds that the model ts the data better than the equilibrium prediction
and random outcomes. The model uses nine parameters, which is found to
be the required minimum to t the data well. Furthermore, evidence from
the experiments suggests that real humans do not gather evidence about all
rules as proposed by the model, but rather focus on subsets.
2.2.3 Analytical Approaches with Simple RL Models
Many authors have analysed the properties of learning rules, and try to
establish conditions under which the actions of players converge to the op-
timal action (in single-player decision problems) or equilibrium (in games).
Typically, the proofs for convergence rely on stochastic approximation the-
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ory. Early work mostly established results for limited classes of games or
simple one-player decisions. Only more recent articles (e.g. Beggs 2005;
Hopkins and Posch 2005; Gotts et al 2007) could state more general results
for the boundary behaviour for the process, and larger classes of games.
ER models Some authors have analysed the ER learning rule (Rustichini
1999; Laslier and Walliser 2005; Beggs 2005; Rustichini 1999; Hopkins and
Posch 2005) in single decision and game contexts.
Rustichini (1999) considers optimal properties of selection rules under
full and partial information in a single player context. Under full infor-
mation the player knows opponents' strategies, under partial information
only its own actions. He nds that with a linear rule (as in equation (2.3)),
convergence to the optimal choice is guaranteed. It is not with the exponen-
tial rule, which weights dierences between payos higher and thus might
speed learning up. Moreover, exponential procedures (as in equation (2.4))
are best in the full information case, but not for partial information: Linear
learning is too slow in full information environments, so the process is more
likely to lock into sub-optimal interior points of the strategy space, rather
than the optimum.
According to Laslier et al (2001) the cumulative RL problem can be seen
as an urn model, from which balls are selected with unequal probability over
the repetitions of the game. Describing this process with ordinary dier-
ential equations (ODE), they rst analyse the resulting stochastic process
for single player situations and show that the process converges to choosing
only payo maximising actions. For 2x2 games they state that the ER rule
converges with positive probability to a Nash equilibrium. If the game has
two pure equilibria, the process converges with positive probability to any
one of them, but not to a mixed equilibrium. However, they cannot prove
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that the process converges with probability 1.
Building on stochastic approximation theory, Beggs (2005) considers 2x2
constant-sum games with unique pure or mixed equilibria and generalises
Laslier et al (2001). Players using RL cannot be forced permanently below
their minimax payo, independent of their opponent's strategy. Similarly,
dominated strategies are always eliminated over the course of time. If both
players play RL, the probability that both players converge to the unique
equilibrium, tends towards 1.
Hopkins and Posch (2005) provide more general results about the re-
lationship of the RL processes with the well-analysed replicator dynamics
approach from evolutionary game theory (Smith 1982). They nd that
Arthur's model (Arthur 1993) as well as ER-type models converge only to
boundary points which are a Nash equilibrium. This is easier to show for
the Arthur model because the action strength updates (step sizes) are of
the same size, while the reinforcements in ER can change at dierent rates.
They show that RL will not converge to boundary points that are linearly
unstable under the replicator dynamics.
Averaging models In PA, a decision maker faces for a number of times
an identical decision problem. The players assess expected payos myopi-
cally by estimating the expected payo using average returns per actions.
They choose the action with the expected maximum payo (i.e. choice is
deterministic). Sarin and Vahid (1999) show that this model converges to
choosing the objective maximin strategy if learning is slow. If players are
more likely to experiment, players converge to the strategy yielding the
maximum possible payo.
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Aspiration level models The reinforcement problem in aspiration level
models has been also been studied by several authors, and has been sur-
veyed in-depth by Bendor et al (2001a). Here, some representatives of this
approach are described.
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996) present a case-based reasoning (CBR) ap-
proach. The decision maker faces a number of dierent situations or `states',
and must make a choice in such situations. In dynamic environments, aspi-
ration level (AL) updating rules have to be ambitious enough to search for
the best result in various situations. In more static environments, it must
be realistic, i.e. close to actual payos. Both properties must be combined,
as a way to search ambitiously for a best strategy, and then to stick to this
choice after the expected values of the strategies can be estimated. They
show that under these conditions, a case-based decision-maker can learn to
become an expected-utility maximiser.
Extending their work on RL with xed AL, Boergers and Sarin (1997)
develop a model with endogenous aspirations and cumulative rewards. In
Boergers and Sarin (2000), a single player chooses between two strategies.
They show that the process can converge to the optimal choice. Endogenous
aspiration levels improve performance by avoiding high dissatisfaction with
even the best available strategies, but can lead to probability matching.
During probability matching, both strategies are played at the same proba-
bility at which they generate benets, whereas optimal strategies should be
played with probabilities close to 1 for behaviour to be considered `rational'.
This can happen when the initial aspiration levels are too high, so that also
dynamic adaptation of the aspiration level cannot lead to a lock-in.
While Boergers and Sarin and Gilboa and Schmeidler establish results
for single player decision problems, other authors extend the results to
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games. Karandikar et al (1998) rst analysed a prisoner's dilemma. The
aspiration levels of both players are updated simultaneously with the re-
ceived reward, and approximate long-run averages. The main result is that
cooperation is sustained if there are no trembles (i.e., externally imposed
changes or noise on the AL's) to the AL's and the speed of updating the
AL's is low. Introducing perturbations into the AL changes the process,
and may lead to dierent equilibria. However, in the long run, the process
returns to the cooperation path. The intuition behind these results is that
the mutual dissatisfaction with non-cooperative payos triggers experimen-
tation until some state is achieved that yields high enough satisfaction (the
point where AL and current payo converge).
Karandikar et al (1998) is modied and extended to arbitrary games
and a larger class of learning rules in Bendor et al (2001b). Similarly, Napel
(2003) applies the model to an ultimatum game and shows that in the long
run players almost surely achieve the equilibrium state. Which equilibrium
depends on the initial conditions and the stability of aspirations, which are
allowed to vary randomly. If such trembles are rare and learning is slow,
the available surplus will be shared eciently. If there are perturbations in
the aspiration level, any equilibrium is supported.
Gotts et al (2007) look at the behaviour of the BM rule with aspirations
in a prisoner's dilemma, generalising earlier insights of Flache and Macy
(2002). They show that the system has two attractors - either a mixed
strategy equilibrium (a so-called self-correcting equilibrium SCE) or both
players cooperate with probability 1. If learning is slow, the system con-
verges in the long run to cooperation. In the medium run however, the
process moves towards the SCE. RL thus can exhibit very dierent results
depending on the length of the period considered.
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2.2.4 Cognitive Approaches
This section reviews two approaches of a more cognitive nature stemming
from Artical Intelligence AI. Still being based on own experience, they
provide mechanisms to make the agent aware of dierent conditions in the
environment.
CLARION The cognitive architecture CLARION (e.g. Sun and Slusarz
2005) was designed to capture implicit and explicit learning processes in
humans. The main assumption is that there are two dierent levels of
learning: A subsymbolic `bottom' level and a symbolic `top' level. The
`bottom' level represents low-skill, often repetitive tasks for which learning
proceeds in a trial-and-error fashion. Knowledge on this level is typically
not accessible, and it is dicult to express such skills with language. On
the symbolic level, knowledge is directly accessible and can be expressed
with language. This level typically represents more complex knowledge. It
can be acquired by experience, but also by explicit teaching.
The input state is made up of a number of dimensions, and each di-
mension may specify a number of possible value or value ranges. Action
selection takes place using RL in the bottom level, or by ring production
rules on the top level. Which level is used is determined stochastically. Af-
ter the action was performed, top and bottom levels are updated with the
feedback received from the environment.
At the bottom level, the RL mechanism is implemented with a neural
net. The input layer is constituted of the values of the input state. Three in-
termediate layers are used to compute Q-values (allowing memory of action
sequences), while the fourth layer chooses an action according to standard
reinforcement learning (similar to equation (2.10)).
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At the top level, the rule conditions are constructed out of the input
dimensions, their consequents from actions available to the agent. The rules
are, for compliance with the bottom level, implemented as network. Rule
extraction, specialisation and generalisation are determined by feedback
from the subsymbolic level: If there is no rule matching the current state and
the action performed well according to some performance criterion, a new
rule is created with the current state as the condition, and the performed
bottom level action as consequent. If rules matching the current condition
exist and the action was successful, the matching rules are replaced by a
generalised version by adding another input element to the condition. The
covered rules are deactivated, but might become reactivated if specialisation
is applied to the new rule at a later stage. Conversely, specialisation means
the removal of an input value from the condition and is triggered when the
result of an action was not successful in the specied condition. Deactivated
rules are reactivated if the specialised rule does not cover them any more.
An information gain measure that estimates the performance of rules under
dierent conditions serves as the success criterion.
This model is applied in Sun and Naveh (2007) to a `stone-age economics'
simulation in which agents belonging to a group collect and contribute food.
An agent might cheat and not contribute, which is punished with some
probability. They show that their adaptive agents are able to reproduce
results of the same model with more deterministic strategies investigated
before (Cecconi and Parisi 1998). They also investigate the properties of
the emerged survival strategies. For example, it turns out that relying more
strongly on the top level enhances performance, and that higher probabil-
ities of rule generalisation are benecial only when less importance rests
with the bottom layer.
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Learning Classier Systems Learning Classier Systems (LCS) also
aim at the extraction of rules. The basic idea is to start with a set of
initial rules (classiers) and to evolve this set over time by application of
mechanisms for modication, deletion and addition of new rules. Whereas
earlier LCS, as introduced by Holland (1975), relied mostly on the Genetic
Algorithms paradigm, newer versions have more in common with RL ap-
proaches and so have also been described as generalised RL (Sigaud and
Wilson 2007).
An LCS consists of a population of classiers. A classier contains a
condition part, an action part, and an estimation of the expected reward.
Typically, the condition part consists of the three basic tests 0 (property
does not exist), 1 (property exists) and #. # represents a generalisation
and stands for both 0 or 1. A classier has one action as a consequent,
but typically several classiers match a condition in the environment and
hence compete with each other. The action to be executed is then selected
according to some RL mechanism (e.g., the -greedy policy, which selects
the best-performing action at a rate of , 0 <  < 1 tries a random action).
Many LCS use a Genetic Algorithm to create new rules by selecting and
recombining the ttest classiers from the population (where tness is, e.g.,
the expected reward received from the environment). A covering operator is
called whenever the set of matching classiers is empty. The operator adds
a classier matching the current situation with a randomly chosen action to
the population. Sophisticated systems may limit the population size, and
add corresponding eviction and generalisation procedures.
Newer families of classier systems, like anticipation-based classier sys-
tems (ACS, Butz (e.g 2002)), do not rely on evolutionary methods. They
extend the classier representation with the description of the next state and
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build a model of transitions. A specialisation mechanism is applied when
the classier oscillates between correct and incorrect predictions, indicating
that a splitting of the condition might improve the match. Generalisation is
based on complex algorithms that estimate whether generalisation will re-
sult in an improvement (see also Sigaud and Wilson (2007) for an overview
of LCS).
Applications in Economics have usually used Holland-type classiers.
Markets of dierent kinds have been modelled using LCS, for example, the
market for electricity (Bagnall and Smith 2005), for sh (Kirman and Vriend
2001b), or stock markets (e.g. LeBaron et al 1999).
In Bagnall and Smith (2005), the UK electricity market is modelled.
In the model, there are a number of electricity generating agents. Each
agent must produce an oer bid per day for the amount of electricity it
wants to produce. The strategies are determined by three factors - capacity
constraints, demand and capacity premiums (for particular time slots in
a trading period). By this, a 10-bit vector of states, denoting dierent
demand, constraint and premium situations is constructed. The model
is used to model various scenarios. For example, they reproduce actual,
observed bidding behaviour.
Kirman and Vriend (2001b)'s model represents a wholesale sh market,
in which buyers and sellers are matched. Buyers resell the sh, and their
payo is given by the dierence of the prices they pay and a xed price they
receive. Analogously, sellers' prot is determined by the dierence of their
costs and the selling price. Classiers are used for several decisions, such
as deciding stock levels, or buying and selling prices. Furthermore, buyers
may become loyal by choosing to return to a seller; sellers remember their
customers and may reward loyalty by lowering their ask price. It turns
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out that loyalty develops as buyers and sellers realise simultaneously the
benets: Returning customers allow better planning of a seller's stock and
continuous prot ow, for which lower prices are accepted; because of these,
customers learn to return.
The stock market model of LeBaron et al (1999) aims to reproduce actual
stock market behaviour in an articial stock market. In the market, there
are trader agents whose task is to make forecasts about the future price of
assets. The expected price is used in their demand functions, which then
determines the amount of assets to purchase. The agents base their forecasts
on hypotheses or candidate rules, of which a single agent maintains 100.
These rules map conditions of the environment into forecasts. The state
vector is 12 bits long. The conditions are given by dividend/price ratios
and comparisons between current price and average prices, which describe
the value of an asset given the market conditions. LeBaron et al (1999) are
able to reproduce features of price time series taken from real markets.
Summarising, LCS are a way to represent learning where the environ-
ment is dynamic and unclear which possible rules are best for the agent's
performance. They are, in principle, a directed search among candidate
rules: Starting from a large set of possible rules, those are selected that
perform best in the environment the agent is in. Weaknesses of LCS have
been handled in the newer approaches - for example, by modelling state
transitions. However, the mechanisms when to apply generalisation and
specialisation are complex. In this sense, LCS can become relatively 'heavy'
models of mental processes. It has been suggested that using simpler RL
methods is sometimes easier and better tractable (e.g. Holland et al 2000).
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2.3 Concept
As the literature overview in the previous section showed, there is substan-
tial literature, mainly in the area of simple games. Fewer authors attempted
to develop cognitive strategic models. Each approach has its limitations
with respect so ACE modelling. Thus, a cognitive architecture covers psy-
chological details social scientists are often not interested in. LCS are a
rather technical approach to learning. For some domains and problems, the
representation system might not be adequate (Schuurmans and Schaeer
1989). In particular, the representation of knowledge as bit strings may
introduce problems. For example, it is dicult to represent more abstract
knowledge like relational operators such as greater, smaller etc. To cover
large value spaces, it would be necessary to represent each single value as
bit in the string. Thus, representing sh prices from 0 to 1000 in Kir-
man and Vriend (2001b) would become dicult, or at least require implicit
knowledge about the domain to set up the classiers adequately.
The main contribution of the computational approach presented here
is the formulation of a learning model that covers simple as well as more
cognitive modes of learning. From a theoretical point of view, it should be
a mixed model. As a computer model, it should be valid in the sense of
reecting simple, but realistic decision making, and simple in the sense that
it focuses only on decision mechanisms in social and economic contexts. It
should therefore be more specic as a cognitive architecture, and have more
natural and broader representation features as LCS.
A simple framework covering these goals is readily available since the
early contributions to bounded rationality (Simon 1956a;b) and actually
has not changed substantially since then. This framework is based on the
following components:
CHAPTER 2. A COMPUTATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MODELLING
LEARNING 32
{ The set of behaviour alternatives A
{ The set of choice alternatives A0 for bounded rational or computa-
tionally less powerful individuals; this set may be only a subset of
A.
{ Possible future states S
{ Payos connected with S, represented as a function of S, V (s).
{ Probabilities for S. There is uncertainty which state occurs after a
particular behaviour, i.e. there may be more than one.
Bounded rational individuals do not typically know the mapping from be-
haviour alternatives A to future welfare V (s). A possible strategy to learn
about the occurrence and the desirability of these future states is accord-
ing to Simon: Start with a mapping of each action alternative a 2 A to
the whole set of S. Using a utility function such as V (s) 2 f 1; 0;+1g,
nd S 0  S such that (expected) V (s) = 1. Then gather information to
rene the mapping A ! S 0 (i.e., which actions lead to which result under
certain conditions) and search for feasible actions A0 2 A that map to S 0
(Simon 1956b). In other words, an agent's goal is to nd the states which
satisfy its needs, by exploring the state-action space by applying alternative
behaviours.
The translation of Simon's framework into an executable algorithm can
be captured best with the concept of mental models. A mental model is
an internal representation of an external reality. The agent builds it using
experience, its perception, and its problem-solving strategies. A mental
model contains minimal information, is unstable and subject to change and
used to take decisions in novel circumstances. A mental model must be
`runnable' and able to provide feedback on the results. Humans must be
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able to evaluate the results of actions or the consequences of a change of state
(Markham 1999). It is assumed that an agent is only interested in its own
welfare, and its goal is to nd suitable behaviour strategies that optimise
utility under dierent conditions. Information processing and memory are
costly, so that the internal model being built has to be minimal and ecient
with respect to the agent's welfare. The main principles an algorithm has
to account for can roughly be summarised as follows:
Evaluating cognitive cues In any state of the environment, the agent
must be able to choose an action. If low or even negative rewards are
experienced, the agent can attempt to apply a dierent action. If this fails
to improve the agent's welfare, this is a hint to pay attention to more cues
from the environment and distinguish better between situations.
Deciding what to know Paying attention to all cues is computation-
ally expensive and memory limited; humans must lter out certain aspects
of their perception in order to decide and act eectively. The agent has
to `decide what to know' (Rubinstein 1998). What information is useful
depends on how it helps to improve the agent's welfare. This can only be
tested by using the accessible information while acting. Since the usefulness
is unknown initially, the decision procedure can be seen as a search over all
possible state-action mappings. If the agent is satised with a mental model
containing a subset of these mappings, it might stop searching for a better
model or decrease its search intensity. As a rule of thumb the agent fol-
lows the most promising direction. If a certain conguration of mappings
increases welfare, it tries to improve this conguration, e.g. by specialising
the contained information.
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Updating a cognitive model If the environment changes, some aspects
of the internal model might become obsolete. The agent will then experience
a change in utility. In certain states, learning a new behaviour might be
sucient. However, it might also be that the representation of the state is
not accurate anymore (e.g. a new type of agent appears). In this case, the
representation has to be changed, e.g. by removing old representations and
start the search process anew for certain parts of the model.
A similar idea has been used in Giord (2005). In this model, agents
have limited information about future outcomes of opportunities (e.g. stock
returns), and have to decide whether to evaluate new, or to stick to old
behaviours (e.g. buying a new stock). Attention is a scarce resource, so
that evaluating alternatives becomes costly. It turns out that the higher
this cost is, the more `irrational' the behaviour; if cost is neglected, and
agents can spend more eort on evaluating future expected states, behaviour
approximates more rational decision-making.
2.4 The Algorithm
The basic idea of the `Bounded Rationality Algorithm' (BRA) is to build
an internal, exible model of the environment the agent lives in. The en-
vironment is accessible by the input state s dening the current `situation'
the agent is in. The input state is matched with an internal symbolic rep-
resentation Ci 2 C = fC1 : : : Cng of the state. The agent then chooses an
action according to the general form ri : Ci ! A. A is the action set, C
is the set of all possible conditions that can be generated from the input
dimensions, and Ci is a collection of conditions derived from C.
The next paragraphs develop the algorithm in detail.
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2.4.1 Reinforcement Learning
RL is used to implement the dynamic aspect of knowledge generation in the
model. In each state agents learn by trial and error which action to apply
in a given state. Successful actions are rewarded. Actions which yield a
higher reward are selected with a high probability in the future, whereas
bad actions, receiving a lower reward, are selected less often. The history
of these reinforcements is summarised as action strength q. Whenever an
action a has been applied, the strength is updated with the reward p(t)
observed for that action by the following equation (Sutton and Barto 1998):
q(at) = q(at 1) + (p(t)  q(at 1)) (2.9)
This action-value function updates the strength of the current action based
on the weight  of previous experiences and the current reward. It is a
method to approximate the true value of q(a) out of a sample of values.
The smaller , the stronger the impact of past experiences; conversely, for
 = 1 only the reward of the last action is considered, and all previous
experiences discarded. Thus  determines the speed of updates.
In the next step, the action probability is calculated according to the
selection function:
pr(ai;t+1) =
eq(ai)=P
j e
q(aj)=
(2.10)
This exponential selection function determines each action's selection prob-
ability depending on its own strength relative to the strengths of the alter-
native actions. The parameter  is a parameter that determines the rate of
exploration. The inuence of the action strength on the selection probabil-
ity decreases as  grows. For large , the selection probabilities approach
uniform values. Sutton and Barto (1998) report that for many problems,
 values of about 0.1 turned out to achieve a good balance between explo-
ration and exploitation of learnt behaviour. For many problems,  values
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approaching 1 translate into selection probabilities smaller than the original
action strengths, so that too large values quickly stop being useful for the
learner. Finally, as !1, each choice becomes equally likely.
2.4.2 State Space Partitioning
Learning by doing as described above happens for a given state s. This
section describes how states are represented and perceived in the agent's
internal world model.
Representation The state s is represented internally as a collection of
attributes fatt1 : : : attig. Each attribute can have a number of possible
values, for example nominal values such as `low' or `high', or numerical
ranges, e.g. 0-1000. Attributes are connected by simple predicate logic.
For example the predicate `(prot=low or prot=medium or prot=high)
and (sales 0 < sales < 1000)' could describe the situation of a rm in the
dimensions prot and sales. This representation is called a `state descriptor',
and formally denoted Ci. To each state descriptor actions are bound from
which the action policy for this state can be learnt. In the rm example,
actions could be an array of price levels. This binding constitutes formally
the mapping ri : Ci ! A.
The agent starts with a model covering all possible states. This ini-
tial model contains a root state description or a set of disjunct root state
descriptions; each root descriptor contains all attributes with their value
spaces relevant for this partition, thus the coarsest representation possi-
ble. In consecutive time steps, specialisations are developed stepwise by the
application of a heuristic search method. For this, the space of state descrip-
tions is represented as a tree, where nodes at higher levels contain coarser,
and nodes at a deeper level of the tree ner mappings. Finer grained descrip-
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tions are `expanded' from the predicates at higher levels. Coarser grained
descriptors can be generalised again if the more detailed descriptors do not
perform better than the parent. Which descriptions are expanded depends
on a heuristic evaluation function, which here is the agent's utility. Each
state descriptor has a value that describes this utility. The task of the search
process is thus to nd the level of detail that describes the environment in
such a way that generates the highest welfare for the agent.
Depth-rst search principle The path the expansion mechanism takes
follows a depth-rst search paradigm. If ner grained descriptions increase
welfare this path is followed further, that is, the mechanism assumes that
the most accurate state descriptions are best. Using a tree-search approach,
this corresponds to a process in which a single node on level h is expanded
to level h + 1 according to some performance criterion, while the siblings
on level h are not taken into account. The path this process takes is rep-
resented by the `search path'. Each node the process expands is added to
this path, and removed when it is generalised. The search path is thus
a list which contains all nodes of the tree that are relevant for the model
specialisation and generalisation methods. These methods are described in
the next paragraphs.
State expansion mechanism Before the internal model is updated, the
agent acts in its environment over a period . During this period, the value
of existing state descriptions R = fr1 : : : rng is updated using feedback from
the environment. After each  steps, the state expansion mechanism is ap-
plied: First the node rexpand with the highest value on the search path is
selected. If the search path is empty, a root node is selected. From there,
the next level of the tree is expanded by partitioning the value spaces of
the attributes constituting the conditions of rexpand. For attributes having
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discrete values, one value is picked randomly. Attribute values representing
numeric ranges are split in half. For each partitioned attribute a new con-
dition is created containing the partitioned attribute values or value range,
and the remaining original attribute values (i.e. the number of successor
nodes equals the number of attributes  2 in the original condition). The
conjunction of the predicates of the resulting level (after reduction) is equiv-
alent to the expression of the parent node. By mapping A to each newly
created condition set the new descriptors R0 are generated. The path from
each r0 2 R0 up to the root node is set as search path (without duplicates).
The conjunction of state descriptions with no children in the tree is then
equivalent to the initial state description. The RL mechanism selects ac-
tions only from the matching leaf descriptors. There might be, depending
on the paths that have been expanded, overlapping descriptors. In this
case, for deciding which state is activated some conict resolution has to be
applied. This could be the selection of random node, or the node with the
highest value. In the implementation used for the models of the thesis (see
also appendix A.2.3), a random node is selected.
For example, going back to the rm example above, of the initial, exhaus-
tive description C 0initial = (prot=low or prot=medium or prot=high) and
(0 < sales < 1000) the attribute prot is selected, and of its value range the
value `high'. The value space of the attribute is divided into the expression
`prot=low or prot=medium' and `prot=high', respectively. The result-
ing specialised state descriptions are C 01 = (prot=low or prot=medium)
and (0 < sales < 1000) and C 02= (prot=high) and (0 <sales < 1000).
Analogously, the sales attribute is split in two intervals and two successor
descriptors generated, so that four successor descriptors are created. Figure
2.1 depicts how a search path is generated by this process.
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Figure 2.1: The agent's representation of the state space after partitioning all
possible prot situations. Each state is described by a set of attributes and
an action set. Actions executed in this state are updated with strengths s and
selected with probabilities p, which are determined by rewards. The rewards also
determine the state value v.
Model specialisation and generalisation With the state expansion
mechanism it is possible to specialise the conditions in the state-action space
in many ways. A heuristic evaluation function determines the direction of
this process. This function is calculated as follows: First, the value of a
state at time t is calculated as
v(r; t) = v(r; t  1) + (q(at)  v(r; t  1)) (2.11)
where q(at) is the reward of the executed action in the state described by
r. The function approximates an average of the state description value; the
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speed of update is governed by the parameter  .
Before an expansion happens, some constraints have to be satised: The
parameter  limits the maximum number of nodes the tree can have, i.e.
the maximum number of situations the agent can dierentiate. New states
can only be evolved at the cost of `forgetting' other state descriptions (see
below for deletion). Furthermore, since the deletion of nodes might occur,
it is possible that state descriptions that were deleted are expanded again,
so that endless cycles of generalisation and specialisation occur. The right
balance has to be found depending on the stability of the environment;
preventing many visits of identical descriptions too early can be harmful if
the environment changes; on the other hand, the agent should be allowed not
to become trapped into useless expansion/retraction cycles. So to speak, the
agent is taught that constantly trying the same without eect is worthless.
To tune this balance, a function with a cost parameter ; 0 <   1 is used
to compute a value determining whether the successor description should be
developed or not: The better a state descriptor compared with the average
performance (measured by the average reward at time t, gt = (r(ai;t) gt 1)
y) and the smaller , the more frequent (recurrent) expansions beginning
from that state descriptor are allowed (equation (2.12)).
expand(r) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
true; if expansions(r) = 0 or
  expansions(r) g < v(r; t)
false; otherwise
(2.12)
A state description might lead to a good solution strategy, but if only
In the implementation used for the models of this thesis,  is xed at 0.5. Since v
represents a part of the environment, updates should be not too fast. The medium value
has been chosen as the norm; reasons for adjusting this value in simulations might be
given, but did not arise in this thesis.
yHere again, the update speed parameter  was set to 0.5 for the simulations in the
thesis. Since g is supposed to be a representative value of reasonably large sample, the
average value of the possible interval 0 : : : 1 has been chosen.
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rarely visited is of limited value (they only use up scarce memory space and
processing capabilities). Therefore, a heuristic function h used by the pro-
cess is the state-value weighted by the number of its activations to account
for the recency of the value:
h(r; t) = v(r; t)
activations(r)
t
(2.13)
The search process selects the node with the maximal heuristic h(r; t)
in the search path, if the expand condition is satised. In accordance with
depth-rst principle described above, the expandable set of nodes in the
search path are the leaf nodes. h(·) is only applied to those nodes.
Before new states are developed after  steps, the state descriptions of
the current level of the tree h may be deleted if they did not outperform
the value of their parent states (performance could be, e.g., the average
of the state description values). This is called rule generalisation. A rule
generalisation is the reversal of a ner grained state back to its original
parent state. Generalisations can thus only take place if at least one ex-
pansion has taken place, as the initial state is the all-encompassing state.
Analogously to rule specialisation, the generalisation process sets in after
a certain time . While  is a parameter, the dierence between  and 
should be reasonably large to allow some re-sampling the state values v(r; t)
of the parent node in case of a contraction. By this ne tuning feature, the
algorithm can correct a wrong search direction before deciding on the next
expansion at the higher level h   1. If the j   j is too small, cycles are
more likely: Since the parent node has had the largest value in the past,
the same `wrong' expansion will be made again if there are to few updates,
which possibly decrease the value to their current true value.
Figure 2.2 illustrates how the initial state is expanded and which states
are matched against s. For clarity, predicates are only indicated.
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Figure 2.2: Representation of the agent's search space at a particular time. Leaf
nodes are active nodes which are matched against s. The hashed nodes represent
the search path along which generalisation and specialisation takes place. P: : :
represent the predicates describing the state.
As an example of the specialisation and generalisation process, gure
2.3 shows a possible path of expansion and retraction of nodes. For clarity,
only the values of the nodes are depicted.
Avoiding local search optima The search process proceeds in a certain
direction. On its way down to more specialised descriptions, it becomes
dicult to revert it. Since the environment is dynamic the search path
may become suboptimal. There is no back-propagation of values, e.g. an
update of the successor states with a discounted value of the current state,
so that more general descriptions higher up in the tree or in other partially
developed paths can have higher, although outdated values. To leave a
certain path and develop dierent directions in the tree might be dicult;
in the worst case, the current deepest level might decrease in value, become
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Figure 2.3: Example of the agent's search space at particular time steps and
when nodes are specialised and generalised. The hatched nodes represent the
search path, the numbers describe the value of the state descriptions.
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deleted and developed again so that a circle develops. To get back to a
better expansion node can take a long time or even be almost impossible.
To prevent such situations, it is possible to switch the search path. Although
node values higher up in the tree might no longer be up-to date, the agent
uses these values as a hypothesis that they are more promising than the
current path. Switching happens with probability ; 0    1, in which
case the highest overall value in the tree is selected as the new expansion
point. The path from the root to this node becomes thereby the search
path.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the switching process. It shows that the result is
similar to generalisation and specialisation. The dierence is that the new
path was not reachable because the deepest leaf nodes have a higher value
than their (unchanged) parent. With the switching procedure, there is a
chance that this trap is left.
The complete algorithm is summarised in pseudo-code in the next sec-
tion.
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Figure 2.4: Illustration of how BRA avoid local search optima. The hatched
nodes represent the search path, the numbers describe the value of the state
descriptions.
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2.4.3 The Complete Algorithm
This section summarises the algorithm in pseudo-code.
Table 2.1: Summary of notation
Name Description Value range
 discount parameter for reward 0 : : : 1
 interval at which underperforming rules
can be deleted 0 : : : 
 interval at which new rules can generated 0 : : :1
 cost parameter determining the frequency
of re-exploring already visited paths 0 : : : 1
 maximum number of nodes 1 : : :1
 probability for switching the current search path 0 : : : 1
p payo (reward) 0 : : :1
gt average payo (reward) until time t 0 : : :1
A action set of actions a
qat strength of action a 2 A 0 : : :1
prai action selection probability of action ai 0 : : : 1
Ci conditions that can be generated from
input dimensions S
ri A state-action mapping Ci ! A
v(r; t) The state value function
h(r; t) = f(v(r; t)) The heuristic selection function
fSetup and Initialisationg
Dene the time discount for action updates 
Dene the update-cycle 
Dene the delete-cycle ;  < 
Dene the cost of expansion 
Dene the maximum number of states descriptions 
Dene the probability of switching the search path 
Dene the search path search path as a subset of R
Dene expansions(r) as a function counting the number of expansions
from r
Dene activations(r) as a function counting the times r matched a state
Dene parent(n) as the parent of a node n in the state-tree T (R)
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Dene children(n) as a function returning all children of a node n in
T (R)
Dene uniform(x : : : y) as a uniform random distribution in the interval
x : : : y
q(a) = 0;8a 2 A
C1  [ S
search path r1 : fC1 ! Ag
repeat
fReinforcement learningg
observe reward p(t  1) received after executing at 1
gt = gt 1 + 12(p(t)  gt 1)
q(at) q(at 1) + (p(t)  q(at 1))
v(r; t) v(r; t  1) + 1
2
(q(at)  v(r; t  1))
activations(r) activations(r) + 1
compute situation s [ S
nd the most specic mapping ra 2 search path matching s
prai;t+1  e
qaiP
j;j 6=i e
qaj ;8a 2 Ara
select action at from the resulting distribution and execute at
fState space partitioningg
fExpandg
if rest( t

) = 0 and jRj <  then
rexpand  maxh(r; t);8r 2 search path
if   gt  expansions(rexpand) < v(rexpand)) then
partition rexpand according to expansion mechanism into R
0  
fr00 : : : r0ng
initialise the value of the new states with v(rexpand;t)
append R0 as children of rexpand
add R0 to search path, remove siblings of R
expansions(rexpand) expansions(rexpand) + 1
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end if
end if
fDelete obsolete mappingsg
if rest( t

) = 0 then
fdetermine the most recent expanded mapping rexpanded and its
children CHg
CH  fch1; : : : chng  search path, children(chi) = ;
rexpanded  parent(chi)
if v(rexpanded; t) >
1
jCHj
jCHjX
i=0
v(chi) then
delete CH
end if
end if
fAvoid local search optimag
if uniform(0; 1) >  then
clear search path
rmax  max v(r; t);8r 2 R, children(r = ;)
add the path from r1 to rmax to search path
end if
until end of simulation
2.4.4 Compact Notation
After the various mechanisms have been described in detail, the following
conventions might be useful in describing the system in a more concise way:
An agent's state of mind is represented by a set of state-action mappings
R. There can be k distinct sets of state-action-mappings. Each state-action
mapping Rk  R consists of a symbolic representation of the state, denoted
by Ck. C is a simple propositional system L of formulae Z and logical
operators 
, Lk = L(Z;
), where a formula consists of terms (variables and
constants) and relational operators. The operation succ(Lk) partitions the
formulae in Lk intom subsets Lk(1 : : :m). By successive application of succ,
i new successors Ck can be generated, labelled Cki . The corresponding Lk is
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augmented by the index i to identify it uniquely: Cki := Lki . Denoting with l
the number of succ operations applied from the initial representation, from
each Cki;l=0 new symbolic representations can be generated until succ(Lki;l) =
;. The action set remains constant per k.
Denition 4. A complete state-action-mapping during the process of state-
space partitioning can shortly be described with Rki;l : C
k
i;l ! Ak. R denotes
the set of mappings, C the set of symbolic representations given by the sys-
tem L, and A the action set. There are k distinct sets of mappings. i denotes
the i-th representation generated by the application of operation succ(Lki ) at
the l-th level of successors of the root representation Ck0;0.
For example: Omitting the index k for k = 1, the variables and constants
fa; b; 0; 1000g and operators f<;>g make up the set Z : f0 < a < 1000; 0 <
b < 1000g of formulae in L0;0. The logical connective ^ denes the set

. Thus C0;0 : L0;0 = (0 < a < 1000) ^ (0 < b < 1000) for the initial
symbolic representation. The full mapping is described by R0;0 : C0;0 !
faction1; action2g
succ(L0;0) is given by
L1;1 = (0 < a < 500) ^ (0 < b < 1000)
L1;2 = (0 < a < 1000) ^ (0 < b < 500)
L1;3 = (500 < a < 1000) ^ (0 < b < 1000)
L1;4 = (0 < a < 1000) ^ (500 < b < 1000)
A corresponding successor representation would be denoted is simply
C1;1 : L1;1, and the mapping written shorthand asR1;1 : C1;1 ! faction1; action2g.
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This denition will be useful in the following sections and chapters to
describe in a compact way the dierent modes of reasoning that can be
implemented with the algorithm.
2.5 Relation to Existing Approaches
To conclude the formal section, BRA is briey compared put into context
with the existing models and methods given in section 2.2.
BRA attempts to provide a mixed approach to learning by combining
cognitive aspects (rule extraction) and learning by experience. With respect
to the game theory literature, models discussed as mixed models are most
closely related. In detail:
{ BRA uses the concept of state-space partitioning to balance experi-
mentation and habitualisation. In new situations, agents nd out by
trial-and-error situational adequate behaviour (if it exists). For known
situations, behaviour can become very stable. This is similar to CBR.
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996) nd that rules that experiment in un-
known cases and tend to habitual repetition in well-known situations
are most ecient.
{ The update rule in BRA approaches the average reward; a discount
parameter determines the speed of this approximation. This can be
interpreted as calculating the expected payo, and is thus similar to
the rules used by PA, or in the experiments of Mookherjee and Sopher
(Mookherjee and Sopher 1994; 1997).
{ Most simple RL and mixed models discussed in this chapter are explic-
itly designed for (behavioural) game theory. As a computer algorithm,
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BRA is more general (rather a framework), and can be applied to any
sort of model.
As a computational method, BRA is closely related to CLARION and
LCS. As in CLARION and LCS, RL is the most important aspect for gener-
ating action-centred knowledge. Dierences exist in the way such knowledge
is used to build the internal models of the environment:
{ BRA does not start with a psychological model of skill acquisition
as CLARION or no explicit model at all as machine learning, but a
sociopsychological model of bounded rationality.
{ BRA uses a pure symbolic representation of conditions with simple
rst- order predicate logic. CLARION has to transform them in a
network structure, LCS in binary strings.
{ CLARION modies rules only after evaluation of bottom level actions;
ACS compares prediction errors. BRA is much less sophisticated here,
using a simple generate-and-test procedure to decide whether a rule
should be specialised or generalised. If the test phase fails (possibly
only after a long time when the environment changes), the generated
rule is deleted again. CLARION as well as ACS keep detailed statistics
and perform complex estimations to decide about generalisation and
specialisation of specic rules.
{ BRA starts with a state description covering all possible states and
builds a model by searching heuristically through the space of these
state descriptions that can be expanded logically from the initial de-
scriptor. In CLARION as well as ACS, it is not necessary to describe
the state space fully. If new states are encountered, new rules are
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created on the y. BRA is thus much more sensitive to characteristics
of the state space. For example, for state variables with large value
spaces, specialised rules would be discovered only at later stages of
the state expansion mechanism. Even if ne-grained dierentiation is
useful, they might never be developed because descriptions generated
on the path might not be immediately more successful than more gen-
eral rules, so that the path is not further explored. However, BRA
could be extended to cover initially only a small range of conditions,
adding new attribute values dynamically as they appear in s.
2.6 An Example
To demonstrate the principle, a simple bargaining game was simulated using
the algorithm. The idea of bargaining games is that two players have to
agree on a share after a nite number of oerings. If haggling takes too long,
both players get nothing. A simplied version of such games with discrete
shares is simulated here. In the game, agents can demand a low, medium
or high share of a good. Table 2.2 shows the payos. This distribution
of payos leads to situation where demanding a low share guarantees a
certain, but low payo, while demanding a high share may yield a higher,
but uncertain payo.
In the rst simulation, there are N + 1 agents: N=2 agents always de-
mand the highest share, N=2 always the lowest. One agent has no prede-
ned strategy, but learns what share to demand from encounters with other
players. Agents demanding a low share are green, agents demanding a high
share are blue. Each time step, agents are paired randomly and play their
strategy. With each encounter the learner is told which colour the opponent
has. The agent can then use this information to build the state-action tree.
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low medium high
low 0.3 (0.3) 0.3 (0.5) 0.3 (1)
medium 0.5 (0.3) 0.5 (0.5) 0,(1)
high 1,(0.3) 0,(0) 0,(0)
Table 2.2: Payos of the demand game. The rst number in a cell is the payo
of the row player, the second number the payo of the column player.
In the second simulation, strategies are assigned randomly to the green and
blue agents. Simulations were run with N = 10 (i.e. the learner encoun-
tered with equal probability a green or blue agent) for 1000 steps. The
model parameters were set at  = 1,  = 0:4,  = 0:3,  = 25,  = 19. The
parameter  is not of interest here, because the question is which categories
do emerge; any restriction would be counterproductive. So,  is set to the
arbitrary high value 100.  is set to 1 to speed up learning since the en-
vironment is deterministic;  = 0:4,  = 0:3 are set to moderate values to
prevent excessive switching and cycling but still avoiding traps.
The aim of this simulation is to demonstrate the working of the algo-
rithm, not to explain bargaining behaviour. Therefore, only the evolution
of the state tree of the learner is analysed.
Figure 2.5 shows the result of the tree-building process: The agent has
learnt that it is benecial to distinguish between the colours of opponents.
When it meets green agents, it demands over 80 % of the time a high share
of the good, while it demands a low share if blue agents are encountered.
The process thus converges to the optimal solution; in most encounters with
each type of agent, the maximum payo is obtained. With only two possible
states, this distinction is easy to learn, and consequently discovered early
in the simulation. This is shown by the activation frequency of the state
descriptors: In just about 50 steps out of 1000 the initial state description
'opponent is blue or opponent is green' is used. The deeper levels 'colour is
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Figure 2.5: BRA example 1. Colours correspond to actual strategies of the
agents. The values are fractions of total activations of actions and encounters of
state descriptions, respectively.
Figure 2.6: BRA example 2. Colours are assigned randomly to strategy types.
The values are fractions of total activations of actions, and encounters of state
descriptions, respectively.
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blue' and 'colour is green' is expanded quickly and remains stable.
Figure 2.6 shows the result if the colours are assigned randomly: Since
there is nothing to gain from a distinction of colours, the agent does not pay
attention to this attribute. As a result, the agent demands the low share
irrespective of the other player's colour 80% of the time. Furthermore, the
most frequent state description is the initial state with no dierentiation
between colours. Thus, the process converges to the dominant strategy.
Because it is impossible to use colour as an indicator for the opponent's ex-
pected strategy, the learner chooses the action that yields always a positive
payo.
2.7 Conclusion and Outlook
In this chapter, an algorithm aiming to replicate simple decision processes of
bounded rational actors has been described, formalised and demonstrated.
BRA contributes to reinforcement learning in social simulation and com-
bines elements of approaches already used by CLARION and learning clas-
sier systems. However, it is dierent from these approaches as it is less
general than a cognitive architecture and explicitly built upon a sociopsy-
chological concept of learning. In that sense, the contribution is not the
provision of a better or more ecient problem solution method than, e.g.,
classier systems. On the contrary, it allows to add cognitive limitations
and human mistakes to a learning agent. For an appropriate representation
of human learning, BRA can, thus, deliberately be suboptimal (if required).
Problem solving methods, however, are typically designed to be ecient. A
major dierence and advantage to existing learning approaches is further-
more the use of symbolic state representations. This makes a model more
tractable than, e.g., a binary string representation or neural network. It
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becomes possible to look into the agent's `mind' and understand its mental
model. By the same means, BRA can also cover more abstract concepts in
an intuitive way.
The motivation of the example simulations was to assess the perfor-
mance of the algorithm from a perspective of verication. Being a simple
simulation, it was straightforward to verify that the algorithm performed
as specied in simple settings. Agents learnt to distinguish simple features
in the environment.
BRA is a very general way of representing learning. It attempts to
represent learning and bounded rationality in a more realistic way - neither
too `simple' (pure stimulus-response), nor too `rational' (full information
and deliberation). The solution in BRA is to combine a rule-based with
an RL-based approach. Being a framework, BRA allows the specication
of dierent learning models. More precisely, the following typical learning
cases in ACE scenarios can be represented:
1. Dynamic CBR: The agent learns to behave habitually depending on
the situation, without having full knowledge of all possible situations.
This is the most general case described by the previous sections, and
was demonstrated in the example. More formally, this case can be
described with k  1,
nT
k=1
Lkl = ;, jAkj > 1, and succ(Lki ) 6= ;. For
example C10;0 = (0 < a < 1000), A
1 = fx; yg, C20;0 = (0 < b < 1000),
A2 = fx; y; zg.
2. Static CBR: The agent does not learn rules, but simply learns to
behave habitually for a set of given situations. This case can be de-
scribed with k  1, jAkj > 1,
nT
k=1
Lkl = ; for k > 1 and succ(Lki ) = ;.
It describes a simple CBR agent who learns optimal actions for a num-
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ber of xed situations. The dierence to the previous case is that the
successor operation returns an empty set of symbols (i.e. `nothing').
3. Pure RL: This case is given by further simplication of CBR (2): k =
1, jAkj > 1, L00 = ;. There is only one situation, which is described
by an empty condition. The agent becomes a simple reinforcement
learner like those described in the game theory literature review.
4. Combining CBR and LCS: It is possible to combine the case-based
approach of BRA with the classier idea used in LCS. This can be
described with k  1, jAkj = 1 and
nT
k=1
Lkl 6= ;. succ may be empty
or non-empty. For example C10;0 = (0 < a < 1000), A
1 = fxg,
C20;0 = (0 < a < 1000), A
2 = fyg. Here, several mappings `compete'
to become the current node from which the single action is selected.
Initially, the competing mappings are likely to become activated with
similar probability (by cycles of generating, testing and deletion of
paths). Once true values of the state-descriptors are approached, the
agent should eventually apply some rules with higher probability even
if the conditions are overlapping. This type of learning is basically a
dierent form of representing case (1) - instead of deciding between
action x and y using RL, the state value is used as the decision crite-
rion.
5. Fully deterministic: A BRA agent can become fully deterministic by
allowing only one condition and one rule per k. In this case, k  1,
jAkj = 1,
nT
k=1
Lk0 = ; and succ(Lk0) = ;.
Being a congurable computer simulation framework, the features of the
algorithm always depend on the concrete problem modelled. The remaining
chapters 3, 4 and 5 are applications of this framework. More specically,
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cases (1), (2) and (3) are represented. Case (4) is, in principle, a dierent
form of case (2) and not further treated. Also, case (5) is not treated since
it is not interesting for most models of human behaviour, but belongs to a
very subconscious mode of learning where nothing about the environment
is known or perceived. In detail, the chapter represent the cases in the
following way:
{ The statistical discrimination model in chapter 3 is a representative
of case (1). The model variants treated have a two-dimensional state
space (test results and colours of workers). BRA works on these di-
mensions, expanding further state descriptions and learns the respec-
tive action policies.
{ In chapter 4, a simple RL model of network formation is presented,
implementing case (2). The cases are given by the player names in
the simulations. Learning takes place only in the form of RL; there
is no expansion. However, a simple reference model representing case
(1) is compared with the simple RL version.
{ In chapter 5, learning is further simplied, representing case (3): Pa-
tients choose between doctors; no additional cases are needed. From
an implementation point of view, RL is realised as case (2) with a sin-
gle condition - if a consumer is ill he becomes a patient; as a patient
he chooses a doctor. To represent this binary choice, a condition is
checked in the rule system of the agent before executing the behaviour.
Chapter 3
Statistical Discrimination
3.1 Introduction
Discrimination is the disadvantageous treatment of individuals based solely
on their membership of a certain group such as race, age or gender. Eco-
nomic discrimination occurs in dierent domains, e.g., in the housing, in-
surance or labour market. For example, insurance premiums frequently
dier among age groups or gender. Women or migrants more often work in
jobs below their actual qualication as comparably qualied white males.
In labour economics, one speaks of discrimination if members of a certain
group who have the same abilities and skills as other groups `are accorded
inferior treatment with respect to hiring, occupational access, promotion,
wage rate, or working conditions' (McConnel et al 2006; p.428). Typical
forms of discrimination in labour markets are: wage discrimination, where
the disadvantaged group receives a lower wage; employment discrimination,
where the disadvantaged group is more likely to unemployed; job discrimi-
nation where certain groups are restricted from entering certain occupations
irrespective of ability; and human capital discrimination, meaning that the
disadvantaged group has less access to productivity-increasing opportunities
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such as schooling or vocational training (McConnel et al 2006; p.428).
In Economics, Becker (1957) rst brought forward a theory of discrimi-
nation, which was based solely on preference. He dened employer discrim-
ination as a situation in which employers are prejudiced against a certain
group and prefer to employ members of group A but not members of the
prejudiced group B (the distinction of A for the advantaged and B for the
disadvantaged group will be kept for the remainder of this section). This
taste is assigned a monetary value. The strength of this value is called
discrimination coecient d. Employers maximise a utility function that is
the sum of prots plus the value of employing members of the particular
groups. Prejudiced employers want to hire B workers at a wage rate of
wB. B workers are hired only if their wage is lower to compensate for the
discrimination coecient, thus wA = wB + d. If the aggregate coecient
d0 in the market is suciently large, this will create a wage gap between A
and B workers as long as labour supply exceeds demand. The model im-
plies that biased employers earn less due to their preferences, as unbiased
rms can hire more B workers with equal skills at the lower wage. In the
long run, this would eliminate the wage gap, because the number of more
protable, non-discriminatory employers will increase to the point where
B workers do not have to work for discriminating employers. In reality,
however, dierences in wages between groups have mostly persisted.
In the theory of statistical discrimination, on the other hand, inequality
between groups arises endogenously. The reason for discriminatory treat-
ment is based on believed or actual average dierences between groups. The
average characteristic is then ascribed to individual members of each group.
When members of the disadvantaged group realise these beliefs and expect
to be treated negatively, they may actually adopt this behaviour, which
reinforces existing stereotypes.
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There are two broad directions of statistical discrimination models. Phelps
(1972) and related approaches build models based on exogenously imposed
dierences. The basis of such models are two groups of workers and employ-
ers who observe skills only as a noisy signal, e.g. by using an employment
test. Skill and signal are jointly normally distributed. The noisier the sig-
nal, a worker's productivity is on average close to the group average. If the
signal is precise, it predicts productivity well. Discriminatory outcomes can
be generated in basically two ways: Either each group's signal is equally in-
formative, but productivity is dierent. In this case, one group will receive
lower wages as employers expect productivity to be lower. In the other case
skills are distributed evenly, but signals are dierently informative. Work-
ers belonging to the group with the more informative signal receive higher
wages than workers with the same skill belonging to the group with worse
signals.
At the same time, Arrow (1973) proposed a model in which initially
identical groups can evolve into groups with dierent productivity due to
co-evolving stereotypes on the employer side. In the model, workers invest
in human capital conditional on the expected wage. Employers pay a wage
depending on the skills of the worker, which they observe perfectly after
their hiring. Discrimination can exist if employers expect the skill level of
group B to be lower than that of group A. This reinforces wage expectations
of the workers of the respective groups. If investing in human capital is not
worth the eort for group B, the beliefs of the employers are reinforced,
leading to a self-fullling prophecy. The result is an equilibrium in which
one group does not invest and will consequently be assigned the less well-
paid jobs. Coate and Loury (1993) extend this model by making the ex-post
skill observation uncertain, which adds higher uncertainty with respect to
the observability of workers' actual skill.
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Coate and Loury (1993) is the basis for many models, including dynamic
approaches and laboratory experiments. Also the model developed in this
chapter is based on it and will therefore be described in detail in section
3.2.
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a dynamic model of statistical
discrimination in labour markets using BRA as the learning method. There
already some dynamic models (e.g. Blume 2006); however they use belief
learning methods. Furthermore, the chapter also aims to reproduce the
experimental results of Fryer Jr. et al (2005). Using an agent-based model
has the advantage that not only the aggregate results, but also individual
behaviour can be compared. The research question thus becomes whether
and under which conditions statistical discrimination can emerge in an RL
model, and whether these mechanisms reect actual human behaviour.
The outline is as follows: In section 3.2 the theoretical literature is dis-
cussed in some detail and in section 3.3 the experimental literature. Empha-
sis is put on the central approaches: The model of Coate and Loury (1993)
(CL); and the laboratory experiment of Fryer Jr. et al (2005), which is
based on CL. The RL model is described in section 3.4, which takes the ex-
periment as the starting point for its specication. The model is calibrated
for the learning and choice parameters of BRA in section 3.5.1. Then, sim-
ulations are run and the dynamics of statistical discrimination analysed in
more detail in sections 3.5.2 and .
3.2 Models of Statistical Discrimination
In this section the central approaches of statistical discrimination are dis-
cussed. For a more complete, recent review, see Fang and Moro (2011).
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In the seminal model of Arrow (1973) groups are ex ante identical; actual
dierences between groups are derived endogenously. In the model, rms
oer two types of jobs, skilled and unskilled. Firms have a production
function f(Lu; Ls), where Ls stands for skilled and Lu for unskilled labour.
Unskilled workers receive a wage of wu = f1(Ls; Lu) and skilled workers a
wage of ws = f2(Ls; Lu), where f1 and f2 denote the rst derivative of the
rst and second arguments of f . Skills are acquired through investment at
cost c, which is distributed according to a distribution function G(·), which
is independent of worker colour.
The proportion of skilled A workers A and skilled B workers B is de-
termined by the following process: If a worker is assigned to an unskilled
job, he receives wu, if he is assigned to the skilled group he gets ws, inde-
pendent of the colour. The rm conducts a test which determines the skill
with certainty. If the worker belongs to the skilled group j, j 2 fA;Bg, the
employer pays a wage > 0 and 0 otherwise. For this test, the rm must pay
a cost r. Arrow claims that competition among rms results in zero prots,
so that r can be written as
r = A[f1(Ls; Lu)  wA];
r = B[f1(Ls; Lu)  wB]:
This implies that
wA =
B
A
wB + 1 

B
A
f1(Ls; Lu)

:
Thus, if B < A then wB < wA, and the resulting segregation between low-
and high-skilled jobs can be explained by beliefs instead of preferences.
In equilibrium, the fractions A and B might dier. Workers invest in
skills only if the expected gain exceeds the costs. The gains are given by
wj wu for group j workers. The proportion of skilled workers is G(wj wu),
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that is the fraction of workers whose investment cost is lower than the wage
gain.
Equilibrium is given by
j = G(wj(A; B)  wu); j 2 A;B:
While in the symmetric equilibrium A = B, in the asymmetric A 6= B.
In a situation where most workers of a group invest little, the rms will
perceive the group on average as lower-skilled and assign the unskilled job
to members of that group. This in turn provides little incentive for the
workers to invest in the future, decreasing the average skill of the group.
By this mechanism, self-fullling prophecies become possible: Because B
workers are believed to be not qualied, they invest less so that in the end
B workers are indeed less qualied.
The most important dierence in Coate and Loury (1993)'s model is that
wages are xed, and that worker skills are not perfectly observable. In the
model, rms assign workers of type A and B either to a simple task for
which no qualication is required, or a complex task which requires a skill.
The wage for the complex task is w, while the wage for the simple task is
0. The rm's return x depends on which task was assigned and the actual
qualication: If the worker is qualied and the task complex, the return is
xq > 0; if the worker is not qualied and the task complex, the return is
 xu. If the task is simple, the return is always 0. Workers decide ex-ante
whether to invest in a skill or not. The skill investment cost c is distributed
heterogeneous across workers according to a cumulative distribution func-
tion G(·). This function is independent of the worker group. G(c) is the
fraction of workers with investment costs not greater than c. Firms observe
a noisy signal  of a worker's qualication. The signal is drawn from a
uniform interval according to a probability distribution function fq() if the
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worker is qualied, and fu() is the worker is not qualied. fq and fu are
assumed to satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property that l()  fq()
fu()
is strictly increasing and continuous in . This implies that workers who
invested in skills are more likely to receive a positive signal, and that the
ex-post probability that a worker was qualied is also increasing in .
The game has three stages. In stage 1, nature draws workers' types and
investment cost c. In stage 2, workers make their investment decision given
c. As signal  2 [0; 1], the rms observe a test result which is drawn from
the probability distribution functions fu or fq, respectively. In stage 3, rms
decide whether to assign workers to the complex or simple task.
A rm will hire a worker only if it believes the worker is qualied. Since
the signal is noisy and the probability of being qualied is increasing in ,
a suitable hiring strategy is to set a threshold standard. Workers achieving
the standard are assigned to the qualied task, workers who fail to achieve
this threshold value are assigned to the unqualied task. More specically,
the posterior probability (; ) that a worker is qualied is given by:
(; ) =
fq()
fq() + (1  )fu() =
1
1 +

1 )


fu()
fq()
The expected payo is (; )xq (1 (; ))xu. The best policy is to assign
the worker to the complex task only if xq=xu  (1  (; )) = ((; )),
which is equivalent to xq=xu  (1  =) (fu()=fq()). The threshold s()
is given by
s() = minf 2 [0; 1]jxq
xu


1  


fu()
fq()
g:
Employers set the standard sj = s
(j); j 2 A;B, before observing the
actual signal. More optimistic beliefs will lead to lower standards, more
pessimistic beliefs to higher. Thus, if a group is believed to be less qualied,
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investing workers from that group are less likely to get a signal exceeding
s.
Rational workers invest only if the cost does not exceed the expected
benet. The expected benet depends on the probability that the worker
gets the qualied job, which in turn depends on the standard s, and the
gross return from the wage of this job. The probability of getting assigned
to the qualied job is 1   Fq(s) if the worker invested, and 1   Fu(s) if
not. The expected benet can then be dened as (s) = ! (Fu(s)  Fq(s)),
where ! is the gross return from being assigned to the complex task. Thus,
the worker invests only if c  (s). The fraction of workers that become
qualied is G((s)). (s) is a single-peaked function of s, increasing when-
ever fu(s)=fq(s) > 1, and decreasing if fu(s)=fq(s) < 1, which reects the
monotone-likelihood property. There is little incentive to invest if standards
are very high or very low. Either the chance to get the qualied job is always
high independent of investment behaviour, or too small to make investment
benecial.
In equilibrium, employers choose standards that induce workers to be-
come qualied at the rate postulated by the beliefs. Formally:
j = G((s
(j))); j 2 fA;Bg (3.1)
A discriminatory equilibrium can exist whenever equation 3.1 has mul-
tiple solutions. Employers may have the belief that a group is less qualied
than the other and consequently, will set higher standards for this group. As
this lowers the incentive to invest, the outcome is a self-fullling prophecy.
Figure 3.1 shows the equilibrium graphically. Coate and Loury (1993)
note that not all solutions of equation 3.1 are locally stable under the im-
plicit adjustment process t+1 = G((s(tt)). An initial belief close to 
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium in Coate and Loury's statistical discrimination model.
The x-axis represents the assignment standards s that need to be fullled to be
assigned to the qualied task, on the y-axis,  measures the belief how many
workers invest in skills. WW depicts pairs of standards and proportions of a
group investing consistent with optimal worker behaviour (the graph f(s; )j =
G((s))g). EE depicts the standard-belief pairs consistent with optimal employer
behaviour (the graph f(s; )js = s  ()g). A point s and  that lies on both
curves solves equation 3.1.
converges only to  if the slope of the EE curve exceeds that of WW at .
An unstable self-conrming belief is not robust to small errors in employers'
perceptions, as the resulting standards will not induce workers to engage
into the 'required' investment behaviour.
Coate and Loury (1993) analyse the implications of this model with
respect to the question whether discriminatory equilibria can be changed
by imposing hiring quotas. They show that there are conditions under
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which negative stereotypes can be eliminated. The idea is that in a non-
discriminatory equilibrium, an employer assigns the complex task to a ran-
domly selected worker with equal probability. This equality is achieved
via an adjustment process of the assignment thresholds sj; j 2 A;B that
changes the skill investment incentives of both groups. For qualied workers
it becomes more dicult to get assigned to the complex task, while unquali-
ed workers are motivated to increase their skills. Note that in the resulting
equilibrium sA must not necessarily be sB; the concrete value depends on
the initial discriminatory equilibrium. CL illustrate how this process works
by the following example: Consider a situation where the employment test
can take three outcomes: A pass result, a fail result, and an unclear re-
sult. The unclear result corresponds to a signal which can originate both
from investing and not-investing workers. Without armative action, rms
assign with probability 1 workers with bad test results to the unqualied
task, and workers with a good result with probability 1 to the qualied
task. If the result is unclear, rms can either follow a liberal or conservative
strategy. Under the liberal strategy, workers are assigned to the complex
task, under the conservative strategy to the simple task. Without interven-
tion, the expected return from the liberal strategy must be large enough to
assign the qualied task. If B workers coordinate on the conservative equi-
librium because employers have low expectations about B productivity, and
A analogously on the liberal equilibrium because of higher expectations, the
outcome is discriminatory. If a quota is introduced in such a state, the em-
ployer must decide whether to assign more B workers, possibly with a bad
test result, to the complex task, or more A workers with ambiguous results
to the simple task. If the expected loss of assigning qualied workers to
unqualied jobs is greater than the expected gain from assigning unquali-
ed workers to the complex task, the rms will assign all B workers with
unclear results, and a fraction of B workers with failed tests to the complex
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task, until the employment quota requirement is achieved. The employ-
ers thus patronise B workers because the assign them the skilled jobs even
though they failed the test. As a consequence, the investment incentives
for B workers might be lower as for A workers. Employers continue to view
members of group B as less qualied.
Most models of statistical discrimination are static models and state only
that discriminatory equilibria might exist. However, how discrimination
comes about is not considered and usually attributed to historical circum-
stances. Only some dynamic models exist, of which the Blume (2006)'s is
described in some detail in what follows.
Blume (2006) considers a stochastic model using ideas from evolutionary
game theory based on the CL model. There are three types of workers: The
common type c can acquire skills at cost c > 0; workers of type 0 have no
cost of investment; and an 'unteachable' type 1 with innite investment
costs. The total number of workers is xed at M , but the size of each
subgroup may vary. A worker is of type 0 with probability 0, type1 with
probability 1, and of type c with probability 1  0   1. 0 and 1 are
small. The skill level of the common type is endogenous, while the level of
groups 0 and 1 is xed at the beginning (always/never skilled). Workers
believe to get a skilled job with probability . On the employer side, there
are two types of rms. Both types value unskilled workers with 0. Type
 rms value a skilled worker at  > 0, type  rms with  > 0. The
probability that a rm is of type  is . The cost of hiring an unskilled
worker is  > 0.
Workers have no opportunity to signal their skill; group membership is
the only marker. Employers have a common expectation  that a worker is
skilled. In each discrete time step, one employer is matched with a worker.
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The probability that this happens is given by q = minfN=M; 1g. The wage
rate for skilled workers is xed at w; costs are c < w <  . If a skilled worker
is matched with a rm, he earns w; a worker who is not oered a job goes
to the unskilled labour market and earns 0.
In equilibrium, workers maximise their expected return with respect to
skill acquisition. Firms maximise their prots depending on the expecta-
tions about the skill level of the labour force. Type  rms hire a worker
only if expected prots are not negative:
   (w + (1  ))  0
The reservation belief  that a worker is skilled is given by:  = 
+ w ;
this value makes the rm indierent about hiring or not. It is assumed for
 -rms that ((1  0) + 0w)=0 > 0, which implies  > 0. Similarly, for
type- rms ((1  0) + 0w)=0 < . From this follows that type  rms
will always hire a worker from the disadvantaged group. Whether type 
rms do so, depends upon its beliefs.
Type c workers believe with probability  that they will be oered a job,
so that the return to skill investment is w   c. The reservation belief at
which c workers are indierent whether to acquire skills or not is given by:
vw   c = 0
The equilibrium is determined by two probabilities: f , the probability that
a type  rm oers a worker a job, and w, the probability that a type c
workers acquires skills. Thus, equilibrium is a pair f ; w such that
1. f maximises f (   w   (1  ))
2. w maximises w(vw   c)
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3.  = 0 + (1  1)w
4.  = (1  )qf = q
Hence, analogously to CL, the beliefs  and  determine the equilibrium.
Two possible pure equilibria exist: First, full-employment exists when all
workers who can acquire jobs are oered skilled jobs (f = 1; w = 1;  =
1;  = q). An underemployment equilibrium is given if type c workers choose
not to acquire skills, and only type  rms oer jobs (f = 0; w = 0;  =
0;  = q). In the full-employment state, all workers nd a job, even the
unteachable ones; in the under-employment state, only the workers with
zero investment costs get a job. Statistical discrimination exists if both
full- and underemployment pure equilibria exist. This happens if q < 
assuming that  > w > c; vu < q; 0 <  < 1   1. Similarly, if  < q
then the only pure equilibrium is the full-employment state. The typical
case is 0 < 
 < 1   1, as the fractions 0 and 1 are assumed to be
small. This is the basis for the dynamic analysis which is described next.
In the dynamic perspective, I workers enter the labour market at each
discrete timestep t. A worker's lifetime has two periods. In the rst period
at t, they acquire skills. In the second period at t+1 they are matched with
an employer. Employers hire workers according to their beliefs. Of the M
workers at time t, Kt will receive jobs, and Jt of the workers with jobs have
in fact skills. Normalising these numbers as fractions denes kt = Kt=M and
jt = Jt=M . From the fractions jt and kt rms and all workers update their
beliefs to t+1 and t+1. All knowledge is public. The newly arrived workers
at t = 1 make then their skill investment decision based on t+1. Since all
information is public, workers can predict rms' expectations accurately,
so that vt+1 = q if t+1  , or t+1 = q otherwise. If t   then
only type- rms oer jobs, resulting in the underemployment equilibrium
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(beliefs in the `low regime'). If beliefs are t  , the full-employment
equilibrium results (beliefs are in the `high regime').
The market outcome jt; kt is the result of the belief formation in the
preceding time steps. The stochastic process (jt; kt)
1
t=0 thus describes the
evolution of the market outcomes. The learning procedure based on public
information described above makes the process Markovian with two tran-
sition regimes. The probability that t+1 is in low regime depends on the
joint distribution of jt and kt. Blume shows that there are only two such
distributions, leading either the to the high or the low regime. Analysing
the long run behaviour reveals that for most parameter values the process
remains in one of the two regimes most of the time. More specically, the
parameters  and  determine equilibrium selection. As  ! 1 and  ! 1
the probability of the high regime goes to 1, and vice versa. As the size of
the market grows, the process is more likely to remain in one of the two
states permanently.
Blume (2006) discusses a number of policy implications. For example,
imposing a hiring quota has the eect of raising , the probability of being
hired in the low regime. If this change is large enough, the underemployment
equilibrium will disappear. However, also the opposite might happen, and
the probability of the high regime fall to 0: With higher  more workers'
true skills are observed, which makes it more dicult to transit from the
low-regime if the skill level is low. This is the same conclusion as in Coate
and Loury (1993), but there the reason was too low incentives to become
qualied; here the reason lies in employers' learning abilities.
Levin (2009) presents a similar stochastic model. The main dierence is
that time is continuous with workers arriving at a constant ow rate. In the
model, employers observe the noisy test signal 'Good' or 'Bad'. As in the
CHAPTER 3. STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION 73
preceding models, workers invest only if expected returns exceed a certain
threshold. The process depends on the probability  of receiving a positive
signal. As this probability increases, the process moves to a high regime.
Steady states with discriminatory equilibria may evolve. Levin (2009) shows
that even if  increases for the disadvantaged group, this may still not result
in higher investment so that negative expectations and discrimination will
persist. He also shows that not any increase in  by, e.g., better access
to resources shifts the equilibrium to high state, but only changes that are
large enough.
The purpose of this short review was to discuss the major models of
statistical discrimination, looking at the dynamics where possible. These
concepts provide the basis of the RL model presented in section 3.4. The
main features of these models are:
{ Discriminatory equilibria can exist if the beliefs of both employers and
workers are mutually reinforced.
{ Whether a group invests or not depends on employers' beliefs and the
probability  of a positive test result.
{ Once discrimination exists, it might take strong interventions to shift
the equilibrium from an under-employment state to a full-employment
state.
Further extensions of CL or alternative models are not further treated here.
For reviews see, e.g., Fang and Moro (2011) or Altonji and Blank (1999).
Before presenting the RL model, the next sections looks at statistical dis-
crimination experiments.
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3.3 Experiments with Statistical Discrimina-
tion
Statistical discrimination has been tested in a series of experiments. Before
discussing the experiment of Fryer Jr. et al (2005) in detail, some earlier
experiments are summarised based on the review of Anderson et al (2005).
Davis (1987) studied an experimental labour market in which worker
groups were of dierent size. If more observations can be drawn from one
group, then it is more likely to produce a higher maximum observation.
If employers focus on this higher draw, this may result in a bias towards
the larger group. In the experiment, the employer group was in the rst
period confronted with 80 % of draws from the majority population, in the
second they chose themselves how intensively the respective groups should
be sampled. Still, 60 % of the employers sampled the majority group,
pointing to a mechanism with which a bias towards one group might arise
simply induced by population properties (Anderson et al 2005; p.105).
In the experiment of Anderson and Haupert (1999), workers were divided
into green and yellow groups. The productivity of each worker in each
group was assigned exogenously. Before making a decision, employers could
interview the workers at a certain cost. Anderson and Haupert (1999)
observed that in markets with lower average productivity of one colour,
employers tended to hire fewer workers of that group. They claim that in
the absence of an interview, employers focus on the population average.
This is supported by the fact that employment levels rose after the cost of
interviewing was reduced (Anderson et al 2005; p.106)
Whereas in the previous experiments dierences were exogenous, Fryer Jr.
et al (2005) conducted a classroom experiment where productivity and hir-
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ing decision could evolve simultaneously as in the model of Coate and Loury
(1993).
The experiment is set up as follows: Half of the players are employers,
the other workers. Half of the workers are green, the other purple. Workers
are told that their investment cost is drawn from an interval between $0
and $1, and that costs are independent and vary randomly. Workers make
their investment decision after observing their cost. After the decision, a
test result is generated. If a worker invests and gets hired, he gets a wage
of $3.00. If he is not hired, he gets a low-skill job at a wage of $1.50. The
net gain for an investing worker is the wage minus his investment cost. Two
draws of the test are made to determine the nal test result. Test results are
represented as marbles in an urn. A blue marble (B) represents a positive
test result, a red one (R) a negative result. The probability that a result
is good is 0.5 if the worker invested, or 0.2 if not. A test result of BB thus
means that the chance that a worker invested is high, a result of RR means
he probably did not invest, whereas in the event of BR (or RB), the result
is unclear. An employer only knows the worker's colour and test result. An
employer earns $4.00 if a worker who invested is hired; $0.00 if a worker
who did not invest was hired, and $2.00 if the worker was not hired. To
both workers and employers, the hiring rates of each colour are presented,
i.e. information about the market outcome is public.
Two treatments are presented: In the rst treatment, investment costs
are drawn for both worker groups over 20 periods from the interval [$0.00,
$1.00]. The second treatment was conducted to `investigate the eects of
historical discrimination' Fryer Jr. et al (2005; p.166). In this treatment,
for the rst ve periods investment costs for purple workers were drawn
from the interval [$0.5, $1.00], whereas for green workers from [$0.00, $0.5],
so that green workers had higher incentives to invest. For the remainder 15
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rounds, the cost distributions were equal.
In general, Fryer Jr. et al (2005) observe that discrimination emerges
only in some experiments. Of these they present two instances.
In the rst experiment discrimination against purple workers emerged
quickly. Around 80-90% of green workers were hired most of the time,
whereas purple workers were hired at around 40-50%. Hiring rates remained
almost constant for green, and slightly improved for purple workers. Invest-
ment rates for both groups increased for some periods, after which they
fell again. Investment costs in the rst two rounds was (by chance) higher
for purple workers. This `may have been a factor that kept investment
rates much higher for green workers in most periods' (Fryer Jr. et al (2005;
p.165)). Employers hired always when the test result was BB. Employers
were more liberal with green workers: If the test result was unclear, they
were hired invariably, but only 78% of purple workers. If the result was RR,
employers still hired 64% of green, but only 15% of purple workers. In the
following discussion, it emerged that beliefs that purple workers would not
invest formed quickly, as well as the corresponding belief that this group
is unlikely to get hired. This lead most workers of that colour to decrease
their eorts. Moreover, the consistent liberal treatment of green workers
encouraged most of them in their investment behaviour, while some players
stopped investing because they expected to get hired anyway. Thus, invest-
ment rates for both groups declined in the second half of the game, but for
dierent reasons.
In the second experiment, it emerged that investment rates of green
and purple workers were similar, although the costs for purple workers were
much higher. They were hired at an only slightly lower rate than green
workers. After step 5, the cost distributions became equal again. Pur-
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ple workers continued to invest at similar rates, while investment rates for
greens dropped quickly, resulting in higher employment for purples (raising
from about 60% to 90%), and lower employment for greens (decreasing from
about 65% to 50%).
Summarising, these results highlight some driving factors in experimen-
tal environments:
{ Negative stereotypes can form quickly and are persistent. It might
only take some random perturbations (here, initial cost asymmetries)
to generate these stereotypes.
{ Decisions are not independent. The belief that one group is more pro-
ductive leads to the belief that this still holds if bad or mixed outcomes
occur, while the opposite is true for the disadvantaged group.
{ The height of the cost does not necessarily have a large impact on the
investment decisions, as long as the return to investment is positive.
3.4 A Reinforcement Learning Model of Sta-
tistical Discrimination
There are n worker agents and m employer agents. Workers are assigned
the colours green and purple with equal probability. Each round, workers
and employers are paired randomly. Employers must decide to hire or not to
hire a worker depending on the result of an employment test and the colour
of the worker. If no investment is made, the worker incurs no cost. The test
outcome might be either good (+) or bad (-). Two draws are made. The
probability of a positive test signal are drawn from two distributions; fq()
if the worker invested, and fu() if not. Table 3.1 shows the payos. In the
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following simulations, investment cost c is xed at 0.1 throughout, so that
there is never a negative payo.
hire not hire
invest 0.3-c (0.4) 0.15-c (0.2)
not invest 0.3 (0) 0.15 (0.2)
Table 3.1: Payos for the RL statistical discrimination model (employer payos
in brackets)
This model setup is with minor variations identical to Fryer Jr. et al
(2005). The main dierence is that all information is private. Employers
and workers have no information about the employment levels of the respec-
tive groups as in the original game. Another dierence is the magnitude of
rewards, which was divided by 10 for this experiment (simply to standardise
values between 0 and 1), and the distribution of players. Furthermore, in
the Fryer experiment, there were as many employers as workers and work-
ers were split exactly half in green, and half in purple. In the simulation,
workers' groups are partitioned randomly, so that one worker group is often
larger than the other. Moreover, there are only half as many employers as
workers. The reason is to support learning: The smaller the worker group,
the more likely there will be similar behaviour simply by chance, and thus
it is `easier' to discriminate. Similarly, with fewer employers, variation may
decrease by chance, and feed back into worker decisions As a consequence,
only half of the worker population is matched each round, while all employ-
ers act. However, as the simulation results below will illustrate, this seems
not to be necessary for generating discrimination.
Using the BRA approach developed in chapter 2, the agents are imple-
mented as follows: Workers have a simple state-action mapping with an
empty state description and invest/not-invest as action set. Employers, on
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the other hand, may use the dierent test outcomes and colours of the agents
to construct rules according to BRA. The action set consists of hire/not-
hire. Dierent ways are possible to generate rules that constitute beliefs
about the relationship between colour and productivity. If the majority
of generated rules are based on colour alone, statistical discrimination is
clearly observable; if rules are only based on test only, there is meritocracy.
Three dierent setups are considered. Using the convention of denition
4, they can be described as follows:
Variant I In this variant, there is only limited learning. Only if test
results are ambiguous (+- or -+; since both events are equivalent +- is used
as the representative for both from here on) agents may learn; otherwise
employers always hire if the result is good (++), or never hire if the result
is bad (- -). This corresponds to the example constructed by Coate and
Loury (1993) described above. Employers can learn a conservative or liberal
strategy, depending on their beliefs about the productivity of each group -
if in doubt they can either believe that the test comes from a productive
worker or the opposite. The deterministic rules can be described by r10;1 :
C10;1 !hire with C10;1 :(test-result = ++) and r20;1 : C20;1 !not-hire with
C20;1 :(test-result = - -). The corresponding initial state-action mapping for
the learning problem is r30;1 : C
3
0;1 ! A with C30;1 : (test-result = +-) and
(colour = purple or colour = green). Using denition 4, the decision model
can hence be described by k = 3, jAkj = 2,
3T
k=1
Lkl = ; and the symbols
in table 3.2. The table describes all possible rules the search process can
expand.
Variant II In this variant, three dierent sets of state-action mappings
are specied. The rst set contains only one initial rule r10;1 : C
1
0;1 ! A
with C10;1 : (test-result = ++) and (colour = purple or colour = green), the
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L10 = ftest-result = - -g
L20 = ftest-result = ++g
L30 = f(test-result = +- ^ (colour = purple _ colour = green))g
L11 = L21 = succ(L10) = succ(L20) = ;
L31;1 = succ(L30) = ftest-result = +- ^ colour = purpleg
L31;2 = succ(L30) = ftest-result = +- ^ colour = greeng
succ(L32) = ;
Table 3.2: Description of all possible rules in Model Variant I. The events +-
and -+ are summarised as +-.
second set contains r20;1 : C
2
0;1 ! A with C0;12 : (test-result = - -) and (colour
= purple or colour = green), and the third set is given by r30;1 : C
3
0;1 ! A
with C30;1 : (test-result = +-) and (colour = purple or colour = green).
Based on denition 4, the model can be decribed by k = 3, jAkj = 2,
3T
k=1
Lkl = ; and the symbols described in table 3.3, which again describes all
possible mappings.
This specication pre-wires some knowledge about the relationship be-
tween test-result and productivity by restricting the possible combinations
of the condition elements. Per mapping, only two rules can be generated,
limiting the maximum number of rules to six. Subjects observe test result
and colour, and based on the test result they start deliberating how to treat
the worker from the respective groups.
Variant III This variant nally poses the most challenging learning task.
The initial rule can be described correspondingly with r10;1 : C
1
0;1 ! A with
C10;1 : (test-result = ++ or test-result = - - or test-result = +-) and (colour
= purple or colour = green). Agents start with no prior knowledge or
categories at all.
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L10 = f(test-result = ++ ^ (colour = purple _ colour = green))g
L20 = f(test-result = - ^ (colour = purple _ colour = green))g
L30 = f(test-result = +- ^ (colour = purple _ colour = green))g
L11;1 = succ(L10) = ftest-result = ++ ^ colour = purpleg
L11;2 = succ(L10) = ftest-result = ++ ^ colour = greeng
L21;1 = succ(L20) = ftest-result = - - ^ colour = purpleg
L21;2 = succ(L20) = ftest-result = - - ^ colour = greeng
L31;1 = succ(L30) = ftest-result = +- ^ colour = purpleg
L31;2 = succ(L30) = ftest-result = +- ^ colour = greeng
succ(L11) = ;;
succ(L21) = ;
succ(L31) = ;
Table 3.3: Description of all possible rules in Model Variant II. The events +-
and -+ are summarised as +-.
Based on denition 4, this variation of the model can be described with
k = 1, jAkj = 2 and the symbols in table 3.4.
L10 = f(test-result = ++ _ test-result = - - _ test-result = +-)
^ (colour = purple _ colour = green)g
L11;1 = succ(L10) = f(test-result = ++) ^ (colour=green _ colour = purple)g
L11;2 = succ(L10) = f(test-result = +-) ^ (colour=green _ colour = purple)g
L11;3 = succ(L10) = f(test-result = - -) ^ (colour=green _ colour = purple)g
L11;4 = succ(L10) = f(test-result = - - _ test-result = +-)
^ (colour=green _ colour = purple)g
L11;5 = succ(L10) = f(test-result = ++ _ test-result = - -)
^ (colour=green _ colour = purple)g
L11;6 = succ(L10) = f(test-result = +- _ test-result = ++)
^ (colour=green _ colour = purple)g
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L11;7 = succ(L10) = f(test-result = ++ _ test-result = - - _ test-result = +-)
^ (colour = purple)g
L11;8 = succ(L10) = f(test-result = ++ _ test-result = - - _ test-result = +-)
^ (colour = green)g
L12;1 = succ(L11;1) = ftest-result = ++ ^ colour = greeng
L12;2 = succ(L11;1) = ftest-result = ++ ^ colour = purpleg
L12;3 = succ(L11;2) = ftest-result = +- ^ colour = greeng
L12;4 = succ(L11;2) = ftest-result = +- ^ colour = purpleg
L12;5 = succ(L11;3) = ftest-result = - - ^ colour = greeng
L12;6 = succ(L11;3) = ftest-result = - - ^ colour = purpleg
L12;7 = succ(L11;4) = succ(L17) =
f(test-result = - - _ test-result = +-)^ colour = green g
L12;8 = succ(L11;4) = succ(L18) =
f(test-result = - - _ test-result = +-) ^ colour = purpleg
L12;9 = succ(L11;5) = succ(L18) =
f(test-result = ++ _ test-result = - -) ^ (colour = purple)g
L12;10 = succ(L11;5) = succ(L17) =
f(test-result = ++ _ test-result = - -) ^ (colour = green)g
L12;11 = succ(L11;6) = succ(L18) =
f(test-result = +- _ test-result = ++) ^ (colour = purple)g
L12;12 = succ(L11;6) = succ(L17) =
f(test-result = +- _ test-result = ++) ^ (colour = green)g
L12;13 = succ(L11;7) = ftest-result = +- ^ colour = greeng
L12;14 = succ(L11;8) = ftest-result = +- ^ colour = purpleg
succ(L12;1) = succ(L12;2) = succ(L12;3) = succ(L12;4) = succ(L12;5) =
succ(L12;6) = succ(L12;3) = succ(L12;13) = succ(L12;3) = succ(L12;14) = ;
L13;1 = succ(L12;7) = L12;3
L13;2 = succ(L12;7) = L12;5
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L13;3 = succ(L12;8) = L12;4
L13;4 = succ(L12;8) = L12;6
L13;5 = succ(L12;9) = L12;2
L13;6 = succ(L12;9) = L12;6
L13;7 = succ(L12;10) = L12;1
L13;8 = succ(L12;10) = L12;5
L13;9 = succ(L12;11) = L12;2
L13;10 = succ(L12;11) = L12;4
L13;11 = succ(L12;12) = L12;1
L13;12 = succ(L12;12) = L12;3
succ(L13) = ;
Table 3.4: Description of all possible rules in Model Variant III. The events +-
and -+ are summarised as +-.
3.5 Simulations
Simulations are run in three steps:
1. First, the model is explored to nd the RL parameter settings for
 and  that are capable of generating discrimination. The other
parameters are xed. The results of the optimisation procedure are
looked at in some illustrative simulations.
2. Using the results of these exploratory simulations, the RL parameters
are xed and more simulations with a larger number of agents and
more repetitions are run. The key statistical discrimination parameter
 is varied. The aim is to obtain representative samples of the model
behaviour.
CHAPTER 3. STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION 84
3. Some more specic scenarios modelling existing negative stereotypes,
taste-based discrimination and variation in investment costs are run to
analyse further which features are responsible for generating statistical
discrimination.
3.5.1 Exploration
The aim of this section is to nd out which model setups under which
parameter settings are able to generate statistical discrimination. For this,
many simulations with few agents and many  and  parameter settings
are run and optimised using a Genetic Algorithm (GA) as a stochastic
optimisation method. The following paragraphs describe the procedure used
and the outcome of these simulations.
3.5.1.1 Finding Optimal Learning Parameters
GA's (Holland 1975) are often used in stochastic optimisation problems. An
optimisation problem is, for instance, the approximation of a function that
estimates some empirical observable value. GA's are, in principle, a directed
search process. At the start of the process, a pool of candidate solutions
called chromosomes is initialised. A chromosome contains a number of
genes. The genes represent, for example, parameter values of a function to
be approximated. A chromosome is initialised with a number of typically
randomly initialised genes. A gene is represented as a binary string. The
bits of the string can encode dierent things such as the digits of a number.
The task of the algorithm is to evolve and select the best solutions from
the chromosome pool by applying genetic operators such as mutation or
crossover. These operators change and recombine the bits of the ttest
genes. Mutation switches a bit of the string with a certain probability;
crossover selects a fraction of the chromosomes and recombines genes of
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the same type from the resulting sample at a randomly selected point in
the string. The new pool of chromosomes constitutes the next generation.
Fitness is determined by a tness function, which computes the distance
from the candidate solution to the problem solution. While a subset of the
ttest genes is reproduced in the next generation using the operators, unt
genes are removed from the population. The process stops after a certain
criterion, e.g., after a maximum number of generations has been computed,
or some tness threshold has been reached (for an introduction, see, for
example, Goldberg (1989).
Here, the GA is initialised with chromosomes containing four genes. The
genes represent the parameters employer, employer, worker and worker. The
population size of a generation is limited to 20 chromosomes; the maximum
number of evolutions is bound to 25. The probability that mutation occurs
is set at 0.35. The crossover rate is 12%. The framework used for imple-
mentation is JGAP (2011). The tness function is given by the resulting
employment discrimination after a simulation run of 5000 time steps. For
this, the average dierence between employment levels between green and
purple workers over all time steps is computed. The larger the dierence,
the `tter' the candidate parameter set. The time scale has no relation to
the classroom game. The reason is that this model is of an exploratory
nature and unknown whether the necessary agent learning can be achieved
in `real time'. Moreover, large time scales can inform about the stability of
the model in the long run.
Applying this algorithm to each model variant produces for each vari-
ant a set of dierent optimal parameter values. Before looking at some
example runs in the next sections, the parameters and the outcome of the
optimisation procedure are shown.
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Table 3.5 summarises the relevant parameters for each model variant.
 is set to an arbitrary high value (100 in this case), because the goal is
to nd out whether it is possible to generate discrimination at all. There-
fore, a limitation of state descriptions provides no benet at this stage. 
is set to a small value to allow frequent re-evaluation of mappings and con-
sequently, adjustment in the beliefs. That is, it is easier to revise negative
stereotypes. If discriminatory outcomes emerge, they are likely to be based
on co-evolution and not ignorance on the employer side. Similarly, the pa-
rameters  and  are set at intervals that allow reasonable large samples of
rewards for single rules (about 100), but can be changed frequently enough
over the 5000 time steps to allow reasonable variation in the expanded state-
action mappings. Finally,  was xed at a value > 0 to prevent traps in the
search process, but not too large to prevent excessive switching.
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Parameter value meaning
Discrimination parameters
fq 0.5 Probability of good test result if invested
fu 0.2 Probability of good test result if not invested
c 0 - 0.1 Investment cost interval
BRA parameters
 0.05 Weight for revisiting expanded nodes
 0.3 Weight for switching paths in the tree
 75 Interval for deleting inferior expansions
 100 Interval for creating new expansions
 100 Maximum numbers of nodes
Variant I
employer;r1 0.01 - 0.15
choice parameter for r1 - action set bound to
descriptor L10 (test-result is ambiguous and
(colour is green or colour is purple))
employer;r1 0.01 - 0.5 discount parameter for r
1
worker 0.01 - 0.2 choice parameter for worker rule
worker 0.01 - 0.5 discount parameter for worker rule
Variant II
employer;r1 0.01 - 0.1
choice parameter for r1 - action set bound
to descriptor L10 ((test-result=+-) and
(colour=green or colour=purple))
employer;r1 0.01 - 0.5 discount parameter for r
1
employer;r2 0.01 - 0.1
choice parameter for r2 - action set bound
to descriptor L20 ((test-result= ++) and
(colour=green or colour=purple))
employer;r2 0.01 - 0.5 discount parameter for r
2
employer;r3 0.01 - 0.1
choice parameter for r3 - action set bound
to descriptor L30 ((test-result=- -) and
(colour=green or colour=purple))
employer;r3 0.01 - 0.5 discount parameter for r
3
worker 0.01 - 0.2 choice parameter for worker rule
worker 0.01 - 0.5 discount parameter for worker rule
Variant III
employer;r1 0.01 - 0.15
choice parameter for r1 - action set
bound to descriptor L10 ((test-result=++
or test-result=+- or test-result=- - ) and
(colour=reen or colour=purple))
employer;r1 0.01 - 0.5 discount parameter for r
1
worker 0.01 - 0.2 choice parameter for worker rule
worker 0.01 - 0.5 discount parameter for worker rule
Table 3.5: Simulation parameters for nding optimal RL parameters.
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Figure 3.2: Model t for various parameter settings in model variant I.
Figures 3.2 to 3.4 summarise the dierent parameter settings that have
been visited by the GA. The gures display all samples which were run
and are sorted by the largest dierence in the employment levels of the two
groups. The x-axis represent simulation runs while the y-axis displays the
various parameters of the model and the tness criterion, which all vary
between 0 and 1. On the right end of the graph are those simulations that
produce the strongest discrimination.
In general, settings with small worker (early lock-in into investment/non-
investment behaviour) have the best chances to produce the discrimination.
Thus, if worker behaviour is relatively stable and diers, for some reason,
between groups (here due to the variation of choice and learning behaviour),
then employers discriminate between them accordingly.
3.5.1.2 Variant I
In this scenario, learning happens only when test results are ambiguous. In
the case of - - employers never hire, in the case of ++ they always hire.
Figure 3.2 shows that discriminatory outcomes emerge mostly in case
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Figure 3.3: Model t for various parameter settings in model variant II
Figure 3.4: Model t for various parameter settings in model variant III.
where workers'  is small. The reason for this is that the workers act as an
`environment' for the employers. The more stable workers' behaviour, the
easier it becomes for the employers to learn. When the initial conguration
is such that sucient members of each group play almost exclusively one
of the two possible strategies, discrimination can emerge very quickly and
remain stable. As soon as workers'  increases, the employers are increas-
ingly unable to use colour as a decision hint, and the hiring rates for both
groups become similar.
The sample simulation shown in gures 3.5 and 3.6 illustrates this dy-
namic. Discrimination persists, but investment behaviour of the workers is
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Figure 3.5: Hiring rates of an example run for model variant I (5 purple workers,
5 green workers). Parameters: employer = 0:13, employer = 0:17, worker = 0:01,
worker = 0:17
non-deterministic. There were also simulations with even greater discrimi-
nation; however in these simulation workers never changed their strategies,
i.e. no experimentation occurred any more, and the result was determined
fully by the matching of the rst time step.
The sample simulation generates discrimination, but stays short of the
simulation reported by Fryer et al.: In both cases, there is persistent dis-
crimination, and this behaviour emerges very early. However, in the class-
room experiment, discrimination was, with employment rates of 0.8 and
0.4, much larger. In the simulation, rates are on average about 0.48 and
0.36, in the most extreme case the rates reached 0.55 and 0.24. A simple
calculation reveals that the hiring rates in the simulations reect a liberal
strategy independent of worker colour: For investing workers, the test out-
come probabilities are ++ = 0:5  0:5 = 0:25,    = 0:5  0:5 = 0:25,
and +  = 2(0:5  0:5) = 0:5 (since event +  and  + are equivalent,
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Figure 3.6: Investment rates of an example run for model variant I (5 pur-
ple workers, 5 green workers). Parameters: employer = 0:13, employer = 0:17,
worker = 0:01, worker = 0:17
they are denoted only with + ); for non-investing workers these prob-
abilities are ++ = 0:02  0:02 = 0:04,    = 0:8  0:8 = 0:64, and
+  = 2(0:016  0:016) = 0:032. In the simulation, purple workers invest
with a relative frequency of 0.6 and green workers with a relative frequency
0.4. In case of a liberal strategy independent of colour (represented by the
rule `if test result is ambiguous, always hire'), the expected employment
level is 0:6  0:75 = 0:45 for purple workers, and 0:4  0:75 = 0:3 for green
workers. This is, by and large, reected by the simulation results. Employ-
ers hire fewer green workers because their test results are usually worse. If
employers were biased against green workers because they invest less, the
employment rate of greens should be lower (for a pure conservative strategy,
the rate would be 0.1 only).
This means that dierence in employment levels can be generated and
persist in this model. However, it seems likely that it is not the type of
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discrimination observed in the classroom game, where decisions were biased
towards `hire' in case the worker belonged to the group with higher expected
investments and towards `not-hire' in the opposite case. In the RL model,
discrimination reects actual dierences in worker productivity.
3.5.1.3 Variant II
The example run of model variant I indicates that employer decisions reect
actual investment behaviour. This resulted into a colour-independent liberal
strategy. Possibilities for discrimination were limited, as employers could
use colour as decision criterion only if the test result was ambiguous. In the
second setup, employers have the capability to favour workers even if their
result was bad, and to discriminate even if the test result was good.
Looking at the tness of simulations with dierent parameter settings,
gure 3.3 shows analogous behaviour as Variant I.
However, the employment level is higher and as gure 3.7 shows, the
dierence in employment levels is much stronger. Moreover, it seems that
this equilibrium state can collapse quickly for no or only very little changes
in investment behaviour (gure 3.8).
This result comes closer to the empirical results of Fryer Jr. et al (2005),
who observed that if in doubt, workers expected to invest are hired at a
higher rate than if expected not to invest. Discrimination is persistent;
however, the level of employment and the extent of discrimination may
change quickly. As it can be seen from gure 3.8, this is due to a preceding
change in investment behaviour.
Calculating the hiring rates for a liberal strategy in the same way as
in variant I results in expected employment levels of 0.44 for purple and
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Figure 3.7: Hiring rates for an example run of model variant II (6 purple workers,
4 green workers). Parameters: employer = 0:08, employer = 0:21 (for all initial
mappings), worker = 0:01, worker = 0:3
Figure 3.8: Investment rates for an example run of model variant II (6 purple
worker, 4 green workers) . Parameters: employer = 0:08, employer = 0:21 (for all
initial mappings), worker = 0:01, worker = 0:3
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0.4 for green workers. The actual average hiring rates are 0.79 for purple
and 0.45 for green workers. This means that employers hire purple workers
most of the time even if the test result is bad, whereas the test outcome
plays a more important role for green workers (even though they are hired
more frequently than even the liberal strategy would suggest). Which beliefs
exactly form during simulations with such outcomes is shown in more detail
in section 3.5.2.
3.5.1.4 Variant III
Figure 3.4 illustrates that there is no parameter setting supporting discrim-
ination. At most, if at all, it seems that large choice parameters (  0:1)
on the employer side, together with small choice parameters (  0:05) on
the worker side generate dierences in hiring levels.
The simulation with the largest average dierence in hiring rates em-
phasises this result (Figures 3.9 and 3.10). Hiring rates in general are much
lower (on average 0.31 for purple and 0.23 for green agents) as in the previ-
ous examples. It is dicult for employer agents to distinguish between the
benets of a good and a bad test result, so that they tend to rather not hire
anybody. Although there are dierences in hiring rates across both groups,
this variation does not follow a stable pattern; the green workers simply
experience more erratic phases of hiring and investment. This does lead to
short cycles of discrimination (e.g. between steps 2000 and 3000), but the
pattern does not persist.
3.5.2 Average Results
After nding out appropriate learning parameters, this section presents sim-
ulations with more agents, samples of dierent  values and more runs,
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Figure 3.9: Hiring rates for an example run of model variant III (4 purple
workers, 6 green workers). Parameters: employer = 0:05, employer = 0:07,
worker = 0:12, worker = 0:15
Figure 3.10: Investment rates for an example run of model variant III (4 pur-
ple workers, 6 green workers). Parameters: employer = 0:05, employer = 0:07,
worker = 0:12, worker = 0:15
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keeping the RL parameters constant.
The distribution of  determines the outcome of the test result, depend-
ing on whether an agent has invested or not. If fu() and fq() is similar,
investing does not make a big dierence - the outcome is mostly random.
If the dierence f() = fq()  fu() is large (fq() > fu(); see also section
3.2), investing increases the chance of a good test result strongly. If there is
a positive relationship between  and investment level and, consequently, in
the hiring rate in the RL model, then the employment level can be expected
to increase with f(). The medium range of f() reects a similar setup
as in the previous section. The chance of a positive test result is slightly
higher for investing workers. This setting can also be expected support dis-
crimination the most: It depends crucially on employers' response whether
investment pays. If the standards are very high (e.g., never hire a worker
with a bad test result if coming from a certain group), investing becomes a
costly choice for workers. Conversely, it becomes expensive to turn around
such beliefs once they exist for the same reason. In the RL model, this
could turn into reinforcing the non-investment choice.
To x  and , the averages of simulations producing an average discrim-
ination rate of 10% were selected, ensuring the possibility of discrimination
in subsequent runs. This boundary is set arbitrary to pick not only one,
possibly unrepresentative, parameter value of, e.g., the most discrimina-
tory outcome. Furthermore, only model variants I and II are followed up,
since variant III was not capable of producing discrimination. The following
section will analyse both models further.
Simulations are run for 50 samples of , drawn from uniform distribu-
tions fq and fu. Each simulation is repeated 5 times. Table 3.6 sum-
marises the parameters.
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Parameter value meaning
Discrimination parameters
fq 0.5 - 1.0 Probability of good test result if invested
fu 0.0 - 0.5 Probability of good test result if not invested
c 0 - 0.1 Investment cost interval
Variant I
employer;r1 0.13
learning parameter for r1 - action set bound
to descriptor L10 (test-result is ambiguous
and (colour is green or colour is purple))
employer;r1 0.15 discount parameter for r
1
worker 0.0107 learning parameter for worker rule
worker 0.16 discount parameter for worker rule
Variant II
employer;r1 0.05
learning parameter for r1 - action set
bound to descriptor L10 ((test-result=+-) and
(colour=green or colour=purple))
employer;r1 0.43 discount parameter for r
1
employer;r2 0.05
learning parameter for r2 - action set
bound to descriptor L20 ((test-result=++)
and (colour=green or colour =purple))
employer;r2 0.43 discount parameter for r
2
employer;r3 0.05
learning parameter for r3 - action set bound
to descriptor L30 ((test-result is bad) and
(colour is green or colour is purple))
employer;r3 0.43 discount parameter for r
3
worker 0.0107 learning parameter for worker rule
worker 0.27 discount parameter for worker rule
Table 3.6: Simulation parameters for obtaining average results.
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3.5.2.1 Variant I
Figure 3.11 shows simulation results averaged over dierent parameter set-
tings . On the x-axis the dierence f() = fq()   fu() is displayed. To
compare the employment levels over all the runs, the members of green and
purple groups are relabelled into advantaged and disadvantaged depend-
ing on which group had the higher or lower employment in a particular
simulation. Figure 3.12 displays the results for all simulations.
Figure 3.11 shows that the dierence between the groups is small; the
largest average dierence between employment rates is 0.16. The chance
to generate a positive test-result has thus, on average, no inuence on dis-
crimination. Moreover, employment does not rise with f(). If discrim-
ination evolves, it is again an isolated event without any relationship to
the parameter  (estimating the linear regression function in the form of
discrimination = + f() did not result in signicant coecients). This
is also underlined by a look at the distribution of single runs in gure 3.12
- runs with the same f() can result in very dierent employment levels.
Summary measures of the simulation samples given in appendix B illustrate
that higher average discrimination is due to single runs with discrimination,
whereas most samples show little dierence between the groups.
Figures 3.13a to 3.13d show the simulations with the highest dierence
between employment levels (0.1603 and 0.1604). The pattern is similar to
the simulation presented in the previous section 3.5.1.2. Discrimination and
investment behaviour evolves at the same time early in the simulation and
persists.
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 show the rules that emerged. Since only the rule for
ambiguous test results was not xed, there are just three possible outcomes.
Using the exponential selection rule (equation 2.4), the table displays the
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Figure 3.11: Average hiring rates for model variant I across dierent values of
. The x-axis is given by f() = fq()   fu(). Discrimination is the dierence
between the high and low employment group.
Figure 3.12: Hiring rates for model variant I across dierent values of . The
x-axis is given by f() = fq()  fu()
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(a) Hiring rates variant I (23 purple, 27
green workers), fu() = 0:26, fq() = 0:59
(b) Investment rates variant I (23 purple, 27
green workers), fu() = 0:26,
fq() = 0:59
(c) Hiring rates variant I (30 purple, 20
green workers), fu() = 0:48, fq() = 0:55
(d) Investment rates variant II (30 purple,
20 green workers), fu() = 0:48,
fq() = 0:55
Figure 3.13: Statistical discrimination - 2 sample simulation runs of model vari-
ant I, nemployer = 25; nworker = 50. Each graph shows moving averages over 10
time steps.
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choice propensity p(hire) for action `hire' and the number of rule activa-
tions. The propensity for action `not hire' is 1   p(hire). The table shows
that the original rule (test result is ambiguous and (colour = green colour
= purple)) is activated only a few times, while the successor rules are ac-
tivated more often. Thus, most of the time the discriminatory behaviour
persists. However, the dierences between the two groups is small. In the
rst simulation, for example, purple workers are hired with a probability of
0.86, whereas green workers with probability 0.61. This reects the obser-
vation made in section 3.5.1.2 - discrimination comes about due to dierent
investment behaviours alone.
state description p(hire)
rel.
act.
abs.
act.
Test-result is ambiguous and (colour =
purple or colour = green)
0.61 0.03 3
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =
green
0.61 0.47 45
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =
purple
0.78 0.49 47
Table 3.7: Rules generated in a sample simulation of model variant I (23 purple
workers, 27 green workers), fu() = 0:26, fq() = 0:59 and their relative (rel.
act.) and absolute (abs. act.) activation frequency in the employer population.
Measurements were taken every 100 time steps.
3.5.2.2 Variant II
Figure 3.14 shows again simulation results averaged over dierent parameter
settings . Figure 3.15 displays the results for all simulations.
Discrimination is on average higher as compared to setup I. The dif-
ference between high and low employment groups moves up to about 0.3.
Estimating a linear regression of the form discrimination =  + f()
results in a small, however signicant relationship with discrimination =
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state description p(hire)
rel.
act.
abs.
act.
Test-result is ambiguous and (colour =
purple or colour = green)
0.67 0.06 19
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =
green
0.68 0.49 152
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =
purple
0.86 0.45 141
Table 3.8: Rules generated in a sample simulation of model variant I (30 purple
workers, 20 green workers), fu() = 0:48, fq() = 0:55 and their relative (rel.
act.) and absolute (abs. act.) activation frequency in the employer population.
Measurements were taken every 100 time steps.
0:03467 + 0:03617f(). However, large dierences in average employment
levels are again mainly due to extreme values in the samples, as shown in
appendix B. A large average discrimination comes usually with a high stan-
dard deviation. Figure 3.15 illustrates this graphically. Thus, also here one
cannot assume a relationship between  and discrimination.
Figures 3.16a to 3.16d show the two single simulation runs with the
highest discrimination (0.31 and 0.28). In both examples, investment levels
are relatively stable from the beginning, while employment levels adjust only
after some 1000 time steps. This points to a pattern where rst some actual
dierence between worker group behaviour exists, which is then followed by
an adjustment of the beliefs on the employer side.
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 show the rules that emerged for the two sample
simulations. In the rst simulation, employers developed no rule for the
ambiguous test case. They trust most of the time that green workers' good
test results lead to high productivity, while they believe the opposite of
purple workers. If the test result is bad or ambiguous employers tend not
to hire. In the second simulation - reecting the Fryer results - employers
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Figure 3.14: Average hiring rates for model variant II across dierent values of
. The x-axis is given by f() = fq()   fu(). Discrimination is the dierence
between high and low employment group.
Figure 3.15: Average hiring rates for model variant II across dierent values of
. The x-axis is given by f() = fq()  fu()
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(a) Hiring rates variant II (28 purple, 22
green workers), fu() = 0:01, fq() = 0:99
(b) Investment rates variant II (28 purple,
22 green workers), fu() = 0:01,
fq() = 0:99
(c) Hiring rates variant II (26 purple, 24
green workers), fu() = 0:35, fq() = 0:98
(d) Investment rates variant II (26 purple,
24 green workers), fu() = 0:35,
fq() = 0:98
Figure 3.16: Statistical discrimination - 2 sample simulations runs of model
variant II, nemployer = 25; nworker = 50. Each graph shows moving averages over
10 time steps.
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tend to favour the green workers even in the event of a bad test result; they
behave similarly if the result is unclear. Purple workers are always believed
to be less productive: If their test result is negative, they get almost never
hired; if the result is positive, they are hired only with a chance of 0.2.
Likewise, their chances to get hired in case of an ambiguous test result are
worse.
The dierence between the two samples is the impact of f(). While in
the rst simulation, employers can be certain that an investing worker has a
positive test result (fq() = 0:99) and a non-investing worker most likely has
a negative result (fq( = 0:06)), this is not so clear in the second simulation.
In the latter, the chance of a good test result if not investing is closer to
the chance of a good result if investing. Consequently, the variety of rules
emerging is greater: In the rst simulation, the parent state-descriptions
`test-result is good and (colour=green or colour=purple)' and `test-result
is bad and (colour=green or colour=purple)' are activated almost as many
times as their children, indicating that the coarser grained descriptions are
(on average) nearly as good as the more detailed successors. The expected
value of the parent approaches the payos in table 3.1. Since the test-result
is a certain indicator of productivity, there is no need to consider colour
as a hint. In the second simulation, the dierence between the expected
values of the parent state-descriptions cannot be so large as in table 3.1,
because non-investing workers of the same colour will more often get a
positive test result. So it becomes more likely that the algorithm evolves
(or switches between) more branches, using colour as an additional hint. As
the new rules match worker behaviour, they remain stable. As a result, the
employers in model variant II follow clearly a discriminatory pattern that
makes it dicult for purple workers to escape their situation - even if they
achieve good test results, employers are unlikely to believe them.
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state description p(hire)
rel.
act.
abs.
act.
Test-result is ambiguous and (colour =
purple or colour = green)
0.05 0.02 90
Test-result is bad and (colour = purple
or colour = green)
0.16 0.18 1040
Test-result is good and (colour = pur-
ple or colour = green)
0.33 0.12 698
Test-result is bad and colour = green 0.1 0.2 1152
Test-result is bad and colour = purple 0.05 0.24 1387
Test-result is good and colour = green 0.9 0.12 691
Test-result is good and colour = purple 0.11 0.11 607
Table 3.9: Rules generated in a sample simulation run of model variant II (28
purple workers, 22 green workers), fu() = 0:06, fq() = 0:99 and their rela-
tive (rel. act) and absolute (abs. act.) activation frequency in the employer
population. Measurements were taken every 100 time steps.
3.5.3 How Persistent is Discrimination?
So far, the simulations showed that discrimination in the RL model can
emerge. However, there is no general rule when this might happen. Fur-
thermore, looking at the details of variant I, clearly this candidate does
not match the empirical results of Fryer Jr. et al (2005). Variant II has
more parallels in aggregate results as well as in the behaviour patterns that
emerge. In what follows, model variant I is, therefore, not considered any
further.
The purpose of this section is to nd out whether there are conditions
that support statistical discrimination on the average, that is, whether it
is possible to make some general statements about why and when discrim-
ination emerges in the RL model. For example, the existence of negative
stereotypes towards one worker group could discourage this group from in-
vesting from the beginning and persist over time. Such scenarios can be
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state description p(hire)
rel.
act.
abs.
act.
Test-result is ambiguous and (colour =
purple or colour = green)
0.31 0.07 447
Test-result is bad and (colour = purple
or colour = green)
0.1 0.06 794
Test-result is good and (colour = pur-
ple or colour = green)
0.35 0.13 365
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =
green
0.63 0.08 482
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =
purple
0.33 0.07 447
Test-result is bad and colour = green 0.18 0.19 1170
Test-result is bad and colour = purple 0.06 0.2 1256
Test-result is good and colour = green 0.86 0.11 662
Test-result is good and colour = purple 0.2 0.09 591
Table 3.10: Rules generated in a sample simulation run of model variant II
(26 purple workers, 24 green workers), fu() = 0:35, fq() = 0:98 and their
relative (rel.act.) and absolute activation (abs. act.) frequency in the employer
population. Measurements were taken every 100 time steps.
modelled by starting with situations in which discrimination exists, for ex-
ample, negative stereotypes or uneven cost distributions. Then, it can be
observed in which direction the simulation develops further.
Three scenarios are considered to investigate this question. First, taste-
based discrimination is introduced. In this scenario, the share of rms never
hiring green workers is increased. In the second scenario, heterogeneous
conditions for green workers are introduced by increasing their investment
cost for an initial, but limited period. In the third scenario, employers are
confronted with always investing purple and never investing green workers
for an initial, limited period. After this period, the deterministic workers
are replaced with the original, homogenous agents. The third scenario can
also be thought of as an extreme case of the second where investment cost
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at the beginning is prohibitive for green workers, and 0 for purple workers.
Taste-based discrimination In this scenario, inequality is generated by
xing rm behaviour, similar as the preference model of Becker (1957)).
For this purpose, simulations are run with a proportion of rms never hir-
ing green workers; for purple workers, the same rules as in variant II apply.
Figures 3.17 and 3.18 shows the hiring rates of green and purple workers
as the number of these rms (labelled p-rms) increases. In this scenario,
the employment chances of green workers worsen deterministically. The
question is how they react to these conditions and how this inuences the
remaining rms hiring green workers. If statistical discrimination is en-
couraged, one would expect an over-proportional decrease in hiring levels
of green workers: Green workers invest less due to worsening conditions on
the labour market, which induces the remaining liberal employers not to
hire them because of expected lower investments. If the liberal employers
continue to hire greens at the same rate, then worker behaviour reects just
the increasing number of p-rms.
Figure 3.17 shows a slight sigmoid shape of the hiring level graph of green
workers, that is, hiring levels decrease slightly over-proportionally while the
number of p-rms increases linearly. An estimate of the logit function with
employment as dependent and share of p-rms as independent variable (in-
terpreting the employment levels as categories) shows graphically a closer
approximation than the linear model (coecient estimates are signicant).
That is, in the medium region workers are discouraged strongly from invest-
ing, resulting in over-proportionally lower hiring levels. However, the eect
is small.
Furthermore, as gure 3.18 shows, the discrimination of the green group
has also an eect on the hiring level of purple workers. The eect is linear.
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Figure 3.17: Hiring rates of green workers if increasing numbers of rms deter-
ministically discriminate against them. The x-axis depicts the number of rms
that never hire green workers. The dotted line indicates the linear model esti-
mated from the data, the hatched line the estimated logit function.
In the beginning, purple workers manage to free-ride on the expectations
of the employer population and invest at lower rates as they get hired.
Firms expect higher average investment rates (independent of which colour
invests more), which makes riskier rm decisions, such as hiring workers with
a bad test result, more protable. With increasing p-rms, the chance of
generating high payos on average decreases as green workers invest less and
less, so the average payo of hiring (any) workers with a bad or ambiguous
test result will also decrease.
Unequal investment costs In this scenario, there is initially an unequal
distribution of costs similar as described above in the experiment of Fryer Jr.
et al (2005). For a starting period, the cost distribution of green workers is
drawn from the higher interval 0.1 - 0.3, so that investing is always more
expensive than for the purple group (interval 0 - 0.1). This could repre-
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Figure 3.18: Hiring rates of purple workers if increasing numbers of rms deter-
ministically discriminate against green workers. The x-axis depicts the number
of rms that never hire green workers. The dotted line indicates the linear model
estimated from the data, the hatched line the estimated logit function.
sent a situation where entry barriers into certain vacations are high for the
discriminated group. The question is whether this leads to dierent invest-
ment behaviour and if yes, whether this persists after the barrier is removed.
The scenario implemented by setting back the cost distribution to normal
after step 1000. Simulations are run again for fu() = 0:35, fq() = 0:98
and fu() = 0:06, fq() = 0:99; that is, with the same settings as for the
two sample simulations with the highest discrimination from the preceding
section 3.5.2. Figures 3.19a to 3.19d show the results.
In both scenarios, green workers invest less up to time step 1000, and
employers hire them at a corresponding lower rate. The hiring rate dif-
fers according to the distributions of . In the simulation with less noise
(fu() = 0:06, fq() = 0:99), the employment level of both groups is higher.
The pattern in both simulations is similar. In both simulations, green work-
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(a) Hiring rates variant II), fu() = 0:01,
fq() = 0:99
(b) Investment rates variant II, fu() =
0:01,fq() = 0:99
(c) Hiring rates variant II, fu() = 0:35,
fq() = 0:98
(d) Investment rates variant II, fu() = 0:35,
fq() = 0:98
Figure 3.19: Eect of cost heterogeneity in model variant II, nemployer =
25; nworker = 50, 25 repetitions. Each graph shows moving averages over 10
time steps.
ers are hired at a similar rate as purple workers after the barrier is removed.
That is, cost heterogeneity leads to discrimination, but the eect on em-
ployer beliefs is not permanent. Whether this is because the dierence is
too small can be checked in the next paragraph.
Negative stereotypes In the last scenario, inequality is generated by
creating negative stereotypes on the employer side. To achieve this situ-
ation, the two sample simulations of variant II are set up with the same
parameters as before. The simulation is split in two parts: For 1000 steps,
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(a) Hiring rates variant II, fu() = 0:06,
fq() = 0:99
(b) Investment rates variant II, fu() =
0:01,fq() = 0:99
(c) Hiring rates variant II, fu() = 0:35,
fq() = 0:98
(d) Investment rates variant II, fu() = 0:35,
fq() = 0:98
Figure 3.20: Eect of prior negative stereotypes in model variant II, nemployer =
25; nworker = 50, 25 repetitions. Each graph shows moving averages over 10 steps.
employers are confronted with purple workers who always, and green work-
ers who never invest. After that, all deterministic worker agents are removed
and replaced by learning worker agents as in the original setup. The simu-
lation is then run for another 4000 time steps. Figures 3.20a to 3.20d shows
average results for 25 repetitions.
As the gures illustrate, employers discriminate on average when worker
behaviour is deterministic. They hire purple workers at a rate of almost 0.35
and green workers at a rate of about 0.1. However, after exchanging the
worker agents, both hiring rates converge to the same rate in between the
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extremes. The only dierence between the two samples is the employment
level: For the setting fu() = 0:35, fq() = 0:98, the level is higher for
purple and lower for green workers as compared to the rst simulation.
Furthermore, there is a slightly lower investment. So it seems that the
smaller chance of getting a positive test result discourages green workers
from investing. This eect is small and only temporary. In the longer run,
both hiring and investment rates converge.
Tables 3.11 and 3.12 show the rules responsible for this result. In the rst
simulation (fu() = 0:06, fq() = 0:99), the relative frequency of activations
of the general rule `if test-result is bad and (colour=green or colour=purple)'
increased from 0.13 to 0.24, whereas the share of its children decreased.
Thus, after switching worker behaviour, employers generalised some rules.
For simulation fu() = 0:35, fq() = 0:98, the share of the general rule
`if test-result is good and (colour=green or colour=purple)' increased only
slightly from 0.1 to 0.15. Thus, employers generalise existing discriminating
rules to some extent. However, the adaptation process works mainly over
adjusting the selection probabilities.
Some more simulations were run to verify the observation that initial
beliefs do not inuence the result in the longer run. Figure 3.21 shows
the discrimination between green and purple workers for dierent f(). On
average, discrimination is low; maximum values are at most around 0.1.
Averaged over all steps, there was no simulation with discrimination larger
than 0.06. The extent of discrimination varies; this variation, however,
does not occur between simulations, but over time. In most simulations,
green workers even get hired more often at some stage. For example, for
f(q) = 0:71 and f(u) = 0:21 discrimination is close to -0.15 at t = 1500,
but close to 0.05 at t = 2000 and t = 4500.
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state description p(hire)
rel.
act.
abs.
act.
for t < 1000
Test-result is ambiguous and (colour =
purple or colour = green)
0.41 0.02 20
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =
green
0.5 0.01 11
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =
purple
0.5 0.01 11
Test-result is bad and (colour = purple
or colour = green)
0.33 0.13 119
Test-result is bad and colour = green 0.13 0.21 185
Test-result is bad and colour = purple 0.84 0.2 184
Test-result is good and (colour = pur-
ple or colour = green)
0.34 0.15 131
Test-result is good and colour = green 0.19 0.13 118
Test-result is good and colour = purple 0.78 0.13 119
for t = 1000 to t = 5000
Test-result is ambiguous and (colour =
purple or colour = green)
0.15 0.02 136
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =
green
0.45 0.02 121
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =
purple
0.54 0.02 124
Test-result is bad and (colour = purple
or colour = green)
0.39 0.24 1791
Test-result is bad and colour = green 0.13 0.18 1353
Test-result is bad and colour = purple 0.14 0.18 1375
Test-result is good and (colour = pur-
ple or colour = green)
0.37 0.11 815
Test-result is good and colour = green 0.16 0.12 866
Test-result is good and colour = purple 0.16 0.12 877
Table 3.11: Rules generated for model variant II with negative stereotypes, 25
repetitions, fu() = 0:06, fq() = 0:99, and their relative (rel. act.) and absolute
(abs. act.) activation frequency in the employer population before and after
time=1000. Measurements were taken every 100 time steps.
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state description p(hire)
rel.
act.
abs.
act.
for t < 1000
Test-result is ambiguous and (colour =
purple or colour = green)
0.35 0.08 74
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =
green
0.34 0.07 61
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =
purple
0.63 0.07 63
Test-result is bad and (colour = purple
or colour = green)
0.37 0.13 121
Test-result is bad and colour = green 0.25 0.1 93
Test-result is bad and colour = purple 0.7 0.1 94
Test-result is good and (colour = pur-
ple or colour = green)
0.36 0.1 93
Test-result is good and colour = green 0.16 0.17 160
Test-result is good and colour = purple 0.8 0.17 160
for t = 1000 to t = 5000
Test-result is ambiguous and (colour =
purple or colour = green)
0.31 0.07 613
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =
green
0.32 0.06 553
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =
purple
0.32 0.06 560
Test-result is bad and (colour = purple
or colour = green)
0.4 0.12 1075
Test-result is bad and colour = green 0.28 0.1 864
Test-result is bad and colour = purple 0.3 0.1 855
Test-result is good and (colour = pur-
ple or colour = green)
0.44 0.15 1271
Test-result is good and colour = green 0.17 0.17 1430
Test-result is good and colour = purple 0.19 0.16 1419
Table 3.12: Rules generated for model variant II with negative stereotypes, 25
repetitions, fu() = 0:35, fq() = 0:98, and their relative (rel. act.) and absolute
(abs. act.) activation frequency in the employer population before and after
time=1000. Measurements were taken every 100 time steps.
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Figure 3.21: Discrimination rates of green workers if rms are biased nega-
tively against green workers. Discrimination is the dierence between green and
purple employment levels. Each line represents averages of 10 simulation runs
for a particular combination of fq() / fu() (The legend displays the concrete
realisations).
3.5.4 Summary of the Simulation Results
Besides presenting more detailed gures about the behaviour of the RL
model, the purpose of the preceding two sections was to test under which
conditions it is possible to generate discrimination. Varying the exogenous
parameter  produced similar results as already obtained in the exploration
section. Discrimination can occur, but cannot be explained by  alone. In
the simulations that resulted in discrimination, a certain independence of
worker and employer behaviour was observed. Thus, an important reason
for discrimination in the RL model can be seen in dierent investment levels
on the worker side, if they are discovered only later during the simulation
by the employers.
In the next step, three scenarios where simulated. These scenarios intro-
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duced systematic biases in the simulation setup in the form of determinis-
tically discriminating rms, dierent investment cost distributions, and the
introduction of negative beliefs about green workers on the employer side.
The simulation results show a slight tendency of mutually stabilising ex-
pectations. So, for example, there is a non-linear relationship between the
number of deterministically discriminating rms and investment behaviour.
The more rms discriminate one group, the stronger this group is discour-
aged from investing, and the more unbiased rms tend not to hire members
of that group. The next scenario showed that the eect of increasing the
investment costs of green workers was not signicant enough to establish
a persistent negative employer bias. A similar picture exists if rms have
negative stereotypes about green workers. Thus, even an initial prohibitive
entry cost did not lead to persistent discrimination of the disadvantaged
group. In the longer run, discrimination disappears.
Thus, the RL model shows a weak interdependency between employer
expectations and worker behaviour. However, the main driving force in
the RL model is the stickiness of investment behaviour. This dynamic is
closer to the approach of Phelps (1972), where employers adjust to existing
dierences in worker productivity. In the RL model, this can only occur
if the simulation takes a certain path. A favourable condition can be seen
in free-riding behaviour of worker agents. If rms treat workers equally in
the beginning, but investment behaviour is dierent, members of the free-
riding group have no incentives to increase investments. Nevertheless, as
their behaviour is exible enough, employers will adjust their hiring levels.
On the other hand, workers in the model are less exible, and so they
remain with their initial choices. So to speak, initial `liberal' behaviour in
favour of less productive workers can turn into persistent discrimination, but
negative beliefs usually do not discourage otherwise homogenous workers
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from investing.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter presented a RL model of statistical discrimination using the
BRA algorithm developed in chapter 2. It aimed to reproduce experimental
results and asked whether these results could be generalised with an RL-
based model. Thus, the question was, whether, starting from empirical
observation, there is a general mechanism that could explain the emergence
of statistical discrimination.
The RL model was compared with both theoretical and empirical re-
sults from statistical discrimination games. Several model variants were
simulated to nd out which setup and parameter setting can reproduce the
patterns of Fryer Jr. et al (2005)'s classroom experiment best. One model
(variant II) reproduced with a relative large discrimination the aggregate
as well as behavioural patterns. Using this setup, some more scenarios were
simulated to analyse the properties of the model further.
Similar to game-theoretic and experimental results, the RL model shows
that statistical discrimination can exist. Whether it occurs is, however,
path-dependent. The scenarios simulated in this chapter were not capable of
creating a setting in which statistical discrimination emerges on the average.
Some dierences to the theoretical as well as experimental literature can
be highlighted:
{ The relationship between  and employment level could not be ob-
served. Increasing the likelihood of a positive test result does not
increase the number of investing workers and thus their hiring rates.
CHAPTER 3. STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION 119
{ Initial beliefs do not necessarily inuence the outcome in the long
run. That is, employer behaviour can adjust very quickly if worker
behaviour changes, e.g. due to an intervention such as increasing
access to human capital.
{ In the RL model, discrimination emerged although no knowledge
about market outcomes was available, whereas in the experiment
knowledge about market outcomes was public. Thus, for a belief to
emerge it may require even less publicly shared information. By look-
ing closer at the rules that emerged during the simulations, it could be
shown that the behavioural patterns of the RL model are nevertheless
similar as in the classroom experiment: If in doubt, hire a worker if he
or she comes from the group that is believed to be more productive;
do not hire if he or she comes from the group that is assumed to be
less productive. In some simulation runs, this results in a state in
which workers of the preferred group get hired even if they signal low
productivity.
{ In the RL model, worker behaviour is the driving factor for generating
discrimination. Discrimination can only emerge if the groups stick to
dierent investment behaviour after employer change their policies.
In summary, the RL model was shown to be a good approximation of
actual human behaviour in the experiments. While results of experiments
and simulations are similar, the RL model cannot conrm all the relation-
ships postulated by theory. Furthermore, a general rule capable of creating
discrimination could not be found.
Chapter 4
Network Formation
4.1 Introduction
Networks are an important paradigm for modelling social and economic
relationships. How members of a society are connected to each other de-
termines behaviour and welfare. Through connections to other persons,
important resources can be accessed and used for one's own purpose.
A useful distinction is between social and personal networks. Personal
networks are comprised of the relations an individual has, e.g. relatives,
friendships, acquaintances. Social networks are an aggregation of individual
networks.
The structural properties of networks have long been the topic of network
analysis in Sociology. The following stylized facts about empirical personal
networks can be drawn from this literature:
{ Personal networks are small; the closer the contact, the smaller the
network. In personal relationships, these contacts are usually family
and a few very close friends. Building on existing research, Hamill
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and Gilbert (2009) also note that maintaining close relationships is
costly, requiring resources as time and eort. This naturally limits
the extent of close relationships a person can maintain.
{ The distribution of the degree (the number of links a node in the net-
work has) of personal networks is unequal. Some individuals are more
sociable, and so have more relationships than most other people in the
network. Empirically, distributions of personal networks are typically
right-skewed, or 'fat-tailed'. This has been observed, for example, for
co-authorship data: There are some economists who appear in many
co-authored papers, while the majority has only few co-author rela-
tionships (Jackson 2008; p.60).
{ Members of personal networks tend to share the same characteristics
(homophily). Contacts between similar people are more likely than
among dissimilar people. This can be described by the cluster coe-
cient. This coecient determines, in principle, the likelihood that two
nodes share the same links. Thus, personal networks have characteris-
tically large cluster coecients, as compared to, say, a social network.
This phenomenon has already been observed by Granovetter (1973).
Social networks, on the other hand, are much less connected than indi-
vidual networks, i.e. they have a low overall network density (the ratio of all
links relative to all possible links). In larger groups, it is simply impossible
to know most other people. Nevertheless, most individuals in a society can
be reached within a few steps. This property of small average path lengths
(the number of nodes between any pair of nodes in the network) and small
diameters (the largest distance between any two nodes in the network) has
been captured in the notion of small worlds. This phenomenon became
widely known by Milgram's experiments (e.g. Watts 2004; Milgram and
CHAPTER 4. NETWORK FORMATION 122
Travers 1969). In these experiments, persons had to route letters to per-
sons in other states whom they did not directly know, passing the letter
to the target themselves or to someone they thought is likely to know that
person. About a quarter of the letter reached their targets. Drawing on
such insights, Milgram suggested that there are in general six degrees of
separation, i.e. anyone in a society is linked to anyone else with just six
intermediaries.
While a large literature about the structural properties of networks exists,
much less has been written about the dynamic aspects. Many concepts of
how and why people relate to each other are based on chance (homophily,
social or regional closeness, etc.), but they do not conceptualise the cre-
ation and maintenance of relationships as choice. For example, Barabasi's
preferential attachment model (Barabasi and Albert 1999) simply assumes
a higher probability of linking to already well-connected persons in the so-
ciety. However, if links, as stated above, are assumed to be costly, persons
have to make implicit or explicit decisions about who they want to be friends
with.
The concept of strategic network formation models the decisions on the
micro-perspective explicitly. Strategy should here be understood not liter-
ally, but in the sense that individuals tend to form mutually benecially
relationships and drop relationships that are not (Jackson 2008; p.153).
Viewing the formation of connections in such a way allows to model
networks as the outcome of a game. Goyal (2007) summarises the main
features of strategic network formation as follows:
{ Strategic network formation can be modelled as a game in which play-
ers decide to link or not to link to each other, depending on some
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value function of the network and an allocation rule that distributes
the value among the players.
{ It is based on assumptions of complete information (players know each
other and the payo structure).
{ Networks have some form of externality; that is, for individual players
the structure of the network itself inuences their utility.
Communication networks represent a commonly used network model in
Economics. Communication networks model relationships among individ-
uals that exhibit some benet to the members of the network, typically in
the form of information ows. The benet depends on the number of other
persons a member is linked to; the more persons in the network, the higher
its value to the individual. In its simple form, utility is a linear function of
the number of other players in the personal network. A more realistic form
assumes decay in value the more distant the source of information is. Es-
tablishing and maintaining direct links is costly because it typically involves
some eort. Individual utility depends, then, on the relationship between
costs and benets. On the aggregate, then, this relationship determines the
shape of the networks that can form. Such a general model can cover many
interesting social and economic settings where the structure of the networks
inuences the well-being of the members, for example, friendships, work re-
lationships, but also research partnerships between rms.
Although strategic network formation focuses on the micro perspective,
it is also possible to generate large-scale networks. Jackson and Rogers
(2005), for instance, present a spatial variation of a communication net-
work game. In this model, players are distributed on islands. Costs for
connecting to near-by players are low and high for connecting to distant
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players. Jackson and Rogers (2005) show that with certain cost settings,
the resulting network exhibits small world properties. The intuition is that
players form links with most of their close neighbours, but economise on dis-
tant links. It is, nevertheless, still benecial to maintain the distant links
which provide the only chance to access the benets of more players. Simi-
larly, the residential segregation model of Schelling (1971) could be seen as a
prototype of a network model combining chance and choice: Green and red
members of a society move randomly and meet other members. Depending
on their preference for living in a same-colour neighbourhood, they decide
to relocate or stay. The result is a society that is clustered into same colour
neighbourhoods.
In recent years, several experiments with strategic network formation
have been conducted in order to compare the theoretic predictions with
empirical data. Few of them are based on the partially cooperative network
model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996; JW). In this model, links are formed
only if both involved players agree. More research is related Bala and Goyal
(2000)'s non-cooperative version, where links can also be established uni-
laterally.
As this overview illustrates, strategic network formation can be seen as
a dierent and complementary way for generating personal and social net-
works dynamically. There have also been experiments to evaluate the pre-
dictive power of network formation models. So far, however, no experience-
based model of network formation exists. In general, RL models have been
found to predict experimental data better (see chapter 2). The purpose of
this chapter is to provide such a model for network games in order to bridge
the gap between theory and experimental evidence. It focuses on the level
of personal networks alone.
CHAPTER 4. NETWORK FORMATION 125
Section 4.2 rst introduces notation and denitions. Section 4.3 shortly
discusses the relevant theoretical, section 4.4 the experimental literature.
The RL model is then described in section 4.5. The simulations are analysed
in section 4.6. In section 4.8, a modied version of the RL model is used to
compare the results to the laboratory experiments conducted by Conte et al
(2009). The main question is whether the RL model can predict the outcome
of network formation processes better than the equilibrium prediction.
Relating the RL network model to the general learning approach as
discussed in chapter 2, it represents the case-based variant of BRA. Using
denition 4 developed in section 2.4.4, it can be described with: k > 1,
jAkj > 1,
nT
k=1
Lkl = ; and succ(Lk0) = ; for a number k of cases. It is
assumed that all players know each other, so that k players represent the
k cases. There is no dynamic extraction of rules. A variant of BRA where
the case distinctions are allowed to evolve dynamically is shortly presented
in section 4.7.
4.2 Denitions and Notation
4.2.1 Graphs
Denition 5. Graphs. A graph g, g  G, consists of a nonempty set
of elements, called vertices and denoted vi; v  V , and a list of pairs of
vertices, called edges. Edges connecting two vertices vi and vj directly are
denoted ij. A weighted graph is a graph in which weights are attached to the
edges. The cardinality of a graph is the number of edges it contains, and is
denoted with cg.
N denotes the set of all possible graphs that can be generated from V.
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g+ij denotes the graph that can be obtained by adding the edge ij to
graph g. Conversely, g-ij denotes the graph obtained by deleting this link.
Graphs that are obtained by adding or deleting links are called `adja-
cent'.
For simplifying the description of networks, an undirected, unweighted
graph can be dened as follows:
Denition 6. Network density. Network density measures how strongly
the vertices of a graph are interconnected by dividing the number of existing
edges by the number of possible edges. In the directed graph it is dened
as D = 1
n(n 1)
nX
i=0
nX
j=0
ij, for the undirected graph it simplies to D =
1
0:5(n(n 1))
nX
i=0
nX
j>i
ij. The fully connected graph has a density of 1, the empty
graph a density of 0.
Denition 7. Shortest path. Let Pxy be a nonempty path in a weighted
graph g from vertex x to vertex y, consisting of k edges xv1; v1v2:::vk 1y.
The weight of Pxy, denoted as W (Pxy), is the sum of the weights,
W (xv1);W (v1v2); :::W (vk 1y). If x=y, the empty path is considered to be a
path from x to y. The weight of the empty path is zero. If no path between x
and y has weight less thanW (Pxy), then Pxy is called a shortest path between
x and y, and is denoted as SPxy.
Denition 8. Average path length. The average path length is the average
of all shortest paths in the graph g and denoted as L: L = 1
n
nX
i6=j
SPij
While the above denitions are taken from standard graph theory (e.g.
Bondy 2008), the following notation is simply a short way of describing
network structures in small networks:
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Denition 9. Network patterns. Let the vector a be the ordered in- or
out-degree of all vertices. The in-degree is the number of edges arriving
at vertex i,the out-degree is the number leaving from it, the sum of both is
called in-out degree. In an undirected graph the in-degree equals the out-
degree, since for all edges arriving at i, there must be one leading back. If
the labels of the nodes are interchangeable, a describes the structure of the
network completely.
For example, the structure 1,1,1,1,4 represents a star with 5 vertices,
four vertices having one link, denoted by `1', and one vertex having four
links to all other vertices, denoted by `4'.
4.2.2 Games on Graphs
In a network game, the vertices vi represent players, and the edges the
relationships they can engage in.
Network games further include value and allocation functions on the
set of possible graphs G. Value functions specify how the total utility is
generated by the network, and the allocation rule denes how this value is
distributed among the individual players.
Denition 10. Value functions (see Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)).
(i) A value function vf is a mapping vf : fgjg  gNg ! R
(ii) The value function cvf is dened as the sum of individual utilities of
the players: cvf(g) =
P
i ui(g)
Denition 11. Allocation function (see Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)).
An allocation function Y : fg j g  gNg distributes the value generated by
vf . The `equal split rule' (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996) distributes the value
evenly among the players and is dened as: Ye(g; v) = cvf(g)=n.
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4.2.3 Stability denitions
Denition 12. Pairwise Stability (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996). A network
is pairwise stable if
(i) for all edges ij 2 g, Yi(g; v)  Yi(g   ij; v) and Yj(g; v)  Yi(g   ij; v)
(ii) for all edges ij 62 g, Yi(g; v) < Yi(g + ij; v) then Yj(g; v) > Yi(g + ij; v)
In words: If a link between two players is stable, then there cannot
be an adjacent network with higher value obtainable by deleting this link.
Conversely, for any player not being part of the network, the value that can
be added by this player must be smaller than the current value, otherwise
the link would be formed.
The concept of pairwise stability requires that at most two players act at
the same time, and that the players look only one step ahead. The concept
of strong stability extends pairwise stability to coalition of players:
Denition 13. Strong Stability (Jackson and van den Nouweland 2005).
A network g is strongly stable with respect to Y and vf if for H  V and g'
obtainable from g via deviations by H, and vi 2 H such that Yvi(g0; vf) >
Yvi(g; vf), there exists j 2 S such that Yj(g0; vf) < Yj(g; vf).
That is, a network can only be stable if a subset H of players has no
incentive to alter it.
For dynamic models of network formation, Jackson and Watts (2002)
adapted the concept of stochastic stability (Young 1993). In the dynamic
version of the game, at each time step two randomly selected players decide
to form or sever a link. The players act myopically and base their decision
on whether they are better o with the alteration in t+1. That is, they
do not consider the possible consequences that may follow by changing the
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utility of other players. After the decision is taken, with some probability
 > 0 the alteration is applied, or with 1    not. This is a Markov chain
with the states being the respective networks that are formed during the
process. With  ! 0 the stationary distribution converges to a unique
limiting stationary distribution. From this follows the next denition:
Denition 14. Stochastic stability (Jackson and Watts 2002). A network
in the support of the limiting stationary distribution of the dynamic process
is stochastically stable.
Jackson and Watts present methods that allow the identication of
stochastically stable networks. The main idea is to identify paths between
adjacent networks leading with the smallest possible resistance to a pair-
wise stable network. Resistance describes whether there exists an improving
path from a given network (i.e. with every step all players have to be better
o), and if not, how often some deviation from the individual rational choice
(described by ) has to be made. More details follow in the next section.
4.3 Models of Network Formation
The JW model is essentially a proof of the existence of stable and ecient
networks. Subsequent work based on this model (Watts 2001; Jackson and
Watts 2002; Hummon 2000; Doreian 2006) as well as related work (Bala
and Goyal 2000; Beal and Querou 2007) provide a dynamic perspective.
In the JW model, players are fully informed, perfectly rational and my-
opic. Two players can choose at a time to link to each other. The link
is only formed if both players agree. The links are undirected since both
ends are involved in establishing it. Links can be severed unilaterally; the
game is hence partially cooperative. After their decision, the network value
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is computed, and the value distributed among the agents according to the
equal-split allocation rule. Direct links are costly, and both agents bear the
costs of the link. Then, the next two players are selected, who take their
decisions based on the current value of the network and the value that would
result by their respective actions. As they are myopic they only consider the
next state of the network. This process goes on until pairwise equilibrium
is reached. Depending on the cost of links, three dierent equilibria can be
sustained: the fully connected network, a sparsely connected network, and
the empty network.
The utility function is given by:
ui(g; t) = wii +
X
j 6=i
tijwij  
X
j:ij2g
cij (4.1)
tij is the number of links in the shortest path between individuals i and j.
Links between players have a certain value wij, plus a constant 'intrinsic'
value wii that each player perceives (so that, say, remaining unconnected
can have its own utility). 0 <  < 1 is a decay factor by which the value
of connections may decrease. tij captures the fact that the longer the path
between the two nodes, the smaller its benet becomes. If i is not connected
to j,  is set to 0. Direct links are the most valuable, but they come at a
cost: cij denotes the costs of maintaining direct relationships (e.g. time and
eort); for all indirect connections, it is set to 0.
For simplicity, Jackson and Wolinsky set wii to zero and wij to 1, so
that the network depends only on the rate of decay and the cost of direct
links. Furthermore, cost and value are dependent on links, not players.
Therefore, the indices are left out, and only c and  is written. They prove
the following properties of the network game:
{ c <    2: The complete graph is the only unique stable solution.
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Players will choose to connect with each other directly provided that
the cost of a link is lower than the value gained from it: The value of
the highest valued indirect link 2 is smaller than the net-value    c
gained from a direct link.
{  2 < c < : Many solutions are possible, namely all those beneting
from indirect links. In this case a direct link has positive utility, but
as    c < 2 it is more benecial to be indirectly linked. One of the
stable solutions is star, as this structure minimises the number of links
and the distance between the nodes.
{  < c: The only feasible solution is the empty network. No player
would be willing to create a connection, even if there exists a network
that yields positive payos.
They also show that for all n, a unique ecient network exists:
{ If c <    2 then the complete network is ecient, as the utility of
any direct link exceeds the benet of an indirect link.
{ for    2 < c <  + (n   2)=2  2 the star is ecient. It minimises
the number of direct links while connecting all players with a minimal
distance.
{ for  + (n  2)=2  2 < c only the empty network is ecient; that is.
For any situation where costs exceed the value that can be generated
by the star.
Watts (2001) analyses the actual process of forming the network in the
connection model. The static model only identied the equilibria and con-
rms that stable network states exist, but does not reveal whether and how
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these can actually be reached. In the dynamic version, two players are
selected randomly and given the opportunity to form a link. Players are
myopic, and thus anticipate in their decision only the utility of the network
that forms in the next step. The process stops if a stable network results.
She nds that two main attractors are possible: The formation of a stable
network, or a cycle of adjacent networks (an adjacent network is a network
that is obtainable by adding or deleting one link) without any sustainable
equilibrium. A network can only be pairwise stable if it can be reached over
a path of adjacent networks. Where there is no such path, after some time
all feasible networks have been visited, and the process must cycle along
those networks. In more detail, the main results are:
{    c > 2 > 0: The fully connected network forms. In each period
utility strictly increases for any two players not yet directly connected.
Since breaking any link an agent reduces his payo, no links will ever
be broken, as in the static model.
{ 0 <    c < 2: Stable non-empty networks can form. The star
is ecient and is also a pairwise stable network, although not the
unique one. The probability that a star develops decreases as n goes
to innity, because its formation depends on the order in which players
meet: Some agent must be the centre agent. If the centre agent
C meets another agent A not yet linked to it, then C will agree to
establish the connection only if A is not linked to anyone else already
connected to C. Otherwise, C would lose the benet of the indirect
link. Thus, the star can only form if all agents meet the centre agent
rst. The link will be established because with 0 <    c, any direct
link between isolated players will be formed. The larger n, the more
likely that unconnected players meet each other before meeting the
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same (centre) agent. As a consequence, the likelihood of cycles or
the convergence to sub-optimal solutions increases. Especially in the
higher cost regions, agents prefer to connect to players who already
have a link. As the chance to meet the centre agent rst decreases
with n, the process is likely to converge to a network with only one
path connecting every pair of players (i.e. a `line network').
{    c < 0: No link is formed. Myopic agents cannot form any links,
since there is no benet in establishing the rst link, even if connected
networks with a utility > 0 do exist.
Jackson and Watts (2002) generalise this approach by modelling it as a
stochastic process, Again, two players are selected randomly, but their deci-
sion to form or not form a link is only carried out with a certain probability
1   , whereas with probability  nothing is done. The parameter  may
be thought of as errors individuals make in their calculations, or deliberate
deviations in order to explore dierent paths. The smaller , the more likely
the results converge to that of Watts (Watts 2001). However, with larger
random perturbations, the myopic nature of the players can be overcome
by visiting networks that would not result by rational, myopic decisions.
Thereby, a new path of adjacent networks can be reached, possible leading
to a pairwise stable network. As already indicated (see denition 14), the
dynamics can be formalised as a Markov process on the random variable .
As  ! 0, stable networks that cannot be reached are excluded, and the
process selects those solutions that can actually be reached by myopic play-
ers. An application to the co-author model (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996)
demonstrates that the complete network is selected as the unique stochas-
tically stable network out of several possible solutions. This means other
stable solutions might exist, but are not reachable. However, they also
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demonstrate that there are examples where all pairwise stable networks are
equally stochastically stable.
Hummon (2000) uses the same model specication as Watts (2001), but
he simulates the model computationally to obtain his results for n=3, 5
and 10 (see also Doreian (2006) for a detailed, but purely descriptive follow
up for n=5 and n=6). The most important observation in this context is
that on average in all cost ranges either a star or a ring emerges as the
most frequent solution. Which formation occurs depends solely on n and
the order in which actors meet. As Watts (2001) derived theoretically, the
simulations show that with increasing n the frequency of the star decreases.
Only in the lower cost ranges the star still forms.
Bala and Goyal (2000; BG) analyse the formation of communication
networks as a non-cooperative game. In the BG model, links can be formed
and severed unilaterally. Agents who initiate links have to bear all the costs.
They consider two variants of the model, on in which benets accrue only
to the linking agent (1-way-ow model), and one where benets are shared
between players (2-way-ow model).
Using a payo function without decay, the payo of a player is given
by the benet received of direct and indirect links minus the cost of direct
links in network g:
i(g) = i(g)  cdi (g) (4.2)
The marginal benet of being connected to another agent is normalised to
1. c is the cost,  is the number of all players player i is connect to, and di
is the number of direct links the agent maintains.
In any setting where the benets exceed the costs, it is a best response
to link to at least one other player. Bala and Goyal show that in the 1-
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way-ow model the Nash equilibrium network is either empty or minimal
connected. A minimal connected network is a network in which all nodes
are connected and splits apart into more than one component as soon as one
link is severed. In the 2-way-ow model, the equilibrium network is either
empty or minimally bi-connected, meaning that agents are connected in the
form a directed graph, and no redundant links exist.
This equilibrium denition includes a large number of networks as the
number of player grows. For example, for three players there are already ve
Nash networks in the 1-way-ow model. As a renement, Bala and Goyal
dene strict Nash equilibrium networks. A strict Nash equilibrium exists if
there is no other strategy available for all players i that is a best response
given a strategy prole of the other players i. For the 1-way-ow model,
Bala and Goyal show that the Strict Nash equilibrium is either the empty
network or a wheel (a directed graph in form of a ring). More specically,
if c < 1 the ring is the unique equilibrium; if 1 < c < n   1 both empty
and wheel network are stable; if c > n  1, the empty network is the unique
stable network. In the 2-way-ow model, the equilibrium network is either
the empty or the centre-sponsored star network (a star where the centre
player pays all the links). If c < 1, the centre-sponsored star is the unique
equilibrium; if c > 1, then the empty network is the unique strict Nash
equilibrium.
To investigate the question whether these static games actually converge
to strict Nash networks in a dynamic setting, the game is specied as a
repeated one. The start is a random network, and each player plays his
strategy sequentially. All players observe the resulting network as well as the
strategies played. Players remain with their last strategy with a probability
p, or decide to play new action with probability 1   p. In the latter case
they decide on a best-response given the actions played by the other players
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in the previous round of the game. Bala and Goyal then identify limiting
cases of strict Nash equilibria by looking at the changes that are induced
when exactly one player adapts his strategy. Simulations are used to test
whether the game converges to these limits for dierent p and to determine
the speed of convergence. They nd that in the 1-way-ow model, the rate
of convergence is rapid, reaching one of the predicted networks in less than
20 rounds. In the 2-way-ow model, convergence takes longer. The smaller
p, that is, the closer behaviour to pure best-response, the quicker strict
Nash equilibrium is reached. The intuition behind this is that with p = 0,
the network will oscillate between full and empty networks (assuming an
initially empty network) as all agents move. In the rst step, linking to any
player is the best response. When the network is fully connected, severing
all but one link is optimal. With p close to 1, at some stage only one agent
will not move, leaving it at the centre of a centre-sponsored star with some
positive probability (see also Bernasconi and Galizzi (2005)).
Beal and Querou (2007) model a network game with a notion of bounded
rationality. They begin with a one-shot game. In the model, forming a link
requires the consent of both players. Players incur costs for oering the link;
consequently, players only oer links if they know that their opponents do
the same. This results in the empty network as unique Nash equilibrium if
players are fully rational. In their dynamic version of the game, players have
limited memory, but are otherwise perfectly informed about other players'
past actions. The game is repeated over a nite number of time steps
larger than players' memory. Players maximise their average payo. Beal
and Querou show that with this form of bounded rationality, non-empty
networks can exist. Any deviation must be weighted by the players against
the potential harm that results from deleting links, as the other players will
never link once it has been revealed that the other player does not link until
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they forget the deviation until they forget the deviation. As a result, the
costs of establishing new links cannot be too high, or the potential value
gained from a link must be large enough before any link can emerge.
More recent BG-type models look at the role heterogeneity plays for
equilibrium selection. Although heterogeneity is out of scope of this chap-
ter's model, these models are noteworthy because of some experimental
results related to them (discussed in section 4.4). McBride (2006) focuses
on value heterogeneity and partial information. Value heterogeneity is given
if the value of connections is dierent among players; partial information
means that a player observes only the actions of his direct neighbours. In
such cases, inecient outcomes might emerge, whereas under perfect in-
formation, the ecient minimal connected networks are also equilibrium
networks. Other authors analyse the role of heterogeneous cost for estab-
lishing links (e.g. Galeotti et al 2006). They nd that in equilibrium state,
cost-heterogeneous players form either empty or centre-sponsored star net-
works; if value varies as well, a strict equilibrium is either the empty network
or a minimal connected network with components being connected in the
form of centre-sponsored stars.
Models with farsighted players (Watts 2002; Deroian 2003) or coalition
formation (Dutta and Mutuswami 1997; Jackson and van den Nouweland
2005; Slikker and van den Nouweland 2000) are related to the network for-
mation game, but use dierent assumptions about agent behaviour and co-
operation among agents. When players are allowed to form coalitions, con-
ditions for equilibrium are stronger and thus reduce the number of possible
equilibria since deviations require the consent of all concerned players in the
coalition. Using denition 13, Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) show
that strongly stable networks are ecient. When players are farsighted,
situations where the costs of links formed exceeds the benets, but the re-
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sulting (non-empty) network has a positive payo for the connected players,
can be overcome. However, although ecient networks could be formed in
such cost ranges, this does not happen because each player wants to pre-
vent to become the centre of a star-like structure. Rather, circle networks
distributing costs and benets equally are likely to form.
There have been no applications of RL to strategic network formation
games in particular. Using the stag hunt game, only Pemantle and Skyrms
(Pemantle and Skyrms 2000; 2004) provide an RL approach of link forma-
tion. In the stag hunt game, there are two types of hunters, stag hunters
and hare hunters. Both receive a higher utility from hunting with the same
types, a lower utility of being in a group with hunters of the other type, and
a zero payo if they stay alone. At each time step, hunters can propose to
form a group with two other hunters. Hunters who receive a proposal always
accept the oer, so that the group will form if a proposal is made. Starting
with equal propensities to form cliques with any type of hunters, the pro-
cess converges to cliques of the same types if recent experience is weighted
higher. On the other hand, if agents remember all their experiences, the
process is much more unstable or converges very slowly.
4.4 Experiments with Network Formation
Several network game experiments have been conducted. Most experiments
are based on the BG model; only few follow a similar specication as the
JW model, which is the focus of the RL model analysed later. However,
also for the (partial) cooperative JW model some conclusions can be drawn
from the experimental literature.
Vanin (2002) conducts an exploratory experiment of the JW model with
four players. The cost setting is  < c < N 2
2
2, that is, in the medium
CHAPTER 4. NETWORK FORMATION 139
range where the star is ecient, but not stable. The value of linking to
other players j, wij, is set to 1000; the cost of a link is 1000;  was set
to 0.8. Pairwise stable is any minimal connected network. Three dierent
groups played the game cooperatively by discussing possible solutions and
agreeing on the links they form. A rst treatment allows for side-payments
to compensate those players bearing larger costs; the second is without side
payments. With side-payments two groups coordinate on ecient outcomes,
while the third group forms a ring. In the second treatment, there are no
side-payments. The rst two groups coordinated on the line network. The
other group, however, did not consider to agree on an unequal outcome and
coordinated on a ring, splitting the cost equally. This result is remarkable
insofar as the line is the pareto-optimal outcome: While the ring provides
an equal payo of 240 to all players, the line provides a payo of 240 to the
players with 2 links, but the two extreme players get 952. This agreement
was reached tossing a coin. Such an outcome requires that players accept
inequality that the players distinguish between the opportunity to gain more
before the game starts, and the actual outcome.
Falk and Kosfeld (2003) consider the BG game with 1-way and 2-way
ows of benet and no decay. There are four players in the game. The
cost settings cover empty, minimal and star networks as the equilibrium
prediction. The game is played for ve rounds. Links are formed simulta-
neously. After a step, players are informed about the network, costs and
the connected players. They nd that
{ In 1-way ow models many outcomes are Nash strict Nash equilibria
(between 40 and 60 %). However, for the 2-way ow model, there is
no strict Nash equilibrium, and fewer Nash equilibria (between 10 and
30 %).
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{ If there is more than one unique stable network, subjects solve the
coordination problem by opting for the ecient network.
{ Higher costs support the selection of both Nash and strict Nash so-
lutions in the 1-way ow model, but have a negative impact on the
selection in the 2-way ow model.
Falk and Kosfeld (2003) provide two possible explanations for the unequal
results in the 1-way and 2-way ow models. The rst possibility is the asym-
metry in payos: In the 1-way ow model, the ring is the stable network, as
each player has to create a link to participate in the value of the network.
Costs and benets are distributed equally. In the 2-way ow model, the sta-
ble solution is the centre-sponsored star, but no rational player wants to be
in this position. Their data support this hypothesis, as they nd that when
such solutions are reached, they are unstable, i.e. the disadvantaged players
sever their links. The other possible explanation oered are social prefer-
ences. This hypothesis is supported by their nding that the frequency of
Nash outcomes decreases the more unequal the payos are - this becomes
especially apparent in the low frequency of the centre-sponsored star. Using
a regression model, they nd that individuals are more likely to revise their
strategy if outcomes were unequal.
Using a similar setup as Falk and Kosfeld (2003), Bernasconi and Galizzi
(2005) nd very dierent results. They consider four treatments with low
and high costs and one- and bi-directional ow of benets. The main dier-
ence to the former experiment is a more neutral labelling. Bernasconi and
Galizzi (2005) claim that the use of ordered labels A,B,C,D in Falk and Kos-
feld's experiment serves as a coordinating device, as they nd in their own
experiments that the ring from A to D can be observed signicantly more
often than when random labels are used. They therefore choose instead
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more neutral labels like '&' or '%'. They nd that in the one-directional
treatments almost no Nash networks emerge (between 1% and 3%). In the
bi-directional experiments sometimes Nash networks form, but also with
comparatively low frequency (between 13% and 17%).
Callander and Plott (2005) consider a BG model with 1-way ow of
benets with no decay. They consider dierent treatments with homogenous
and heterogeneous cost settings. Cost settings are such that the wheel is
strict Nash. For the homogenous case, they nd that
{ The empty network never occurs.
{ If networks converge, it is usually a Nash equilibrium, however, not
strict.
{ Not all Nash equilibria are stable, often an equilibrium state collapsed
again.
Looking at how players take decisions and the dynamics of behaviour, they
nd that
{ Players do typically not play myopic best-responses as in the BG
model. They often use simple strategies considering the future out-
comes of the game. Agents make more sophisticated decisions antici-
pating future outcomes.
{ Agents using such simple strategic behaviour follow their strategy
more consistently.
{ Convergence depends on the behaviour of all agents. The more agents
switch to simple strategic behaviour, the more likely the network con-
verges.
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{ The more agents remain committed to their behaviour, the more likely
other agents will adopt this behaviour as well.
Conte et al (2009) investigate a link formation game where links are
formed only if both players agree. In each round of the game players bid
for links simultaneously. The main interest is not whether networks con-
verge, but which individual strategies are responsible for the result. There
are six players, no decay, and cost settings are such that the equilibrium
prediction is a minimal connected network. Subjects have full information
about the network. In total, there were 54 participants. Nine experimental
sessions were run with six players per session. A session lasts at least 15
rounds, after which a random generator determined to stop the session. In
the experiments, minimally connected networks emerge; however, stability
is low. Conte et al (2009) attribute this to the fact that many equilibria
are possible, so that it is dicult to coordinate on a certain outcome. They
also observe that when a minimal connected network is established, some
players are tempted to experiment with alternative strategies. As a result,
a network might come out of equilibrium again. From the individual per-
spective, they nd that 40 % of strategies are best-response strategies. The
remaining 60% strategies are not very far from best-response behaviour.
Distance is determined by calculating an index based the dierence be-
tween prots of actual and best response behaviour. Common alternative
strategies are reciprocator and opportunistic behaviour. The rst behaviour
maximises direct connections by always oering links to those players who
oered links in the previous round. The second behaviour tries to maximise
indirect links by removing direct links whenever possible. Best response
behaviour is strongly group driven, i.e. the more players adopt this strat-
egy the more likely that the remaining agents follow. There is an overlap
between best response and the other strategies. Conte et al (2009) estimate
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econometrically that 42% of players belong to the opportunistic, 31% to the
best response type and 27% to the reciprocator type. The high portion of
the opportunistic type thus points, similar as the previous studies, to more
complex than myopic best response behaviour.
Goeree et al (2009) test whether heterogeneous players manage better
to agree on ecient networks. They consider three treatments: A base-
line treatment with homogenous agents, a treatment with a low-cost agent
(experiencing lower costs for maintaining a link), and a treatment with a
high-value agent (experiencing and providing higher utility per direct or in-
direct link). They nd that with homogeneous agents, formation of equilib-
rium networks fails. Introducing cost heterogeneity supports the emergence
of equilibrium networks in the form of minimal connected or star-networks.
When agents receive dierent value from linking the chance to observe equi-
librium networks is highest.
Summarising the main results of the experimental literature, the follow-
ing conclusions can be drawn:
{ The frequency of equilibrium networks diers strongly between the
experiments. Some authors nd no Nash networks at all. Maximum
rates observed go up to 40%.
{ Even where Nash networks are found as good predictors, it becomes
apparent that the actual individual decisions deviate from the myopic
best response (Callander and Plott 2005). Basic strategies like oppor-
tunistic linking, reciprocating behaviour or simple strategic-decision
making are more common.
{ The more agents commit to a certain behaviour, the more likely con-
vergence.
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{ Some authors further mention an equality norm, i.e. a preference of
the players for equal distributions of cost (e.g. Vanin 2002).
4.5 A Reinforcement Learning Model of Net-
work Formation
One conclusion of the literature review is that actual human behaviour in
the experiments diers often from the equilibrium condition. This section
describes the RL based model of network formation and asks how the out-
come diers from the theoretic predictions.
A dynamic version of the connections model is considered, similar to
Watts (2001) and Jackson and Watts (2002), but adapted to a setting with
RL agents. As a benchmark, the original analysis of Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) for the static, and Watts (2001) for the dynamic model can be used.
The game proceeds as follows:
{ Two agents are picked randomly.
{ Both agents decide whether to oer a link or not.
{ If both agents oer a link, the connection is added, otherwise not.
{ The new network is computed.
{ The two agents who acted receive their rewards, calculated with equa-
tion 4.1.
If a link was formed, it exists as long as the two agents do not meet again.
When they meet another time, the link is maintained if both agents oer a
link again, otherwise it is severed.
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Learning In the reviewed network games literature bounded rationality
was described as an injection of `irrationality', for example, as error term
 as in Jackson and Watts (2002) or Bala and Goyal (2000), or a limited
memory as in Beal and Querou (2007).
In the model presented here, RL can be seen as a form of limited ratio-
nality. Agents start with no information at all and learn by trial and error
about the game and the application of the appropriate actions. Players
know only the name of the other players and may choose from the action
set A =fa0 : : : ai : : : ang given by foer link, not-oer linkg.
Using the concepts of BRA introduced in chapter 2, the internal choice
model for agent i is given by rku;v : C
k;k 6=i
u;v ! foer; not-oerg. There are
k   1 mappings and the initial conditions contain only one attribute with
one value (player-name=k), so no further expansion is possible. BRA thus
reduces to disjoint sets of simple RL rules. For each rk agent i updates the
action strengths, that is, 8rk, using
q(aj(t; k)) = q(aj(t  1; k)) + (ui(g; t)  q(aj(t  1; k)))
Using the exponential selection rule in equation 2.10, agent i chooses at the
next encounter with agent j his action.
Parameter settings The model has four parameters of interest,  and
, cost c and value . As in the original JW model, wij is set to 1, and wii
to 0. Agents are homogenous; cost and value are the same for all players.
In the simulations, the parameters c and  are varied. c can be seen
as the structural parameter inuencing the opportunities for the players; 
determines the rate of exploration. The greater , the more likely explo-
ration in the action selection process and the selection propensities for both
actions become more similar; the smaller , the faster the agents stick to
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a reasonably good solution. The central question for the adaptive network
model is whether it is possible to generate stable and ecient solutions, and
how the properties of the learning rule have to be for this. The inuence of
randomness on the outcome has led to the choice of stochastic stability as
the benchmark stability denition for the RL model.
The discount parameter  is only of minor importance for the analysis.
 sets the rate at which the reward is updated. The smaller this weight, the
faster the experienced reward approximates the true reward. Experiments
with various  values were used to select the best model for a more detailed
analysis of . A short overview of dierent  settings is given in section
4.6.4.
The value of , 0 <  < 1 is xed at a value larger > 0. Since there are
no requirements or other substantial reasons for a particular value except
that decay exists, it has been set to 0.5. For each cost range, the values
for c are drawn randomly in order to obtain some samples within each cost
range.  is incremented by 0.01 from 0.01 to 1.
Table 4.1 shows the parameters in summary.
cost range   
c < 0:25 (low cost range) 0.01 : : : 1 0.5 0.1, 0.25, 0.75, 1
0:25 < c  0:5 (medium cost range) 0.01 : : : 1 0.5 0.1, 0.25, 0.75, 1
c > 0:5 (high cost range) 0.01 : : : 1 0.5 0.1, 0.25, 0.75, 1
Table 4.1: RL network model parameter settings
Measurements for the simulations Networks and network formation
can be described in a variety of ways. In section 4.2.1 the measures D (den-
sity) and L (average path length) were already introduced. Three additional
measures are dened here:
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A stability measure is computed to assess how robust the solutions are.
It might occur that a simulation result comes very close to the theoretic
equilibrium in settings where agents explore enough and discover better
solutions. Since exploration comes at the cost of more random decisions in
the process, the whole system can become unstable.
Denition 15. Stability. St = 1  12
n(g;t 1) n(g;t 1)
(n(n 1))
Stability is simply the dierence in the number of links between two time
steps, divided by the number of maximum possible links to standardise the
measure. For a single simulation step, the value can be either 0 or 1. Over
a sample of simulations, St can be interpreted as the probability that a link
changes at t. It thus varies between 0 and 1 and the closer it is to 0 the
more stable the network is.
To compare the results with the game-theoretic prediction, a tness
measure is dened as follows:
Denition 16. Fitness / Eciency. Let the vector gstable be the stochas-
tic stable network (ecient network), and gactual a simulated network. Let
stepsmax be the maximum number of modications starting from any net-
work to gstable, and stepsactual the number of modications to reach gstable
from gactual. Dene the tness at time t as: fitt =
1
2
(
stepsactual;t
stepsmax
+
stepsactual;t
stepsmax
St)
The resulting measure varies between 0 and 1 and tends towards 1 the
closer the network structure to the stochastic stable network, and the more
stable the simulation result (multiplying the distance with St and adding it
in the enumerator has the eect that stable states are weighted higher as
St = 0 if a linked changed, 1 otherwise).
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To determine the stochastic stable network, the procedure in Jackson
and Watts (2002) has been implemented as a computer program. The
program computes the set of all possible networks, and nds out the pairwise
stable network with the minimal resistance from all other networks in the
set.
4.6 Simulations
4.6.1 Overview
Simulations were run for at least 10.000 time steps per  and  combination
for each cost range in samples of up to 4000 steps with several repetitions
per simulation, giving a reasonably large sample. Figure 4.1 shows how
tness values vary depending on  and .
Figure 4.1: Fit of simulations for simulated  and  values.
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Across all , the t of the simulation develops analogously - starting
with a high t of up to 0.6 for small , then decreasing to values of about
0.35. Furthermore, results t better for  = 0:25 and  = 0:75; that is, for
values close to very long memory and no memory at all. The reason for this
behaviour lies in the dierent role of adjustment speeds to other agents'
behaviour depending on the cost range. This is discussed in section 4.6.4.
Analysis revealed that the  and  combinations maximising tness in
each cost range are  = 0:1 and  = 0:75 for the low,  = 0:01 and  = 0:25
for the medium, and  = 0:07 and  = 1:0 for the high cost range (in the
high cost range several combinations achieve a t of 1. Out of the top
20 results, the simulation belonging to the most frequent  value and the
highest  was chosen). Some more samples for these specic values were
simulated to look closer at the behaviour for various cost values. Using net-
work density as an indicator, gure 4.2 illustrates connectivity as a function
of cost.
In the high cost range (c > 0:5) the empty network emerges as solu-
tion. In the low cost range (c < 0:25), connectivity is high (almost fully
connected structures). In the medium cost range (0:25 < c  0:5) networks
become sparser (density between 0.4 and 0.5). For the `border' regions be-
tween low and medium, as well as medium and high cost range connectivity
changes gradually; for example, for cost=0.54, density was 0.28. In the RL
process, no threshold function between cost ranges emerges as stated in the
benchmark model.
The following sections analyse the behaviour of the simulation in more
detail. It is analysed how the shape of networks changes when  changes.
The question is how the exploration and exploitation aect the connectivity
and stability of small networks.  is held constant at the value maximising
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Figure 4.2: Network density over all cost samples.
the tness in each cost range.
4.6.2 Network Properties for Dierent 
Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 show how density, stability and t develop in the
low, medium and high cost ranges.
Low cost range (c <   2) The optimal solution is the fully connected
network (D = 1). Figure 4.3 shows that for small (/ 0:07) the network
is strongly connected (D  0:7) without reaching the complete network,
and stability tends towards 1. As could be expected, for small , agents
tend to stick to rst-best solutions, which are those providing the largest
increase in marginal utility. With  increasing towards  0:11, the network
is developing towards the fully connected network (D  0:8). However,
this comes at the cost of stability, i.e. some agents keep switching. Finally,
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Figure 4.3: Network density, stability and t for the low cost range.
for  > 0:6, connectivity and variability approach a limit in an asymptotic
manner with density about 0.35. The random limit is given by the probabil-
ity that oered links are accepted. Assuming total randomness, the chance
of oering a link is 0.5, the chance that the other player oers a link at the
same time is equally 0.5. Thus, the probability that a link can actually be
formed by pure chance is 0.25. This indicates that RL performs better than
randomness, even if the distance between the action propensities becomes
smaller.
Medium cost range (2 < c  ) According to the static as well as the
dynamic model, minimal connected networks should form (i.e. D  0:5).
Computations showed that the star is the ecient as well as stochastic
stable pairwise network. In the simulations, agents end up very close to
a minimal connected network (D  0:5) for  < 0:06. These networks
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Figure 4.4: Network density, stability and t for the medium cost range.
are very stable. For 0:07 <  < 0:15 there is a decrease in density to
 0:4, with a sharp drop in stability and corresponding decreases in t. For
0:15   < 0:3 density decreases further. For  ' 0:3 the connectivity of the
network settles asymptotically near to the random limit; similar to the low
cost range the RL process performs also here (slightly) better than random.
The density of  0:4 in the range 0:07 <  < 0:15 indicates that networks
are not over-connected, but may be rather ecient. The sharp decrease in
stability points, however, to coordination failure (random switching) rather
than reinforcements. In principle, optimal network structures can develop
simply because they are closer to a random outcome.
High cost range (c > ) Here, the empty network is expected. Although
for some agents positive utility could be generated by indirect links, there
is always at least one agent for whom the costs exceeds the value it receives
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Figure 4.5: Network density, stability and t for the high cost range.
and thus motivates the deletion of direct links. Figure 4.5 shows that the
simulation converges to the equilibrium prediction if agents explore little
( < 0:15). For  > 0:25, at least two agents are linked (D = 0:1).
The random limit is approached for  values > 0.3. the model approaches
quite fast a situation where at least two agents are linked. At   0:6 the
simulation converges to the random limit (D  0:2). Here again RL clearly
performs better than a random process.
4.6.3 Network Structure and Dynamics
Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 show the results for the three cost ranges for the
measures density (D), stability (S), and match (fit). A cluster analysis
for  has been performed on the variables D and S to group the results.
These variables have been chosen because they describe the dimensions
structure as well as time. For the resulting clusters, the emerging networks
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are characterised by network structure, and the summary measures density
D, average path length L, tness fit, S and eciency E. The choice of three
cluster centres reects roughly the main dynamics observed in gures 4.3,
4.4 and 4.5: A good tness in the lower  regions, then decrease in tness
(which may mean a decrease or increase in density), nally approximation
of the random limit. The tables illustrate the most network architectures
which result during this process. For readability, only the upper quartile
is represented. The share of each network is based on the frequency in the
quartile (not the overall occurrences).
Low cost range (c <    2) Table 4.2 shows the following: In clus-
ter 1 (the cluster with the best t), the most common visited networks are
2,3,3,4,4; 2,2,2,3,3 and 2,2,3,3,4 with a relatively high connectivity (D = 0:6
- 4 missing links to the complete network; and 0:8 - 2 missing links to the
complete network). The path lengths of 1.5-1.75 indicate that most net-
works are connected in a way that each player can be reached directly or
with one intermediary at maximum. In the second  range, the most fre-
quent networks 2,2,2,3,3; 2,2,3,3,4 and 1,2,2,2,3 are still connected more
densely than sparse networks, but are also quite unstable (S  0:7 as com-
pared to  0:9 in the rst cluster). Finally, cluster 3 illustrates that with
 ! 1, network density approaches its random limit 0.25, with frequent
unconnected networks (i.e, L = 0).
Medium cost range (2 < c  ) In the medium cost range, relatively
stable networks close to minimal connected networks form. The network
1,2,2,2,3 is the most common one, with an average path length of 2.04,
meaning that now often at least one intermediary connects two dierent
players. This is close to a ring (only one player has more links), which
is the structure minimising the costs, at the same time distributing them
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Cluster Network D L S Fit Share
 0:01  0:24 1,2,3,3,3 0.6 1.88 0.92 0.58 0.07
avg(D) 0.68 1,2,2,2,3 0.5 2.05 0.92 0.48 0.09
avg(L) 1.67 2,3,3,3,3 0.7 1.63 0.93 0.67 0.1
avg(S) 0.93 3,3,4,4,4 0.9 1.38 0.93 0.87 0.11
avg(Fit) 0.66 1,2,2,3,4 0.6 1.75 0.93 0.58 0.12
avg(E) 0.66 2,3,3,4,4 0.8 1.5 0.92 0.77 0.15
2,2,2,3,3 0.6 1.75 0.94 0.58 0.17
2,2,3,3,4 0.7 1.63 0.93 0.68 0.18
 0:25  0:46 1,1,2,2,2 0.4 2.22 0.66 0.33 0.08
avg(D) 0.59 2,3,3,4,4 0.8 1.5 0.75 0.7 0.1
avg(L) 1.84 1,1,2,3,3 0.5 2 0.7 0.42 0.1
avg(S) 0.71 1,2,3,3,3 0.6 1.88 0.71 0.51 0.11
avg(Fit) 0.51 1,2,2,3,4 0.6 1.75 0.72 0.52 0.14
avg(E) 0.51 2,2,2,3,3 0.6 1.75 0.73 0.52 0.15
2,2,3,3,4 0.7 1.63 0.74 0.61 0.15
1,2,2,2,3 0.5 2.06 0.69 0.42 0.18
 0:47  1:0 1,2,2,2,3 0.5 2.06 0.62 0.4 0.07
avg(D) 0.26 1,1,1,2,3 0.4 2.25 0.62 0.32 0.08
avg(L) 0.51 1,1,1,1,2 0.3 0 0.61 0.24 0.08
avg(S) 0.63 1,1,2,2,2 0.4 2.18 0.62 0.32 0.09
avg(Fit) 0.21 0,1,1,1,1 0.2 0 0.63 0.16 0.1
avg(E) 0.21 0,1,1,2,2 0 0 0.62 0.24 0.17
0,0,0,1,1 0.1 0 0.65 0.08 0.19
0,0,1,1,2 0.2 0 0.64 0.16 0.21
Table 4.2: Low cost range network structures
evenly so that no incentives for deviation exist. This is similar to the results
of Watts (2001), and - for the non-cooperative game - of Bala and Goyal
(2000). For example, in cluster 1, the ring has a share of 0.09. More
ecient structures (1,1,2,2,2; 1,1,1,2,3) are more common. Unconnected
networks occur already in cluster 1, and become more frequent in clusters
2 and 3; thus indicating that any equilibrium-like state in this cost range
is more unstable and dicult to sustain. Whereas D indicates a relatively
close match with pairwise stable networks (these are: 1,1,1,1,4; 1,2,2,3,4;
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Cluster Network D L S Fit Share
 0:01  0:2 1,2,2,3,4 0.6 1.75 0.85 0.62 0.07
avg(D) 0.46 1,1,2,3,3 0.5 2 0.78 0.44 0.07
avg(L) 1.78 2,2,2,2,2 0.5 1.88 0.94 0.16 0.09
avg(S) 0.83 2,2,2,3,3 0.6 1.75 0.85 0.31 0.14
avg(Fit) 0.44 0,1,1,2,2 0.3 0 0.72 0.43 0.14
avg(E) 0.44 1,1,2,2,2 0.4 2.37 0.81 0.3 0.15
1,1,1,2,3 0.4 2.25 0.88 0.63 0.17
1,2,2,2,3 0.5 2.04 0.85 0.46 0.22
 0:21  0:4 1,2,2,2,3 0.5 2.06 0.54 0.39 0.09
avg(D) 0.24 1,1,1,2,3 0.4 2.25 0.57 0.52 0.09
avg(L) 0.43 1,1,1,1,2 0.3 0 0.59 0.4 0.09
avg(S) 0.5 0,1,1,1,1 0.2 0 0.62 0.27 0.1
avg(Fit) 0.38 1,1,2,2,2 0.4 2.16 0.56 0.26 0.11
avg(E) 0.38 0,0,0,1,1 0.1 0 0.66 0.41 0.14
0,1,1,2,2 0.3 0 0.6 0.4 0.19
0,0,1,1,2 0.2 0 0.63 0.54 0.19
 0:41  1:0 0,1,2,2,3 0.4 0 0.56 0.52 0.07
avg(D) 0.25 1,1,1,2,3 0.4 2.25 0.56 0.52 0.07
avg(L) 0.32 1,1,2,2,2 0.4 2.15 0.55 0.26 0.08
avg(S) 0.62 1,1,1,1,2 0.3 0 0.59 0.34 0.08
avg(Fit) 0.35 0,1,1,1,1 0.2 0 0.63 0.27 0.11
avg(E) 0.35 0,1,1,2,2 0.3 0 0.6 0.4 0.17
0,0,0,1,1 0.1 0 0.68 0.42 0.19
0,0,1,1,2 0.2 0 0.64 0.55 0.22
Table 4.3: Medium cost range network structures
1,3,3,3,4; 2,3,3,3,3; 2,2,2,3,3; 1,1,2,2,4; 2,2,2,2,2 for cost closer to the low
cost limit, plus the more sparse structures 1,2,3,3,3; 1,1,2,3,3; 1,2,2,2,3;
1,1,1,2,3 for costs closer to the high cost range), the distance to the unique
stochastic stable network 1,1,1,1,4 is larger as compared to the low cost
range. That is, while rational myopic players according to the stochastic
process of Jackson and Watts (2002) are most likely to end up with a star
network, the RL process diverges strongly from this result.
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Cluster Network D L S Fit Share
 0:01  0:27 1,1,1,2,3 0.4 2.25 0.41 0.42 0.01
avg(D) 0.05 0,1,1,1,1 0.2 0 0.76 0.7 0.02
avg(L) 0.09 0,1,1,2,2 0.3 0 0.7 0.59 0.03
avg(S) 0.91 1,1,2,2,2 0.4 2.39 0.65 0.5 0.04
avg(Fit) 0.9 0,0,1,1,2 0.2 0 0.77 0.71 0.04
avg(E) 0.9 0,0,0,1,1 0.1 0 0.88 0.85 0.14
0,0,0,0,0 0 0 0.99 0.99 0.72
 0:28  0:51 0,1,1,1,3 0.3 0 0.65 0.58 0.02
avg(D) 0.08 1,1,1,1,2 0.3 0 0.64 0.57 0.02
avg(L) 0 0,1,1,2,2 0.3 0 0.64 0.57 0.04
avg(S) 0.75 0,1,1,1,1 0.2 0 0.72 0.69 0.07
avg(Fit) 0.76 0,0,1,1,2 0.2 0 0.72 0.69 0.16
avg(E) 0.76 0,0,0,0,0 0 0 0.89 0.95 0.31
0,0,0,1,1 0.1 0 0.81 0.81 0.38
 0:51  1:0 1,1,2,2,2 0.4 2.13 0.55 0.47 0.03
avg(D) 0.16 0,1,1,1,3 0.3 0 0.62 0.57 0.04
avg(L) 0.05 1,1,1,1,2 0.3 0 0.61 0.56 0.05
avg(S) 0.71 0,1,1,2,2 0.3 0 0.62 0.67 0.1
avg(Fit) 0.72 0,1,1,1,1 0.2 0 0.68 0.91 0.11
avg(E) 0.72 0,0,0,0,0 0 0 0.82 0.57 0.15
0,0,1,1,2 0.2 0 0.68 0.67 0.22
0,0,0,1,1 0.1 0 0.75 0.79 0.32
Table 4.4: High cost range network structures
High cost range (c > ) In the rst, cluster the most frequent network
is the empty network with a share of 0.73. In the most frequent non-empty
network only two players are connected. In the other clusters, non-empty
networks are more frequent. In the second cluster, two players link most
of the time; in the third cluster it might happen that even more than two
players connect.
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Cost range  D L S t
0.1 0.68 1.66 0.95 0.66
0.25 0.61 1.78 0.96 0.6
(c <    2) 0.5 0.64 1.67 0.83 0.59
0.75 0.79 1.5 0.92 0.75
1 0.72 1.6 0.89 0.63
0.1 0.51 2.05 1 0.44
0.25 0.47 2.08 1 0.61
(2 < c <= ) 0.5 0.51 1.8 1 0.48
0.75 0.51 1.88 0.99 0.46
1 0.46 1.93 0.99 0.51
0.1 0 0 0 0.99
0.25 0 0 1 0.99
(c > ) 0.5 0 0 1 1
0.75 0 0 0.99 0.99
1 0 0 1 1
Table 4.5: Simulation results for various 
4.6.4 Memory Eects
To round up the analysis, summary measures are reported for simulation
runs with dierent  values while holding  constant. For each cost range,
the optimal  values were chosen: 0.1 in the low, 0.01 in the medium, and
0.02 in the high cost range.
Table 4.5 shows that in the low cost range tness and connectivity are
best for the higher  values. Moreover, a  value of 1 increases connectivity
as compared to smaller values. It also aects the stability of the network, as
the probability of deviations is the highest.  = 0:75 seems to compromise
well between exploration, on the one hand, and stability on the other.
In the medium cost range,  = 0:25 is optimal. Higher  values, but also
 = 0:1, are also here responsible for higher density - which is inecient in
this scenario. Furthermore,  = 0:1 and  = 0:25 both maximise the path
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length, which means they are support networks that connect the players in
the sparsest way. As noted above, in the medium cost range utility might
strongly decrease after a certain threshold is reached. If agents react very
quickly, this could lead to a collapse of the network. More tolerance on the
other side might support experimentation on the fringes.
In the high cost range there seems to be no inuence of  (at least not
for the chosen  values) - all solutions are typically empty and very stable
networks.
4.6.5 Summary of the Simulation Results
Low cost range (c <    2) The likely reason that the network does
not approach full connectivity is the decreasing rate of utility the more
connected the network becomes. At the beginning of the process, the rst
links provide the highest marginal utility and reinforce the highest action
strengths. After agents are connected directly or indirectly to all other
agents (i.e. via ower networks contracting the distance with very few
additional links), the marginal utility of exchanging an indirect for a direct
link is small. Consequently, the selection probabilities for forming and not
forming the link become for certain players more equal the later they interact
in the formation process. As a result, the decisions would switch between
oering and not oering a link for some of the players, irrespective of .
The situation can, nevertheless, stabilise early in the simulation if a player
rst experiences either linking or not linking as negative (or 0), but benets
from an indirect link added by another pairing of players. If the distance
becomes small enough, the particular action played at that time becomes
reinforced, and with  suciently small, will be repeated. If  is large,
this could result in a cycle where most of all players are at some stage the
`marginal' agent that is not worth linking to. This can be inferred from
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the trends in density and stability: For the smallest  values stability is
highest, but not density. As  increases, stability decreases stronger than
density increases. Moreover, the distribution of visited network structures
does not change very much, which means that similar network structures
exist during the whole run, but with more frequently changing links. The
optimal  value of 0.75 indicates, furthermore, that agents have a short
memory and so react quickly to changes in the network structure.
Medium cost range (2 < c  ) Up to the level where the utility of
not being linked is smaller than being linked, the learning process follows
the same marginal utility dynamics as in the low cost range. Once utility
becomes negative, the average rewards decrease strongly and prevents fur-
ther linking. Thus, the cost settings act as a natural cut-o to the reward
perceived by the agents. In the low cost range, there is no such bound,
but the additional utility becomes very small, leading to random switching.
The closer cost to    2, the more similar behaviour in the medium cost
range becomes to behaviour in the lower cost range - density increases. Note
furthermore, that the optimal  is with 0.25 very low as compared to the
other cost ranges, which means that agents are more tolerant of deviations.
A plausible reason for this is that agents must not be `too' myopic, since
for stable networks in this range agents have usually to link to two other
agents. The utility of just one link is small and thus the motivation to alter
that link is large. Allowing some tolerance for such behaviour ensures that
the network does not collapse quickly as a consequence of a single agent
severing a link.
Moreover, t in the medium ranges is worst as the star is the stochastic
stable network, but the emerging structures are ring-like. This coincides
with Watts (2001)'s prediction that the formation of stars becomes unlikely
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the larger n, but conicts with the stochastically stable star that was com-
puted using the approach in Jackson and Watts (2002).
High cost range (c > ) There is nothing surprising in the high cost
range; it largely reects the equilibrium prediction. Here, the learning task
for the agents is extremely simple because there are very few non-empty
networks in which an agent can experience a positive reward. Thus, the only
deviation in this case from the prediction is induced solely by the increased
randomness in the action probabilities with increasing . Furthermore,
the optimal  value of 1 shows that the best performing agents react very
quickly with no memory at all to alterations in the network structure. This
is plausible, since independent of the history, any addition of a link has
always a negative impact for at least one agent - which was also stated in
the dynamic benchmark model.
Thus, the networks evolving from the learning model dier with the ex-
ception of the high cost range quite considerably from the equilibrium pre-
diction. A closer look at the data showed that for the optimal  and 
values (0.1/0.75, 0.01/0.25 and 0.07/1), the pairwise and stochastic stable
outcome was met with a rate of 0.01 in the low range (4,4,4,4,4 the only
pairwise/strongly and stochastic stable network) as compared to a rate of
0.13 of the most frequent network 2,2,3,3,4; in the medium cost range 51%
of all visited networks were pairwise stable, but only 19% stochastic stable;
only in the high cost range 71% of all networks were the predicted empty
network. Looking at the structure of the networks that evolved, it is more
accurate to speak of two characteristic cost ranges, one with c <  and
one with c > . In the ranges where positive utility is achievable, agents
form sparsely connected networks, adding some shortcuts contracting the
distance between them (ower networks). The smaller cost, the closer the
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resulting networks are to the complete network. The higher the cost the
more sparse the resulting network will be - independent of whether the cost
is in the low or medium range. The shorter the distance between agents in
the network, the more undecided agents become whether to connect to some
other player directly or not. If 2   < c < , the RL process matches pair-
wise stable networks more often because utility is increasing with the rst
additional links, but later decreasing (i.e. marginal utility is in the very
low cost range convex, whereas in the second case, it is decreasing after
reaching its maximum). Another factor is simply chance - sparse networks
are simply closer to the random limit of 0.25.
4.7 Applying BRA
In the base model, knowledge is pre-wired - agents maintain a state-action
mapping per player and form expectations about the behaviour of each
player. The implicit assumption was that learning is simplied by saving
the necessary specialisation and generalisation procedure. It thus helped to
reduce complexity, and concentrate on the eects of pure RL in a network
game context. Applying BRA as described in chapter 2 and allowing to
evolve this internal model dynamically can be seen as a further test of
robustness - is it possible to perceive player-specic behaviour (similar to
the discrimination game), and if not, does this impact the result at all?
In the BRA network model, agents develop the state-action mappings
themselves. The initial rule has the form r0;1 : C0;1 ! A where the
condition can be described with: (player-name=2 or player-name=3 or
player-name=4 or player-name=5) for the rst player, for the second player
(player-name=2 or player-name=3 or player-name=4 or player-name=5)
and so on. During the process of the simulation, agents expand this initial
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rule into ner grained mappings, for example C1;1 ! A with C1;1 (player-
name=2 or player-name=3) and C1;2 ! A with C1;2 (player-name=4 or
player-name=5). The idea is that with this mechanism the base model can
be learnt if the distinction per player label is useful.
Three simulations, one for each cost range, were run for 5000 time steps
each. Parameters where set as follows:  = 100,  = 50,  = 40,  = 0:3,
 = 0:2. The parameter setting follows a similar logic as the simulations
in chapter 3.  is unreachable, because limited cognitive capacities impose
restriction in this exploratory simulation. The other parameters are set in a
way that allows the computation of action and state values from reasonably
large samples (, ), and the revisiting of generalised nodes(), since the
environment is very dynamic.
Using the measures D, S and fit, gure 4.6 shows the networks obtained
with this method. In the low cost range, density is 0.62, similar to the
average base network model result. The same holds for the other cost ranges
- density is 0.35 in the medium, and 0.04 in the high cost range. Thus, BRA
generates the same outcome as the base model. In general, stability is lower
than in the base model due to the increased amount of experimentation.
Figures 4.7 to 4.9 show the rules that were created during the process
and how often they were activated. As useless rules are deleted by BRA,
these appear with a lower frequency, rules that survived longer have a high
frequency.
As all three gures show, there was no value in developing ner grained
rules during the process. This is no surprise for the low or high cost range -
in these scenarios utility is always increasing or mostly negative independent
of the current state of the network. In the medium cost range, more rule
experimentation is happening. For example, 36 mappings were generated
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Figure 4.6: Network density, stability and t for the BRA version of the model.
Figure 4.7: Rule extractions in the BRA network model for the low cost range.
The labels denote the mappings, e.g. 1 2 3 4 represents the condition (player-
name=1 or player-name=2 or player-name=3 or player-name=4).
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Figure 4.8: Rule extractions in the BRA network model for the medium cost
range. The labels denote the mappings, e.g. 1 2 3 4 represents the condition
(player-name=1 or player-name=2 or player-name=3 or player-name=4).
Figure 4.9: Rule extractions in the BRA network model for the high cost range.
The labels denote the mappings, e.g. 1 2 3 4 represents the condition (player-
name=1 or player-name=2 or player-name=3 or player-name=4).
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as compared to 27 in the low cost range. The low frequencies, however,
show that this does not lead to any sustainable mappings.
From this result, it can be concluded that the outcome in the medium
cost range is similarly generated by a simple decrease in the selection prob-
ability, irrespective of the players who meet. It explains why the stability
and tness values are worse in the medium cost range; and it also shows
that no specic model is necessary to generate the result. Simply decreasing
the chance of oering a link is enough - at the price of higher instability.
4.8 Comparison with Empirical Results
After describing the structure of the networks resulting from the RL model,
this section asks whether the presented RL model can explain empirical
networks better than the equilibrium prediction.
However, with existing empirical results, comparison is not straightfor-
ward. As described in section 4.4, results in experimental game theory vary
considerably. In the BG models, Nash networks emerge with a frequency
of 0% to up to 40%. An evaluation of how well the RL model performs
based on this data is dicult. In particular, except Vanin (2002) there is
no experiment of the JW model. This model was, however, a rst explo-
ration where the co-operative nature of the game was investigated, but little
quantitative data produced.
To gain some intuition how well the RL model does in predicting actual
outcomes, here the experiment of Conte et al (2009) is simulated: The model
is closest to a JW-type model as it requires mutual consent to establish and
maintain a link. The following modications were made to the RL model: 
is set to 1, i.e., there is no decay. All agents act simultaneously, so that all
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possible parings happen at the same time step, so each agent has to make
n-1 choices each round. This leads to much higher variability in the game,
as from a single agent's perspective, the environment changes much more
erratic as if only two agents moved at a time.
The remaining parameters are set as in Conte et al (2009)'s experiment
described above. Table 4.6 summarises the parameter settings.
cost benet   
90 100 0.01 : : : 0.25 1.0 0.1, 0.25, 0.75, 1
Table 4.6: Adaptive network model parameter settings for the simultaneous
linking game.
Simulations were run for  values up to 0.25 and some  values. Each
simulation is run for 100 steps and repeated 10 times. This is longer than the
original 20 rounds, but was chosen deliberately to gain more representative
results (whereas the variation in the experimental results is high due to the
small numbers). To compare the result to the original model, the average
payo (over all simulations and time steps) is used. In Conte et al (2009),
this value is given as 175.056 (standard error 7.901). The most similar
values fall into simulations with  = 0.75 (see gure 4.10).
From these runs, the simulation with the smallest dierence from the
experimental result in average prots and standard variation is selected .
This turns out to be the setting  = 0:75 and  = 0:19. Table 4.7 compares
the average payo from the experiments with the payo resulting from the
theoretically derived Nash equilibrium and the simulated results. While also
the simulations do not match perfectly, they are with an expected value of
This was the only aggregated gure available at the time of writing. It was not
possible to obtain the results from the authors as their paper was under review at that
time.
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Figure 4.10: Average payo for various  and  values in Conte et al (2009)'s
simultaneous linking game.
about 172 much closer to the actual result than the equilibrium prediction
(a line network) with 296.67.
Payoexperimental (s.d.) Payosimulated (s.d.) Payonash
175.056 (86.55) 171.62 (125.45) 296.97
Table 4.7: Comparison of payos of equilibrium prediction, experimental and
simulated results in the simultaneous linking game(=0.75,  = 0:19, 10 repeti-
tions
.
Figure 4.11 illustrates the dynamic of the simulation using a measure of
stability, tness and density for illustration. Stability is dened as above
in denition 15, that is, as the likelihood that an agent changes a link.
The share of Nash networks indicates how often the agents formed Nash
networks (i.e. minimal connected networks) in the simulations. Although
the simulations achieve quickly their nal state with a Nash frequency of
up to about 20% (average: 14%), it is also obvious that stability is not
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Figure 4.11: Density, stability and frequency of Nash networks over time in
the simultaneous linking game ( = 0:19,  = 0:75, 10 repetitions). Values are
computed as moving averages over 10 time steps.
very high. A value of only slightly about 0.6 means that almost every
second agent chooses a dierent strategy each time step. The share of Nash
networks increases slightly the longer the simulation runs.
Table 4.8 shows the Nash networks that emerged. The most frequent
network is 1,1,1,2,2,3 with a share of 0.078. The ecient star occurs only
three times during the simulations. Moreover, the most frequent network
was the unconnected network 0,1,1,2,2,2, which appeared only slightly more
often (share: 0.08) than 1,1,1,2,2,3. Thus, similar as Falk and Kosfeld (2003)
observe, if a network is connected, there is a high chance that it is a Nash
network.
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pattern stability share count
1,1,1,1,1,5 0.71 0.0004 3
1,1,1,1,3,3 0.56 0.0086 58
1,1,1,1,2,4 0.65 0.0108 73
1,1,2,2,2,2 0.55 0.0422 286
1,1,1,2,2,3 0.54 0.0771 522
Table 4.8: Nash networks visited in the simultaneous linking game. share rep-
resents the share of the network of all networks visited during the simulations.
The number of total observations is 6773.
Although no exact comparison between the RL network model and the
empirical studies are possible, the following parallels and dierences between
the RL model and actual human behaviour emerge:
{ Nash networks are a good predictor for outcomes of the network game.
It is not necessarily myopic, rational behaviour that causes this result.
The frequency in the RL model is, however, low (about 15%). Many
experiments of BG models report similar gures, but variation is high
(from 0% to 40%).
{ The RL model matches the empirical outcome (measured by the av-
erage payo) much closer than the static equilibrium prediction.
{ The RL model is very unstable. This holds, to some extent, also for the
empirical results; some authors report a tendency to experiment after
a stable solution emerged for some time steps. Many experiments
never converged to a stable state. However, variation is lower, as
for example observed in Conte et al (2009). There, in one instance
convergence was observed. Following most authors, this is due to
the tendency of real players to behave strategically. So, Callander
and Plott (2005) nd that some subjects take into account future
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outcomes, which is of course impossible to capture with a simple RL
model.
4.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, a reinforcement-learning version of Jackson/Wolinsky's con-
nections model was presented and studied with simulations. The simulation
results have been compared with the equilibrium predictions using the con-
cept of stochastic stability as developed in Jackson and Watts (2002). The
patterns (high connectivity in the low, medium connectivity in the medium,
and low connectivity in the low cost ranges) are similar, but that there is
some considerable distance between the equilibrium and RL model predic-
tions.
The outcome of the RL process is driven by marginal utility, which has
very dierent forms depending on the cost range. In the low range utility is
convex but always positive; in the medium cost range, it slopes downwards
after a certain density of the network is reached; in the high cost range, it
is strictly negative. For a probabilistic choice model, this results in random
switching in the low cost range the more connected the network becomes;
low rates of experimentation in the medium range once utility starts to
decrease; and punishment of any links in the high cost range. Moreover,
the emerging structures in the medium ranges are most likely to be ring-
like, as was stated by other authors like Watts (2001) or Bala and Goyal
(2000); but this does not correspond to the outcome that was computed
based on the stochastic stability approach in Jackson and Watts (2002),
which resulted in a star.
Simulations with the BRA approach (chapter 2) showed that the same
results can be generated with a simpler rule. The outcome of the algo-
CHAPTER 4. NETWORK FORMATION 172
rithm was that agents did not dierentiate between players, but apply the
same linking probability to any player they meet. This suggests that the
more elaborated mental model of section 4.5 (remembering each player sep-
arately) does not add anything to an agent's utility. This is similar to results
stated for two-player games in the experimental game theory literature (e.g
Erev and Roth 1998).
In behavioural game theory, experiments with network formation are
mostly based on non-cooperative network formation. Equilibrium out-
comes with homogeneous agents are dicult to obtain with human sub-
jects. At most about 40% of experiments converge to equilibrium. To nd
out whether the RL model predicts actual human behaviour better than
the equilibrium prediction, another set of simulations with a modied setup
based on the experiment of Conte et al (2009) was conducted. In the simu-
lations, about 15% of the emerging networks were Nash. Using payos as a
criterion for comparison, the RL model predicts much better. However, the
stability of the simulated networks is lower than in the experiments. More-
over, in the RL model as well as in some of the reviewed literature, most
connected networks were Nash. That is, this equilibrium concept describes
empirical results well if the network becomes connected. However, it does
not reveal anything about its frequency. This is estimated more accurately
by the RL model.
Concluding, simple RL can be seen as a better predictor for actual hu-
man behaviour in network formation situations than the equilibrium pre-
diction. It reproduces both theoretical patterns (although not to the same
degree) as well as empirical phenomena. Thus, the RL network formation
model contributes by adding an experience-based learning approach, which
is situated between both strands of the literature. It provides a possibility
to nd out how likely a theoretic prediction is; while Nash equilibrium is a
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useful concept for the type of result to be expected, the RL approach is a
useful way to estimate the chance that this occurs in reality.
Chapter 5
The Market for Primary Care
5.1 Introduction
Health Economics typically treats health systems as linear systems that
can be tested with statistical tools. Often, however, reality is more com-
plex. Heavy interventions may cause only small changes, or compromise
policy goals in dierent dimensions. In Kernick (2006)'s view, one could
also characterise health care as a complex system, and argue that the con-
struction of linear models leads to the omitting of system elements that
are in the end the driving factors for the response of the system to policy
interventions based on these linearised models. In complex systems, heavy
interventions may have negligible inuence, or small interventions may have
a large eect. Interactions on dierent levels might produce unanticipated
consequences, because on the macro-level these interactions cannot be ac-
curately modelled. For example, a reform that allows patients a choice
of health providers might remain without consequences if the doctors are
reluctant to support their patients' decisions because they, say, see their
inuence and prestige in danger. The system can remain in an unchanged
174
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state. Other interventions might change the system only in the short run
because other factors restore the original state. For instance, higher patient
mobility might rst reduce waiting lists as patients search and so distribute
more evenly across providers. However, in the long run waiting times might
increase again, because, for example, some providers become highly sought
after due to their reputation, while others are underemployed.
On the more specic level of general practice patterns, Scott (2000)
points out that on the micro-level not much is known about doctors' decision
making. There are, however, other, non-economic factors important for
decision making. For example, doctors refer their patients to specialists out
of uncertainty, or follow the pressure of their patients for certain treatments
or prescriptions. However, economic models so far have not considered the
possibility of such interactions on the individual level and their consequences
on the aggregate level.
To nd out whether complex systems theory provides an answer to the
limitations of current research methodologies is, according to Kernick, a
matter of years. In his view, a research program is needed that encour-
ages the development of new statistical tools, experimental work to support
theoretical constructs and demonstrate their usefulness, tools that promote
systematical thinking about healthcare and a more widespread application
of models that encourage dialogue between the stakeholders in the health
economy.
The purpose of this chapter is to develop an agent-based model of pri-
mary care and to add a computational model to such a research agenda. A
distinctive feature is the modelling of dierent assumptions about consumer
behaviour on the individual level. Consumer behaviour in general has often
been described as routine or habitual behaviour. This ts a special case
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in the BRA learning framework presented in chapter 2. RL will here be
applied to model patient choice of the general practitioner (GP). If a con-
sumer knows n doctors, each doctor can be represented as a choice or action
alternative. Using denition 4 this case is represented in BRA by: k = 1,
jAkj = n, and succ(Lk0) = ;, with A = fchoose(GP1) : : : choose(GPn)g. k
represents here the situation that a consumer is feeling ill, i.e. becomes a
patient. Thus, patients are faced with a single condition (being ill), under
which they choose among dierent GP alternatives.
The plan of this chapter is as follows: In the next section 5.2, the health
economic background is briey outlined, before describing GP and patient
behaviour in some more detail in sections 5.3 and 5.4 based on the available
literature. Section 5.6 species the RL model. Section 5.7 presents simula-
tions. First, the model is simulated with a large range of parameters to gain
more understanding of its overall behaviour. Then, section 5.7.2 provides
more detailed, dynamic results.
5.2 Background
The ecient provision of health care and its quality are central objectives
of government policy. Especially in gate-keeping systems as in the UK,
`general (or family) practice and its role is increasingly regarded as the
key to achieving eciency and equity in many health care systems', as
Scott (2000) notes. GPs inuence the total cost of health provision; for
example, they generate direct costs by referring patients to secondary care
or prescribing medication. More indirectly, GPs may inuence health costs
by raising the health standard in general, e.g. by supporting preventative
care.
To inuence the way health care is delivered, primary care can be either
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managed and controlled directly by, e.g., employing GPs as salaried person-
nel; or indirectly by setting nancial and other incentives for self-employed
practitioners. Direct control is dicult to achieve because it is expensive
and dicult to implement, and because professional organisations try to
preserve the independence of their members. Only in recent years, with the
advance of information technology has performance-based pay become more
common. The typical and by far most important approach is, however, to
set nancial incentives and modify political and organisational constraints.
The function of designing incentive systems has been described as a way to
align the government's objectives with the physician's interests, and implies
that governments as principals may have dierent interests than health care
providers. The common assumption is that GPs are income maximisers, an
objective which may conict with the ecient provision of health care (e.g.
by providing more services than necessary). Consequently, the design of
such systems is closely related to the principal-agent problem. Since in the
majority of countries with public health policies the main instrument to
shape the way health services are delivered is their reimbursement, most
attention has been paid to the setting of nancial incentives. Furthermore,
many empirical studies nd evidence that GPs do react to nancial incen-
tives. Another dimension of shaping GP behaviour, which has received more
interest recently, is the promotion of patient choice. Here, the idea is to in-
crease competition among GPs by increasing patient mobility. Where health
providers are able to set prices, this may lead to increased cost-eciency
and/or quality; where prices are regulated, competition can motivate GPs
to provide better quality services in order to attract and bind their patients.
Scott (2000) points out that to understand and judge policy interven-
tions better, more attention has to be paid to the context of GP decisions.
Factors such as patience's health status are important variables in doctors'
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decisions; doctors might be pressed by some patients to refer them and
so on. Most principal-agent and econometric models tend to neglect such
factors, and for the sake of analytical clarity or lack of data treat them as
a residual category. The ACE model presented in this chapter will try to
better account for these contextual factors by using its own concept of `ap-
propriate treatment' that is assumed to be an important decision variable
of doctors.
5.3 GP Behaviour
A central problem in designing incentive systems in health care is informa-
tional asymmetry. The patient is no health expert and has to trust that the
GP acts in his or her best interest. This increases the discretionary power
of the GP (Grignon et al 2002). The GP has also an information advantage
over the public insurer or government, e.g. with respect to the expected case
mix, the necessity of certain treatments, prescriptions and so on. This makes
it dicult to monitor and control behaviour directly or indirectly. However,
although information asymmetry points towards problems of moral hazard,
there are characteristic dierences to a principal-agent relationship: Health
outcomes are dicult to measure; usually not the patient pays for the ser-
vice, but a third party; the utility functions of patient and doctor are, to
some extent, interdependent (Mooney and Ryan 1993) - an important de-
viation from classical agency theory, which assumes independence of utility
functions (Ryan 1994). Another often mentioned factor inhibiting moral
hazard is the trust characteristic of the relationship. The doctor-patient re-
lationship is usually long-term, in which patients invest trust. For the GP,
trust is capital, and he or she has an incentive to maintain it by avoiding
obvious prot-maximising behaviour and safeguarding the interests of the
patient. If the patient gets a feeling of too many unnecessary treatments
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or consultations, he or she may lose trust and search for a new doctor (e.g
Scott 2000; Arrow 1963).
Despite these constraining factors, the economic literature typically fo-
cuses on the principal-agent nature of the GP-patient and GP-regulator
relationship. Under the assumption of self-interest and opportunistic be-
haviour, the question becomes which incentive system encourages the GP
to behave in the best interest of the patient (welfare and quality), as well as
the interest of the regulator (cost eciency, patient welfare, and quality).
Several authors have analysed models of health care provision in the con-
text of a principal-agent problem (e.g. Marinoso and Jelovac 2003; Zweifel
et al 2005; Scott 2005; Jelovac 2001; Ma 1994; Chalkley and Malcomson
1998a;b; McGuire and Rickman 1999), of which the most relevant will be
shortly reviewed here.
Numerous econometric studies building on assumptions posited by the
principal-agent literature have been conducted to test hypotheses about how
GPs react to nancial incentives. The main results of these studies are also
summarised.
Analytical approaches
Considering a health authority maximising patient welfare minus expected
cost, Zweifel et al (2005) analyse optimal contracts. The provider utility
function can be written as u(P; e) = P   C(e)  V (e). P is the pay, C are
expected costs. The parameter e measures the eort to reduce these costs,
and V (e) represents the loss in utility due to these eorts. The payment
can be expressed as P = G + np + K, where G is a basic allowance, a
per capita payment p for n patients plus a share  of the total costs K (i.e.
service payment). At the one extreme, a prospective payment (capitation)
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system is described by setting  to zero. In this case, the provider bears
all the risk. At the other extreme, a retrospective payment (fee-for-service,
FFS) system is described by setting p and G to zero, so that the insurer
bears all the risk.
A contract should internalise the principal's interests in cost eective-
ness. At the same time, the contract must still be attractive enough to
be accepted by the service provider. Following Zweifel et al (2005), the
rst-best solution FB is a payment system E(P ) that compensates the
provider's costs, eorts to reduce costs and a reservation utility which the
provider would achieve by not accepting the contract. This can be formally
written as E(P ) = C[eFB] + V [eFB] + u.
Varying the base model, they derive the following three typical cases with
respect to cost eciency: In case (1), the reference model, the provider is
risk neutral, information is full and symmetric, and cost eciency is the only
objective. The rst-best payment is given by E(P ) = C[eFB] + V [eFB] + u,
where u is the reservation utility that needs to be fullled for the provider
to accept the contract. For this objective, a prospective payment system
is optimal; more specically, a lump-sum payment with which the provider
has to cover all costs. The insurer can set the base payment in such a way
that it covers expected costs. In case (2), GPs are risk-adverse, and the
insurer has to pay a risk premium. It is then more eective to take over
some of the costs to reduce the risk premium. However, this also reduces
the incentive for the provider to reduce costs. Case (3) assumes that the
provider has more information about the expected case mix, and thus over
expected costs. An (opportunistic) provider will claim that he has only
the most costly case mix to obtain a higher risk premium. By increasing
payment with costs, the provider would be encouraged to share accurate
information. This again reduces the provider's eort to reduce costs.
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Three more cases can be derived when quality is added. Quality can be
dened as the treatment success and the welfare of the patient. Treatment
success may sometimes be observable. However, apart from measurement
problems, it is impossible to determine whether a provider did not try to
provide the necessary quality even if treatment was not successful. Extend-
ing the provider's utility function by assuming that quality has a utility
V for the provider and that it comes at a certain cost C depending on
the eort e the form becomes U = E(P )   C(q; e)   V (q; e). Analysing
this utility function, they nd that a provider has no incentive to provide
optimal quality: Case (1) is given by the assumption that treatment suc-
cess and quality are observable and providers are risk-neutral. Then, an
adjusted base payment induces the provision of optimal quality, as long as
the reservation utility of the GP is met (i.e. basically, the insurer pays for
the desired level of quality). If treatment success is stochastic and the more
risk-adverse the provider is, the regulator has to pay a risk premium. In this
case, direct control of quality is the cheaper option. In case (2), treatment
success and quality are not observable. There is a trade-o between quality
and quantity: For full take-over of costs in a pure retrospective system, the
provider has no incentive to minimise costs; hence, he can raise quality until
his marginal utility of quality equals the marginal cost of raising quality.
Since providers in prospective systems have incentives to reduce costs as
much as possible, quality will be minimal. In case (3), the regulator cannot
judge success and quality, but patients can. If providers compete for pa-
tients, then capitation payment is the best option. In this case, there is an
incentive to attract patients by improving quality, while at the same time to
minimise costs. If the situation is monopolistic or the elasticity of demand
is low, again a mix of capitation and fee systems is the best solution.
In what follows, some more specic models of primary care are reviewed,
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focusing especially on the role patient choice plays: The models of Jelovac
(2001) and Marinoso and Jelovac (2003) look in more detail at GPs' clinical
decisions, and how these may be inuenced by prospective and retrospec-
tive payment systems. Levaggi and Rochaix (2007) extend this model and
explicitly look at the role of consumer choice in this setting. The models of
Gravelle and Masiero (2000) and Karlsson (2007) treat capitation systems
when patients choose between GPs.
In Jelovac (2001), patients can have a minor or a major illness. The
minor illness can be treated by the GP; the major illness must be referred
to a specialist. The GP must rst diagnose the condition. The lower his
eort, the less accurate the diagnosis; as a consequence of low eort, the
patient may be mistreated. In case that the special illness was diagnosed
but the patient had the general illness, the patient is cured, but with an un-
necessary, expensive treatment. In the case that the patient was diagnosed
with the general illness and is treated by the GP, but had the special ill-
ness, the patient was not treated accurately and has to be treated a second
time. The doctor incurs a utility loss by mistreatment because a second
visit is assumed to be costly, and because higher costs are incurred by the
unnecessary treatment. In this model, capitation payment induces the most
adequate treatment, since GPs are interested in decreasing the probability
of a second visit and in minimising the total number of treatments. As a
side-eect it induces higher eort as this is the precondition for appropriate
treatment decisions.
Building on the same model setup, Marinoso and Jelovac (2003) provide
some more conditions when prospective payment is more ecient than ret-
rospective. They analyse three dierent strategies available to the GP: He
may refer or treat blindly and save the eort of diagnosing; he can diagnose
with a certain eort and then either treat or refer based on the outcome
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of the diagnosis; nally, he can, under the assumption of asymmetric in-
formation, treat or refer irrespective of the diagnosis outcome. Since some
cost and eort is incurred for accurate treatment, it only pays for the GP
to diagnose accurately if the expected income is high enough. Otherwise,
it is more rational to guess based on the expected case mix, and receive
the net payment with the respective probability that the guess was correct.
Jelovac and Marinoso argue that the right incentive system depends on the
insurer's objective: If welfare loss (caused by inadequate treatment) is high,
the most ecient option is to set incentives in form of treatment success
related fee payment. However, if the welfare loss by inadequate treatment
is not the most important objective, capitation payment is sucient, as it
induces the GPs to reduce eorts, including the diagnosis eort.
Gravelle and Masiero (2000) present a game to research the question
whether increasing the capitation rate can induce higher quality. The model
is a two-stage hotelling game with two doctors, and n patients. Doctors
choose a level of quality; the higher quality the more costs are incurred by
the practice. The patients' utility function includes distance and expected
quality (which is unknown to the patients initially). In the rst round of
the game, patients choose a doctor based on their utility function. In the
second round of the game, quality is revealed, and patients compare their
expectations with the actual quality. Patients may then switch to the other
GP in the second round. If they switch, they incur some switching cost.
Gravelle and Masiero nd that higher capitation rates increase quality as it
makes patients more valuable to practices, even if patients care much about
distance. They also show that GPs have incentives to increase quality even
if patients misjudge quality. As a result, both doctors increase quality as
long as costs are covered.
Karlsson (2007) develops a similar hotelling game. As in the preceding
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model, patients choose in a rst stage their GP based on distance and
expected quality; after that, actual quality is revealed, and patients may
switch to the other GP. Karlsson considers additionally the search behaviour
of patients. Because of the interaction eects between consumer search
patterns and provider reactions, there may be settings where the optimal
capitation rate is indeterminate. If costs are very low, all providers have
strong incentives to increase quality. The more GPs do so, the stronger
decreases the variation in the GP population. This discourages patients
from searching, since there is not much to gain from (costly) search in a
homogeneous GP population. As a result, the equilibrium quality may
decrease even with increasing payments, because patients have no reason
to change providers. However, this happens only with a quadratic cost
function, and the author assumes that hyperbolic cost functions are more
intuitive and likely. Such cost function lead to an equilibrium where quality
increases with the capitation rate.
Levaggi and Rochaix (Levaggi and Rochaix 2007) combine the patient
choice perspective of Gravelle/Masiero and Karlsson with the moral haz-
ard perspective of Jelovac and Marinoso. The setup is as in Jelovac and
Marinoso (2003), but additionally, patients may choose the access route to
either GP or specialist themselves. Thus, GPs as well as patients can make
mistakes in a treatment choice. They nd that under perfect information
(where the severity of illness can be judged ex-post) a gate-keeping system
is ecient. Its eciency can furthermore be increased by allowing patients
to seek specialist care themselves, provided patients bear some of the risk in
form of payments for mistakes. If information is imperfect and opportunis-
tic behaviour possible, then non-gate-keeping systems are more eective.
Intuitively, this is because under capitation, GPs refer also mild illnesses;
under FFS, GPs will rst treat themselves, even if the condition is severe;
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specialists will always treat rather than sending the patient back to the GP.
So the patient is the only actor who has an interest in the eective provision
of care (e.g., because he or she wants to avoid unnecessary visits). Even if
the patient makes mistakes in judgements the result is more cost-ecient.
The conclusion of this short survey is that pure capitation systems are
desirable for cost containment, but are optimal only under very restrictive
assumptions like risk neutrality of providers and information symmetry.
Some costs should be taken over in form of FFS. This reduces the willing-
ness to save costs, but also the risk premium that had to be paid otherwise.
Takeover of costs may as well increase quality if there is no or little com-
petition between providers. However, this will depend on the information
available to the health authority. If there is competition for patients, the
size of capitation payments can act as an incentive to improve quality. Gate-
keeping systems are only ecient under perfect information. Patient choice
can have a cost-reduction and welfare-increasing eect in non gate-keeping
systems, especially if payment is by FFS.
There are further, newer incentive systems in primary health care, which
are not considered here. For example, Pay for Performance combines as-
pects of managed systems with nancial incentives by making payments
dependent on treatment priorities, and conditions treated. If a certain tar-
get is reached, reimbursement decreases, acting against over-treatment and
opportunistic diagnosing. This requires much closer monitoring, which more
recently has become possible due to the increased availability and usage of
new information technology.
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Empirical approaches
Types of studies Several empirical studies in the last 20-30 years inves-
tigated the inuence of dierent remuneration schemes on GP behaviour.
Much of this literature (until about the year 2000) has been extensively re-
viewed (Scott and Hall 1995; Scott 2000; Gosden et al 2000). Most studies
nd a relationship between payment system and practice patterns. How-
ever, the validity of the results is often limited to special circumstances,
as most of them are `opportunistic' studies, taking advantage of data col-
lected for other purposes. Studies where the payment scheme was changed,
or new elements in the incentive system were introduced, were the most
important studies to investigate the relationship between payment and GP
behaviour. The most rigorous selection of studies was applied by Gosden
et al (2000), who reviewed only studies based on control group comparisons
(randomised control trials), time-series data or controlled before-and-after
studies. The advantage of such designs is a better control of confounding
variables. Scott and Hall (1995) also included cross-sectional studies, where
it is more dicult to estimate the inuence of, say, self-selection eects of
GPs into certain payment schemes.
As most studies are described in the reviews, only the main results of the
most inuential studies, and some of the newer literature are summarised
here. The major studies are the following:
The Krasnik study (Krasnik and Groenewegen 1992) compared two
groups of GPs in Denmark. GPs in the Copenhagen area moved from cap-
itation payment to a mixed capitation/FFS payment mode, while for the
regional doctors, the mixed capitation/FFS had already been introduced.
Data were collected six months before and at a 6-month and a 12-month
period after the intervention, allowing the comparison of practice patterns
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of the same GPs before and after the intervention.
The Hutchinson study (Hutchinson et al 1996) compared the referral
patterns in Ontario, Canada, where FFS payment was changed to a mixed
capitation/incentive-based payment. A control group remained in FFS;
the intervention group received capitation payment. Furthermore, for each
hospital day exceeding the mean hospitalisation rate, the practice had to
bear a third of the hospitalisation cost. The authors compared in detail for
dierent patient groups the changes in referrals to hospitals.
The Davidson study (Davidson et al 1992) compared two groups of doc-
tors paid by Medicaid. The capitation group received a per capita payment,
and some amount per service, and could keep any surpluses on savings (but
had also to cover losses up to a certain extent). The FFS group received
higher fees for certain services as compared to the control group (fees were
about half the size).
The Hickson study (Hickson et al 1987) analysed the introduction of
salary payment in a FFS system. The salaried doctors received a xed
income per month, the FFS doctors a fee for each visit. Both incomes were
designed on historical consultation rates, thus roughly equal in height.
Main results With respect to referrals, evidence is mixed - some studies
suggest an impact of the payment system, some do not. The Hutchinson
study found that Canadian FFS doctors did not lower referrals to hospitals.
Likewise, the Davidson study found that the number of specialist visits
was greater in the FFS group than in the capitation group. On the other
hand, the Krasnik study found a decrease in hospital and specialist referrals
after 12 months for FFS doctors, while there was no signicant change in
the short-run (after six months). The Krasnik study also observed a fall
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in prescription renewals after FFS was introduced. This was unexpected
because extra fees for prescriptions were introduced, so that there was no
reason to reduce their costs.
With respect to the number of GP consultations, most studies indicate a
rationing of visits by capitation (and salaried) doctors as compared to FFS
doctors. The Hickson study found a lower number of visits per enrolled
patient in the salaried physician group as compared to the FFS group. This
was partially due to FFS doctors scheduling partly unnecessary services, to
some extent, due to too few visits by salaried doctors. Furthermore, the
Davidson study found that the number of primary-care doctor visits was
higher in the new FFS group than in the capitation group. Moreover, other
studies (e.g. Kristiansen and Hjortdahl 1992; Kristiansen and Mooney 1993;
Kristiansen and Holtedahl 1993) found that GPs paid by FFS are more likely
to provide shorter consultations.
Also with respect to the intensity of services provision most - although
not all - evidence points in the expected direction. FFS increases service
production, which is typically interpreted as the realisation of income oppor-
tunities by doctors. The Krasnik study found a strong increase in curative
and diagnostic services after the change to FFS. Similarly, Kristiansen et
al. found that FFS doctors are more likely to order tests (Kristiansen and
Hjortdahl 1992; Kristiansen and Mooney 1993; Kristiansen and Holtedahl
1993), a conclusion that is also reached by Devlin and Sisira (2008) in their
analysis of doctors with a mainly fee-based income in Canada. However, for
Norway, Grytten and Sorensen (2001) nd that GPs paid by FFS did not
increase service production as compared to salaried doctors. Comparing
practices with dierent list sizes, i.e. dierent demand, they also showed
that practices with short lists have no higher service production per consul-
tation to compensate income loss compared to those practices with higher
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demand (Grytten and Sorensen 2007).
Summarising, evidence is not always as theory predicts. Regarding refer-
rals, evidence is mixed; regarding the number of consultations there seems
to be a clear trend for rationing under capitation; with respect to provider-
induced demand generated by FFS, before-after studies nd evidence for,
cross-sectional studies against additional demand. Especially when looking
at the dierent conclusions of cross-sectional studies as compared to before-
after studies (especially the Krasnik study), the question seems rather not
to be if the payment mode inuences behaviour, but how large and im-
portant the eect is when considering the health system as a whole. Other
inuences such as rural-urban location, working hours and so on could have
an impact that reduces the inuence of the payment as a single factor to
insignicant levels.
5.4 Patient Behaviour
Whereas the insurer-doctor agency problem has been extensively studied,
the patient-doctor relationship has attracted less attention. This relation-
ship is characterised by information asymmetry - because patients are usu-
ally not good doctors, they have to trust their doctors and expect them to
act for their benet. Furthermore, it is often impossible to judge whether
particular treatments are unnecessary or not, or whether a dierent doctor
would have been more successful in treating a certain illness.
The common view has usually been that the patient is only interested in
health, i.e. health status is the only variable to his utility function. There
are, however, other dimensions in the patient utility function. For example,
patients might also expect some non-medical aspects such as a diagnosis to
rule out a dangerous illness, or obtaining information before surgery (Ryan
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1994; Mooney and Ryan 1993). Other authors have stressed the role of
information and the involvement of the patient in the decision process for
treatment options (summarised by Vick and Scott (1998)).
Empirically, discrete choice experiments about the patient-doctor rela-
tionship have been conducted to nd out patients' preferences. Vick and
Scott (1998) derive from the literature the following dimensions as being
important for patients: Being able to talk to the doctor; information about
the health problem; information about the treatment; doctor's information
and explanation; who chooses the treatment; length of consultation; and
waiting time. They nd that `being able to talk' was most important to
patients, and that `who chooses your treatment' was the least important.
Waiting times seem to be of little importance when patients can see a doctor
they know. Information about the condition and treatment were rated with
similar importance in the middle. The dimensions in Hole's study (Hole
2008) were given by: Waiting time; cost (measured as willingness to pay);
warm and friendly doctor; knowing the doctor; thoroughness of physical
examination. In this study, reassurance about the process in the form of a
thorough medical examination turned out to be the most important. These
ndings highlight also the `non-functional' aspects of the doctor-patient re-
lationship; whereas technically the patient has an illness to be xed, the
doctor additionally performs a social function by providing assurance or
help in a general way. Thus, it might be that not necessarily the best doc-
tor in clinical terms is preferred by patients, but maybe a doctor who spends
more time with them and who gives patients a feeling of being taken care of.
As Vick and Scott (1998) point out, convenience and accessibility factors
such as opening hours or distance have already been found less important
for the patient's utility function by other authors (e.g Williams and Calnan
1991).
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Surveys using actual patient satisfaction survey data nd similar results.
Dixon and Robertson (2008) nd that the quality of the relationship with
their doctor is the most important factor inuencing satisfaction, while the
factors with the lowest predictive power are waiting time and accessibil-
ity. They nd that once a good relationship is established loyalty is high.
Practice change, they conclude, will probably only occur if the relationship
breaks down, so that increased choice is not expected to increase patient
movements signicantly. This has also been observed before, although pa-
tient choice was not high on the agenda then. Low mobility has been at-
tributed to unfavourable circumstances preventing dissatised patients from
changing their GP (Gage and Rickman 2000; Goodwin 1998; Gabbott and
Hogg 1993).
Still, the impact of patient choice on the primary care system is mostly
unknown. In the UK, for example, most evidence used to argue in favour
of choice stems from pilot studies in secondary care. Critical authors (e.g.
Appleby and Dixon 2004) state that most arguments in favour of choice
remain rhetorical as no facts nor clear conditions are given. So, for example,
patients in the London choice pilot studies were only allowed to choose
if waiting time exceeded a maximum; as a result average waiting times
decrease inevitably simply by design of the study. The impact of choice
on quality was not measured at all. It has also been argued that actual
quality improvements are less due to the switching of providers, but rather
the image concerns of hospital managers (Robertson and Thorlby 2010).
Summarising, relatively much is known about stated preferences of con-
sumers in health care; very little is known about actual choice behaviour or
whether increased possibilities of patient choice will have an impact on the
eciency (e.g. reduced waiting times) or quality of primary care services.
The available surveys as well as pilot studies from secondary care simply do
CHAPTER 5. THE MARKET FOR PRIMARY CARE 192
not provide suitable data.
5.5 Modelling Primary Care
The preceding sections revealed that existing knowledge about the driving
forces of ecient health care provision has some shortcomings, which are
mainly the following:
{ The agency literature makes strong assumptions about doctors' moti-
vation. Many analyses treat in detail only the extreme case in which
doctors are not interested in their patients' welfare, or constrained by
professional standards. The few articles accounting for joint patient
and GP utility functions remain vague.
{ The empirical literature is constrained by the data available. Only a
few studies had the opportunities to study explicitly the inuence of
dierent remuneration systems in longitudinal designs. Not surpris-
ingly, some results remain inconclusive. For example, some studies
nd that capitation payment leads to more referrals, some nd the
opposite.
{ With respect to quality, there is a theoretical consensus that com-
petition is likely to improve quality, especially when prices are ad-
ministered (Gaynor 2006). However, the extent to which patients
are willing to change providers is unknown. Furthermore, nothing is
known about the implications for the health system as a whole. So
far, data has mostly been collected in exceptional circumstances, as
for example during the (secondary care) patient choice pilot studies.
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A complete model of primary care can certainly not replace missing data,
but at least simulate scenarios and highlight possible policy impacts, which
in the current discussion remain purely theoretical or politically motivated.
The computational model developed in the next sections will look mainly at
the dimensions of quantity and quality of service provision. The following
hypotheses inferred from the literature will be the frame for these scenarios:
{ Prospective (capitation) payment is likely to ration service quality and
quantity. If patient demand reects quality, and there is competition
between GPs, quality may rise if the marginal capitation payment ex-
ceeds the marginal cost (strong empirical evidence from most studies).
{ Prospective payment is likely to induce higher than necessary rates
of referral. This eect might be counterbalanced if eort is high.
In this case, GPs want to attract more patients by better services;
better services could be reected by more appropriate treatment (no
empirical evidence; the hypothesis is mainly based on Karlsson (2007)
and Gravelle and Masiero (2000)).
{ Retrospective (FFS) payment induces in general a higher volume of
services (supplier-induced demand hypothesis; empirical evidence from
most studies). As competition increases, GPs are likely to increase un-
necessary treatments to compensate for short lists (based mainly on
the supplier induced demand hypothesis (Zweifel et al 2005); there is
only weak or even no empirical evidence (e.g. Grytten and Sorensen
2007)).
{ As retrospective payment induces a high provision of services by the
doctor himself, the rate of referrals is expected to be lower than in
capitation systems, i.e. there are no unnecessary referrals. In fact,
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there may be fewer referrals than necessary (some empirical evidence
from studies).
{ Demand side induced competition by patient choice improves qual-
ity. Unsatised consumers are likely to change their GP, but then
are likely to remain loyal, decreasing competition again. Under FFS,
this can be expected to work against unnecessary treatments (to pre-
vent excessive exits of existing patients). Under capitation, patient
induced competition will reduce unnecessary referrals to attract and
keep patients.
The computational model of primary care is described in the next sec-
tion. The aim is to design it in a way that allows to investigate the hy-
potheses that so far have only been incompletely covered in existing work.
5.6 A Reinforcement Learning Model Of Pri-
mary Care
The actors in the model are patients, GPs and the health authority (HA).
The HA is setup once per simulation. Its main function is to implement the
policy for a simulation run (e.g. by dening the value of fee and capitation
payments), and to pay the GPs.
The main assumptions of this model are:
{ GPs are self-employed professionals who trade leisure and patient wel-
fare against income. Costs are incurred only indirectly in terms of
eort and time the GP invests.
{ GPs can dene their maximum workload, which must be > 0.
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{ There is no reservation utility of GPs. A GP must treat patients
coming to him.
{ There are no exits of GPs.
{ There are no switching costs. When patients become unsatised with
a GP, they may search for a new doctor without incurring any trans-
action or search costs.
5.6.1 Overview
Patients and GPs are distributed randomly over a grid, with x and y di-
mensions from 0::1.
Time in the simulation proceeds in a discrete way. A time step d rep-
resents exactly one day. A period t is dened as a number of days. For
example, a period could be a week (t = 7 or a month t = 30). Typically,
certain decisions and updates are made per period, not per day.
At each day d > 1, consumers face a certain probability of becoming ill
with condition 1:::m. When they become ill, they choose a GP based on
their utility function (see section 5.6.2). If it is their rst appointment with
this doctor, the GP adds the patient to his list list. Then, an appointment
is scheduled by the GP at time d+k; 0 <= k. k depends on the waiting list
listwait of the GP. A GP can treat up to appointmentsmax patients a day. As
long as the waiting list for the day is not lled (listwait < appointmentsmax),
k = 0. After that the appointment is made for d + 1 and so on. k is thus
the number of days until a patient is seen by the doctor.
A GP sees then up to n; n < appointmentsmax, patients per day. De-
pending on the condition a treatment is chosen. While the condition is
always diagnosed correctly, the treatment choice is uncertain. This uncer-
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tainty is represented as a probability with which a doctor chooses between
alternatives `treat or `refer'. For example, some severe illnesses must be
referred - the GP has to decide to refer with probability 1. There are other,
milder conditions for which the GP can decide either to refer or to treat
himself. The details how this choice is made is described in section 5.6.3.
After the consultation happened, the patients receive information about
the doctor (e.g., the eort the GP made, or the waiting time to get an
appointment), which then enters their decision-process at the next time
they become ill.
The HA pays the GPs at the end of a period. The GPs send their
bills, containing the services they provided as well as the patients on their
list, to the HA. The HA calculates the pay depending on the policy being
implemented and sends the amount back to the GP. The GP then updates
his utility for the period and decides his work plan for the next period (e.g.,
the number of patients to see).
In the following sections, the utility functions and decision processes of
GPs and patients are described in detail.
5.6.2 Patient Decisions
Utility function When patients become ill, they choose a GP and make
an appointment. The choice of GP is based on distance dist, experienced
waiting times wait, and experienced eort of the doctor, E. Eort is here
interpreted as an indicator for the quality of the doctor-patient relationship,
for example, the time the doctor spends per consultation.
A patient calculates his welfare by
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UP = wait+ dist  E: (5.1)
To be precise, UP is the `inconvenience' of the consumer, which he tries
to minimise (minimal distance, minimal waiting time, maximal eort of
the doctor). Before knowing a doctor, the patient has no knowledge about
waiting times and eort. The function then reduces to UP = distance.
Calculation of the utility function After the rst experience, a patient
can update his doctor information with respective values of E and wait.
Each patient maintains a list of GPs. The model generates and updates
this list; if the list is full, but there are more GPs unknown to the agent,
the model may replace the worst ranking GP from the list with a new
candidate.
Decision process Patients only consider practices if waiting time is <3
days. If all doctors a patient knows have a waiting time  3 days, he chooses
the closest GP. Patients forget the actual waiting time by reducing the
experienced waiting time by a certain factor each following day (currently
set to wait
10
). Thus, even if waiting time was long some time ago, a patient
might consider visiting this doctor again. Forgetting is important in this
model, because otherwise some practices would have no chance to convince
dissatised patients to return, as patient decisions are based on experience.
Patient choice behaviour is modelled using dierent forms of rationality.
A rst dimension in which patients are bounded rational is in the sense that
they have access to only a small amount of information. First, the number
of doctors a consumer can remember is set to 3. Second, information about
GPs is circulated in networks of consumers. The network size may vary;
here networks with 2 or 5 close neighbours and one distant link (randomly
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chosen from anywhere in the landscape) have been generated. The idea is
that in a world with small networks, information circulates less freely. The
distant link has the function to bridge the distance among all consumers
in the landscape so that it is less likely, but not impossible to learn about
the best choices in the model. A second dimension of limited rationality
is realised by the application of dierent choice modes. In the `rational'
choice mode, a patient ranks all GPs by their expected utility, given by
the last experience (i.e. there is no discounting) and chooses the one which
ranks highest. That is, even innitesimal small dierences are recognised
by the agent. This is what meant with 'rational' - the agent utilises its
computational power to distinguish between smallest dierence in utility.
The `probabilistic' choice mode is given by simple RL. In this case, GPs
represent action alternatives, and the expected utilities are used as the pay-
o p for equation 2.9 in chapter 2 to update the action strengths, and thus
the selection probability for choosing a particular GP. In the probabilistic
decision mode, small dierences between GPs will lead to similar choice
probabilities.
Combining the behaviour dimensions - information availability and choice
mode - will allow us later to relate patient behaviour to the ndings from
the literature review. For instance, it will help to investigate the dierence
between scenarios where consumers have access to more information (larger
network), or make more ecient use of that information (by more rational
decision making).
5.6.3 GP Decisions
Decision context and constraints In this model, doctors' decisions
are not inuenced only by their own welfare (income), but also by their pa-
tients' welfare and normative constraints like professional standards, which
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prevents them from being purely selsh. So even if a GP has not reached
his or her preferred income, he or she will not necessarily provide excessive
treatment - because it is neither in the patient's best interest, nor is it jus-
tiable before himself or herself or other colleagues. If there is, on the other
hand, room for `interpretation' whether additional treatment is necessary
or not, his own welfare may play a larger role in deciding.
The model uses a decision-theoretic approach to reect such situated
decision processes. The central concept in this approach is the clinical
condition and the related treatment(s). One patient can have exactly one
condition m, for which exactly one treatment tr exists. This is labelled a
condition-treatment pair fm; trg. The diagnosis is always correct, and the
doctor has only some discretion about whether to apply the treatment or
not.
The condition-treatment pair fm; trg determines the likelihood with
which a patient is treated by the GP or referred to secondary care. A deci-
sion is always, to a smaller or larger extent, uncertain. The GP's decision
is therefore modelled probabilistically.
The condition-treatment pair species also the eort necessary to apply
the treatment, which can be seen as a sort of cost accrued by the GP when
choosing the option to treat. Referral has no eort for the GP - treating is
always more `costly' than referring.
There is only small variation in the probabilities of each outcome (re-
ferral or treatment) of a consultation. The upper and lower bounds of
this variation are determined by parameter varmax, which sets the maxi-
mum deviation from an objective norm. The extent of the actual variation
varactual depends on the individual utility function and is adapted by the
GP during his decision process (see below). In detail, the decision proba-
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bilities are calculated as follows: Each fm; trg has a professional certainty
value p between 0 and 1. This value indicates the certainty that tr is the
`appropriate' treatment for condition m; conversely, 1   p represents the
opposite. The idea is based on Krasnik's operationalisation of uncertainty
(Krasnik and Groenewegen 1992): Krasnik measured professional uncer-
tainty as the regression coecient of treatment and condition in the GP
population. For example, a coecient of 0.24 for a condition-treatment
pair (or better, condition-treatment group, because some services are ap-
plied typically for a number of diagnoses) means that 24 % of all doctors
apply this treatment if they diagnose the respective condition. This can
be interpreted as little professional consensus about whether to apply this
service, as 76 % of doctors would do nothing, or refer. Without accounting
for the empirical distribution of such certainties, the model uses this idea
to dene a `norm' for each fm; trg. So, for example, if p = 0:24, a single
GP decides to treat a condition i with pi;actual = p ±vari;actual, and with
1  pi;actual to refer.
Utility function The GP is seen here as a self-employed professional:
The objective is to earn some income with minimal eort; at the same
time, he cares for his patients' welfare. The utility function is given by
Ugp = I
(Emax   E)(n DEV ): (5.2)
The rationale behind this Cobb-Douglas type utility function is to cap-
ture the decreasing marginal utility that is the usual standard form of utility
functions. It is positively inuenced by total income (I) per period, total
`leisure' (Emax E) per period, and the welfare (n DEV ) of all n patients
in a given period. Leisure is dened as the dierence between maximum
eort Emax and actual eort; the larger this dierence (i.e. the smaller the
actual eort E), the higher utility. A similar logic applies to the valuation
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of patient welfare: Welfare is a function of the appropriate treatment, where
appropriateness is dened as the minimum deviation of a single patient's
treatment from the norm; DEV stands for the sum of these deviations.
The more patients are over- or under-treated, the smaller the contribution
to total utility (n DEV becomes smaller). The calculation of the variables
I, E, Emax and dev is described in the next paragraph.
Calculation of the utility function The components of the utility func-
tions are computed the following way:
Income is dened as
I = lIcapitation +
jTRjX
i=0
qifeeTRi (5.3)
l denotes the list size of the GP, TR is the set of treatments a GP may
apply, and qi the number of times a particular service i from set TR, denoted
TRi, was actually applied. Payment is given by a capitation fee Icapitation
per patient, and the sum of fees of applied services.
For the calculation of leisure, the dierence between the maximum pos-
sible eort Emax and actual eort E is calculated. The actual eort is given
by
E = nEbase +
jTRjX
i=0
qiETRi (5.4)
Each service TRi requires some eort (e.g. the time necessary to perform
the service), which is the same for every GP. However, a GP may vary the
`base eort' Ebase, 0 < Ebase < 1, per patient. This base eort stands for,
e.g., the time spent with the patient, information and explanation given
during a consultation and so on. Thus, the lower the eort per patient,
and the lower the probability of treatment, the smaller the eort (the more
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leisure) of the GP. Emax, the average maximum possible eort is calculated
by the same formula, substituting the maximum possible values for the
variables:
Ebase = 1,
n =
jTRjX
i=0
qi = appointmentsmax,
ETR =
1
jTRj
jTRjX
i=0
Ei(pi + pivarmax).
The average maximum eort ETR over all possible treatments is given
by the average maximum treatment probability p and the eort values E
for all jTRj treatments. Multiplying now ETR by the maximum number of
patients appointmentsmax and the highest possible eort per patient Ebase
denes the maximum possible eort a GP can have per day: Emax = n ETR,
The measurement of patient welfare is not well dened in the litera-
ture and dicult to operationalise. Evans (1976) sees the over-provision of
services constrained by some professional or ethical standard limiting the
power of the income or leisure component's in the GP's utility. Lerner and
Claxton (1996) point in their analysis of utility functions to authors with
similar arguments: Dranove (1985) argues that too aggressive provision of
services might lead to patients leaving or reduce the number of visits. Wood-
ward and Warren-Boulton (1984) state that `each physician derives addi-
tional utility both from positive consumption of the product of his leisure
activities... and from providing additional care per patient ... up to the
`appropriate' amount'. Based on such arguments, it is assumed here that
there is some norm of appropriate treatment, acknowledged by the profes-
sional community as well as by common-sense of patients. The assumption
of the existence of such a standard allows the denition of appropriateness
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as zero deviation from the norm. For each patient, the absolute dierence
of the consultation outcome with the professional certainty p is computed.
So to speak, this is the deviation of what was objectively expected to be
appropriate for the patient, and what the GP actually did. Thus, for all in-
dividual decisions with uncertainty (0 <p< 1), there might be a deviation.
Since the modeller cannot judge the individual clinical decision, only the
sum of all positive and negative deviations is taken into account for dening
welfare:
DEV =
nX
i=0
TRX
j=0
(decisioni   pj)qi;j (5.5)
qi;j equals 1 if treatment TRj was applied to patient i, 0 otherwise.
decisioni equals 1 if the patient i was treated, 0 if referred. Thus, for all
patients of the GP, DEV approximates zero if the doctor treats always
according to the norm (and if patient numbers are suciently large); val-
ues > 0 denote overtreatment (the larger the value the more likely treat-
ment), values < 0 undertreatment (the smaller, the more likely referral).
For example, if pj = 0:8, i.e. professional consensus points strongly to-
wards treating, and if pjactual = 0:5 (the doctor reduces eort by refer-
ring), then of 10 patients with that condition 5 are referred, and 5 treated:
DEV = 5  (1   0:8) + 5  (0   0:8) =  3, whereas for a `norm-conform'
doctor it would calculate DEV = 8  (1  0:8) + 2  (0  0:8) = 0. Patient
welfare n DEV for the rst doctor would be 7, for the second 10.
Decision process The GP's decision concerns the setting of his treatment
pattern pactual: pactual = fp0;actual : : : pi;actual : : : pz;actualg (determining the
referral behaviour), the number of appointments per day n (determining the
workload, respectively leisure Emax E and income I) and the consultation
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pattern, which is the eort invested into the doctor-patient relationship
Ebase. The GP can inuence income and leisure by setting the maximum
number of appointments and the treatment pattern (if there is fee income);
and he or she can inuence patient welfare by setting the treatment pattern.
Several scenarios can be generated with this set of variables. For exam-
ple, some doctors may prefer to set Ebase low and see many patients with
a high probability of referring them. This would be an income-maximising,
eort-minimising strategy for a doctor without concerns for patient wel-
fare. Furthermore, this strategy would pay best in environments with a
large capitation component since there is no income loss from not treat-
ing. However, as patients can react via evaluation of Ebase, and may switch
to another doctor, the relationship of the GP's decision variables become
non-deterministic.
The decisions of the GP in detail are as follows: At the end of each pe-
riod the GP decides about his consultation pattern and how many patients
nt he wants to see each day in the current (beginning) period t. To do this,
he `simulates' the optimal conguration of the treatment probabilities popt
for all treatments: popt = fp0;opt : : : pi;opt : : : pz;optg, and appointments nopt,
appointmentsmin < nopt < appointmentsmax for the next period t. He uses
for this the known constants (such as the capitation rate) and variables
from last period t   1 as the estimates for next period. These values and
constants are: The expected frequency of each condition; the eort values
per treatment (xed at the beginning of a simulation); Ebase; the capitation
rate (xed at the beginning); list size; and fees per treatment (xed at the
beginning). Using these values, he searches for utility maximising values of
the choice variables pi and nt. The search is implemented using a genetic
algorithm. Genetic algorithms are a standard solution for function approx-
imation, and search incrementally for value combinations that come closest
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to a tness value (which is here simply the largest double precision number,
as the largest possible GP utility !1).
Ebase is held constant during this optimisation process. So to speak, it
is assumed that the GP sees an illness, which needs to be xed, and that
he has no intrinsic interest in a better doctor-patient relationship. The GP
only increases eort if he wants to keep or attract new patients; i.e., he
knows that patients value a good patient-doctor relationship, and will use
this fact as a `marketing tool'.
Depending on how many patients are expected per day, the following
actions are taken depending on the outcome of the optimisation procedure:
{ nopt < nt 1: Set pactual = popt and nt = nopt. In this situation, the
waiting list is long enough, and the doctor sees no need to increase the
workload. The agent also sets the treatment patterns to the utility-
maximising pattern. Furthermore, if Ebase > 0, the GP decreases the
base eort by 0.1 (there is no need to attract patients).
{ nopt > nt 1: The GP wants to have more patients than there is de-
mand. In this case, the agent reacts by re-optimising the optimal
treatment patterns p0opt under the constraint that n is given, and sets
pactual = p
0
opt. If Ebase < 1, he increases Ebase by 0.1, because he or she
wants to attract more consumers to achieve the preferred workload.
{ nopt = nt 1: In this case, the situation of the GP remains unchanged.
The agent sets nt = nt 1, and all pactual = popt.
To put this model into context with the related literature, it is a model
with hidden action - the GP has some discretion whether to treat or refer.
There is no diagnosis eort (i.e. no hidden information). The eort variable
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is used to represent aspects of the doctor-patient relationship; however, this
does not, as in other models (e.g. Jelovac 2001), have a relationship with the
correctness of the diagnosis. Furthermore, also in contrast to other models,
list size is not a parameter that enters the calculations of the GPs as for
example in Grytten and Sorensen (2007). That is, in case of capitation
payment, there is no reasoning in the agent that increasing list size by
increasing eort can increase income. Rather, this eect would come as
a side-eect only if there are too few patients for the doctor's preferred
workload.
5.7 Simulations
Simulations are run focusing on dierent dimensions of the system. The
three dimensions considered are: Competition (GP density), payment sys-
tem, and patient choice. After describing the simulation setup (section
5.7.1.1), rst a comparative static perspective is taken by comparing results
averaged over all time steps for these dimensions (section 5.7.1.2); then de-
tailed results for a particular GP density are computed and analysed from
a dynamic perspective. The dependent variables are waiting lists, referrals,
GP eort (as indicator for quality), and patient utility (as indicator for
welfare).
5.7.1 Exploration of the Model
5.7.1.1 Parameter Settings and Setup
Pure capitation and pure FFS are the extreme points of prospective and
retrospective payment modes. In between these extremes, mixed systems
exist. Starting with a pure FFS system, mixed systems are simulated by
increasing the capitation rate Icapitation from 0 stepwise to 1, at the same
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time decreasing the height of fees. So when capitation reaches 1, fees reach
0. Three scenarios are considered: Capitation, half FFS and half capitation,
and full FFS.
The eects of (provider-induced) competition are simply represented by
simulations with dierent numbers of GPs.
The eects of patient choice behaviour is realised by running simulations
combining small and larger contact networks with rational and probabilistic
decision making as described in section 5.6.2: Simulations BR-3 and BR-6
are simulations with a network of 3 and 6 consumers, respectively, using
the rational choice mode, i.e. agents collect information, rank it and choose
the best expected GP. RL-3 and RL-6 are simulations with a network of
3 and 6 consumers using RL, i.e. a GP is chosen probabilistically. Table
5.1 summarises the model parameters for the simulations. The parameters
of the patients' RL action selection function (see equation 2.10) are xed
at  = 0:1 and  = 1. This is an exploration rate and update speed
that enables the patient agents to react in reasonable time to environment
changes. The previous chapters illustrate this extensively.  values < 0:1
often lead to suboptimal choices.  = 1 leads to the immediate realisation of
changes in the environment. Here, this is a change in the doctor's treatment
pattern or waiting lists, or the addition of a new GP. If  is too small, it
might take long until the patient realises this change. There is no reason to
delay such changes, as there is no noise to accommodate, as, for example,
in models where the average reward comes from larger samples of agents.
No variations in GP and patient utility functions are analysed. The only
sources of variations are dierent fees for services, Icapitation, the geographic
distribution, and the learning mode of the patient agents. That is, any re-
sulting dierences in the simulation outcome will be based on homogeneous
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GP and patient preferences. Any inequalities, say, in the distribution of
waiting queues, would be generated simply by the structural and learning
properties of the model.
Most of the clinical parameters are set equally in the beginning: There
are 3 conditions for which the objective certainty values (p) are xed. The
base fees are drawn from a uniform distribution in the interval 0:::1. Then,
eort values for each condition-treatment pair efmi;trig are drawn from a uni-
form distribution in the range 0:::1
2
efmi;trig so that eort is always smaller
than the fee in the beginning. These base settings are equal for all scenar-
ios. Then, for each payment mode, fees and capitation rate are adjusted.
The capitation rate also varies between 0 and 1. For each capitation rate
the service fees are decreased by the same amount. For example, if capita-
tion=0.5, then each fee is decreased by 50%, if capitation is 1, then all fees
are decreased by 100 %, i.e. set to 0.
Table 5.1 summarises the resulting simulation runs for these parameter
settings.
The GP utility function was set in a way that on average GPs prefer a
maximum workload per day below the limit of appointmentmax, and are not
inuenced strongly by patient welfare. Some sample calculations have been
made on an Excel sheet to nd parameter values for ;  and  that (on
average) rst increase the GP's utility until workload becomes so high that
utility begins to decrease. In this model, workload is an important endoge-
nous variable responsible for generating variation in the outcomes. Setting
the utility function in a way that makes changes in workload unlikely (e.g.
by weighting income very high) will induce little variation in the workloads
and thus health outcomes. Figure 5.1 illustrates a sample function that was
generated with an average fee of 0.3, average eort of 0.5, and an average
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Choice Pay #pat. #GP cap. feeavg pavg eavg decision net.
BR-3 S-0 3000 10...250 0 0.48 0.53 0.24 rational 3
S-0.5 3000 10...250 0.5 0.24 0.53 0.24 rational 3
S-1 3000 10...250 1 0 0.53 0.24 rational 3
BR-6 S-0 3000 10...250 0 0.48 0.53 0.24 rational 6
S-0.5 3000 10...250 0.5 0.24 0.53 0.24 rational 6
S-1 3000 10...250 1 0 0.53 0.24 rational 6
RL-3 S-0 3000 10...250 0 0.48 0.53 0.24 prob. 3
S-0.5 3000 10...250 0.5 0.24 0.53 0.24 prob. 3
S-1 3000 10...250 1 0 0.53 0.24 prob. 3
RL-6 S-0 3000 10...250 0 0.48 0.53 0.24 prob. 6
S-0.5 3000 10...250 0.5 0.24 0.53 0.24 prob. 6
S-1 3000 10...250 1 0 0.53 0.24 prob. 6
Table 5.1: Overview of simulation runs. The rst two columns denote scenario
names used in the analysis.
treatment probability of 0.5.
Patients have a simpler objective function: They value the doctor's ef-
fort highest and distance the least, whereas the weight of waiting time lies
between the two. The function is linear: The higher the eort, the smaller
waiting time and distance, the higher utility.
Table 5.2 shows the respective parameters of the utility functions.
Parameter GP Patient
Ugp = I
(Emax   E)(n DEV ) UP = wait+ dist  E
 0.2 0.5
 0.8 0.3
 0.1 0.7
Table 5.2: GP and patient utility functions
Consumers become ill with probability 0.9. This is certainly unrealistic,
but within this simple model justiable, because time is only relevant for
patients to collect experiences about doctors. The value is < 1 to keep some
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Figure 5.1: A typical GP utility function (showing only the two dimensions
income and workload) as used in the simulations.
small variation in the number of ill consumers each time step. Thus, more
realistic lower morbidity rates and longer simulation runs are equivalent to
higher morbidity and shorter runs. A similar technical reason applies for
the decision cycles of GPs, which is set at a week, i.e. t = 7 (whereas
a period of a month or several months is much more realistic - see, for
example, the Krasnik study (Krasnik and Groenewegen 1992), which found
more signicant changes only after 12 months after the intervention) - the
only function is to make the simulation runs more ecient by bundling the
important events.
For the comparative static view, simulations were run with 3000 con-
sumers and varying GP density. The reason for this large number was
mainly to be absolutely certain that the geographical distribution of con-
sumers is random. Only 120 time steps were run. The main interest is
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exploring many dierent competition scenarios by increasing GP density
and generating large enough samples of distribution parameters such as fee
and eort values. To keep the time to compute the simulations manageable,
the duration of the simulations was kept short - therefore the high morbidity
rate and shorter decision periods described above. For the dynamic view,
the number of patients was reduced to 1000 and only one GP density set-
ting run, which, comparing it with the larger simulation, seemed to be a
sucient size. On the other hand, the number of time steps was increased
to 750 to observe the behaviour of the model in the longer run.
5.7.1.2 Static Analysis
The following sections show simulation runs averaged over 121 time steps,
representing 120 days or four months. In the gures, GP density is mea-
sured as the quotient of the number of GPs and patients in the respective
simulation.
Waiting lists
Figure 5.2 illustrates how GP density, payment system and choice mode in-
uence waiting time. Waiting lists are measured as the quotient of patients
waiting for treatment at a time step, and all consumers in the population.
Quite trivially, waiting lists decrease with increasing GP density in all sce-
narios.
Comparing the scenarios, there is a very small dierence between pure
capitation systems and non-capitation systems; there is virtually no dier-
ence between a pure FFS system and the mixed half-fee, half-capitation
system. Furthermore, there seem to be some very small dierences between
choice modes. In the BR-6 scenario, for example, a GP density of 0.01
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(a) BR-3 (b) BR-6
(c) RL-3 (d) RL-6
Figure 5.2: Waiting lists (static analysis)
induces average waiting lists of 0.025. This value is smaller than the BR-3
scenario (where less consumer choice is possible), as well as all RL scenarios.
Referrals
Figure 5.3 shows the referral behaviour. The rate of referrals r is computed
relative against the expected referrals, which is determined by the certainty
value p: r = 1
p
#referrals
#referrals+#treatments
. For example, in the simulation setup
the `objective' treatment probability is p = 0:53 and referral probability =
1   p = 0:47. If the doctors' decisions are on average close to 0.47, then
r  1 and vice versa. The maximum deviation parameter varmax was set
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to 0.2, so that r varies between 1.2 and 0.8.
There is a clear dierence between capitation and non-capitation sys-
tems, but not between choice modes. r is almost constant for capitation
doctors at a rate close to 1; they decide `close to the norm'. This rate does
not change with increasing competition. This is somewhat surprising as the
major instrument for capitation doctors to increase utility is the reduction
of eort ( = 0:8). Patient welfare should not have such a big inuence
( = 0:1); one would, therefore, expect a propensity to refer closer to the
maximum of 1.2 in all scenarios. In the FFS scenarios, the referral rate is
constant at about 0.8 - close to the minimum possible. The incentives of
the model are such that GPs always decide to over-treat; the rationale of an
FFS agent is to maximise income at each consultation independent of the
environment. This is plausible, as there is no incentive apart from patient
welfare to increase the referral rate. While patient welfare can inuence
the decision of capitation doctors, resulting in appropriate treatment, this
inuence is (ceteris paribus) too weak for FFS GPs in the model.
Eort
As could be expected, eort levels (gure 5.4) increase with GP density as
increasing eort is the main instrument for doctors to attract more patients.
Shape and level are similar in all scenarios, although eort is ends up slightly
higher in the BR models ( 0:9 as compared to  0:8 in RL). Furthermore,
in the BR-6 scenario under capitation is only very small change in eort; it
starts relatively high and then remains similar.
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(a) BR-3 (b) BR-6
(c) RL-3 (d) RL-6
Figure 5.3: Referrals (static analysis)
Patient utility
More dierences between the scenarios exist with respect to patient utility
(gure 5.5). In BR-3, patient utility increases at a decreasing rate up to a
level of about 0.6. It then remains, by and large, at this level and seems
even to decrease when GP density increases further over  0.063. In BR-6,
the rise in utility is more constant as competition increases, and at the top
with 0.7 higher than in BR-3. Utility in the RL scenarios is lower, but
increasing almost linearly with GP density.
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(a) BR-3 (b) BR-6
(c) RL-3 (d) RL-6
Figure 5.4: GP eort (static analysis)
Summary
This overview showed on a coarse level the simulation outcomes in the
dimensions GP density and patient choice behaviour. There are mostly no
or only very little dierences between the behaviour modes. Furthermore,
the relationship between competition, eort and welfare is obvious - the
more competition the higher quality. The following two main observations
will be investigated in more detail in the next set of experiments:
{ Less rational choice behaviour (in the form of RL) leads to reduced
eort.
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(a) BR-3 (b) BR-6
(c) RL-3 (d) RL-6
Figure 5.5: Patient utility (static analysis)
{ Patient welfare increases with better information (larger networks)
and more rational decision-making. There are two possibilities why
this can happen - either BR patients switch faster to better doctors
even if dierences are very small; or, vice versa, the probabilistic
choices under RL lead to increased switching (probability matching)
and apparent random behaviour. In the latter case, this would in-
duce doctors to reduce eort, since it does not necessarily increase list
size; hence reducing eort could be a suitable strategy to improve GP
utility.
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5.7.2 Dynamic Analysis
The purpose of the preceding section was to cover many dierent param-
eter variations on an aggregate level. While the aggregate view only gives
a general impression of the simulation behaviour, this section takes the
exploratory results as a starting point and looks at the dynamic aspects.
For this, GP density is xed and the number of patients reduced to obtain
results in a reasonable time. The number of patients is set at 1000, the
number of GPs at 60. Simulations are run for 750 steps. Furthermore, only
pure FFS versus pure capitation is compared, since the eects of minor
variations turned out to be negligible in the model. The other parameters
remain the same. The GP-patient ratio reects the actual ratio in the UK.
According to a 2003 OECD report (cited in Royal College of General Prac-
titioners (2006)) this ratio was 65 GPs per 100.000 patients, of whom the
average patient had three visits per year. Given the high probability of
visiting a doctor in the simulation setup (0.9 as compared to 0.008), this
ratio of 0.000065 can be translated into a ratio of 0.06 in the simulation,
with the average workload of the GP remaining about the same.
Waiting lists
The development of waiting lists (gure 5.6) shows an important aspect
that was not observable during the shorter runs of the previous simulations:
Waiting lists decrease only at later stages of the simulation - roughly from
step 250 onwards. Over all learning modes, the decrease is sharper for FFS;
for network sizes of 6, the dierence is smaller. Furthermore, the dierence
between BR and RL modes is large. Waiting lists drop much faster to low
levels under RL. In RL-6 waiting lists are generally shorter than in RL-3.
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(a) BR-3 (b) BR-6
(c) RL-3 (d) RL-6
Figure 5.6: Waiting lists over time for a density of 0.06 GPs per patient.
Referrals
Figure 5.7 shows the referral behaviour. Here, the dierences are very small
and the rates stable. However, dierences between FFS and capitation in
BR-6 are smaller. Furthermore, variation seems to be larger in BR scenarios.
Eort
Figure 5.8 shows the eort levels. Eort increases quickly to the maximum
of 1 in all scenarios. The rise is a little slower in the RL scenarios. Fur-
thermore, there is - although very little - variability in eort levels under
capitation in the RL-scenarios, and the level is - also only slightly - below
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(a) BR-3 (b) BR-6
(c) RL-3 (d) RL-6
Figure 5.7: Referrals over time for a density of 0.06 GPs per patient.
the FFS levels.
Patient utility
Figure 5.9 shows the patient utility levels. Here, there are very obvious
dierences between choice modes. The BR scenarios are very similar -
neither network size, nor payment mode inuences patient utility strongly.
The dierence is mainly that utility reaches its maximum a few time steps
earlier in the BR-6 scenarios, and this even faster under FFS. Within the
RL scenarios, patient utility is lower and varies much stronger. Moreover,
in the RL scenarios, utility is lower and variation stronger under capitation
CHAPTER 5. THE MARKET FOR PRIMARY CARE 220
(a) BR-3 (b) BR-6
(c) RL-3 (d) RL-6
Figure 5.8: GP eort over time for a density of 0.06 GPs per patient.
than under FFS.
5.7.3 Summary of the Simulation Results and Discus-
sion
The dynamic view highlights the driving factors in the simulation in a more
detailed view. With regard to waiting lists, it was found that there are
considerable dierences between choice modes and payment system. With
respect to patient welfare, there are dierences between choice modes.
Table 5.3 shows some summary measures across all time steps, high-
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(a) BR-3 (b) BR-6
(c) RL-3 (d) RL-6
Figure 5.9: Patient utility for a density of 0.06 GPs per patient.
lighting some dierences between learning modes and payment systems. A
variance analysis for the dependent variables waiting list, eort, referral rate
and patient welfare has been conducted; results are given in the appendix
C.
Using the graphs and the results of the variance analysis, two main
observations can be made:
In the simulations, patient choice reduces waiting times, but decreases
quality: For waiting lists, the variance analysis shows signicant dierences
between payment systems and choice mode (except for BR-3/Capitation
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scenario eort wait referral rate patient utility
mean sdev mean sdev mean sdev mean sdev
BR-3/FFS 0.982 0.000 9.625 5.711 0.808 0.017 0.617 0.053
BR-3/Capitation 0.976 0.005 13.944 5.518 0.988 0.035 0.611 0.053
BR-6/FFS 0.980 0.003 11.636 4.113 0.911 0.023 0.637 0.027
BR-6/Capitation 0.976 0.003 14.070 6.037 0.991 0.029 0.612 0.04
RL-3/FFS 0.963 0.016 6.651 2.497 0.803 0.013 0.44 0.123
RL-3/Capitation 0.964 0.008 7.709 2.229 0.993 0.020 0.289 0.157
RL-6/FFS 0.960 0.010 5.145 2.304 0.805 0.020 0.454 0.155
RL-6/Capitation 0.956 0.015 8.666 3.330 0.998 0.020 0.287 0.189
Table 5.3: Mean and standard deviation for dependent variables, measured
over 750 time steps.
which has no signicant dierences to RL-3/Capitation and RL-6/Capitation;
this is probably due to the strong decrease at later simulation steps). For
patient utility, the dierences between choice mode and payment system
are also signicant, with two exceptions (BR-3/Capitation is not dierent
from BR-3/FFS and BR-6/Capitation).
A likely reason for these clear dierences between choice modes lies in GP
eort and patient mobility. In BR scenarios, patients remain loyal to their
GPs. This results in high and unchanged eort levels. Since eort is strongly
weighted in the patient utility function, this would explain the lower utility
levels in the RL models. Dierences in eort levels are small, but signicant
between BR and RL scenarios. Furthermore, signicant dierences in eort
exist between RL-6/Capitation and all other RL scenarios. With respect
to waiting lists, computations showed that the coecient of variation in
the RL-scenarios is much lower (on average 0.37) than in BR-scenarios (on
average 0.44). This indicates that in BR there are some doctors with longer,
and some with short waiting lists, while in RL, patients distribute more
evenly over practices.
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Strictly choosing the most preferred doctor thus guarantee stability in
demand for the GPs, who in turn have a motivation to maintain quality
to keep patients. Both demand and supply stabilise each other. As the
dierences between GPs are small (due to homogeneous utility functions
xed in the setup), RL patients tend to go `GP shopping'. The closer
expected utility the more likely they switch. This trend is also obvious
when computing a loyalty index (table 5.4) as the ratio of the number of
visits at the GP most often seen by a patient and the number of total GP
visits. It shows that patients are most loyal to their GP in FFS scenarios
with rational decisions and small network size. In other words, limited
choice and economic decisions stabilise the system best. For example, in
BR-3/FFS 74% of all patients stayed with a single GP, whereas in all RL
scenarios, this rate is just 30%. The dierence between capitation and FFS
in the BR models is likely due to shorter waiting lists: because capitation
doctors have longer waiting lists, some patients become unsatised faster
than under FFS and may switch. This would also be reected by the smaller
dierences between waiting lists in BR-6 as compared to BR-3, as are the
dierences between loyalty values. Another pointer into this direction can
be seen in the referral behaviour. In BR-6, for example, even FFS doctors
tend to refer at more appropriate levels (which increases patient utility),
rather than over-treating.
While patient utility increases due to higher quality in BR scenarios,
longer waiting queues develop at `good' doctors, while others have only few
patients. This shows the tension between policy goals - less choice might
actually provide increase quality and welfare, but waiting times are likely
to increase. More patient choice could reduce waiting lists, but also the
quality of doctor-patient relationship.
In the simulations, FFS appears to reduce waiting times better than cap-
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Scenario Loyalty
BR-3/FFS 0.75
BR-3/Capitation 0.49
BR-6/FFS 0.53
BR-6/Capitation 0.48
RL-3/FFS 0.28
RL-3/Capitation 0.29
RL-6/FFS 0.29
RL-6/Capitation 0.29
Table 5.4: Average loyalty index of patients. The index is computed as the
quotient of the number of visits at a most visited GP and total visits of GPs over
the whole simulation.
itation: Looking only at the inuence of payment systems, the simulations
suggest that the FFS scenarios score better on most dependent variables
than capitation scenarios.
With respect to waiting lists, the reason is that the preferred workload of
FFS doctors is always higher (computations show that the preferred work-
load of FFS doctors is roughly twice the preferred workload of capitation
doctors). As the preceding gures showed, they increase their utility by
increasing income by treating more patients, and referring fewer patients.
Consequently, they have on average shorter waiting lists than capitation
doctors. This eect is not visible in early stages of the simulation; only
over time doctors manage to decrease their waiting lists by adapting their
planned workload week after week as their queues increase. It also explains
the dierent speed of BR-3 and BR-6: In BR-6 patients know more doctors
(coecient of variation for waiting lists: 0.43) than in BR-3 (coecient of
variation for waiting lists: 0.4), and thus distribute more evenly over the
GP population. The same tendency, but on dierent levels, is obvious from
gure 5.6 for the RL scenarios.
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Looking at patient welfare, utility is always lower in the capitation cases
- slightly in the BR scenarios, and more obvious in the RL scenarios. In the
BR scenarios, this dierence can easily be attributed to the longer waiting
lists, which have some inuence on utility. The large dierences in RL are,
however, puzzling. Certainly also here the longer waiting lists inuence
welfare negatively. The question is why level and shape of the curves dier
so much and persistently. The pattern in the rst steps is analogous to the
BR simulations - under capitation welfare is always slightly lower. However,
over time, the dierence between utility stabilises, instead of approximating
each other as under BR. The only remaining source of variation remains GP
eort. Eort does vary more and is lower as under FFS, but the dierence
is extremely small (and not signicant within RL-3).
Similar to the rst result, this implies that FFS might be more ecient
in reducing waiting times. Moreover, if there is high patient mobility, more
FFS counterbalances the welfare loss due to lower eort levels.
5.8 Conclusion
Based on the results of the literature about incentive systems in primary
care, an agent-based model was developed, which attempted to address
the major shortcomings of the traditional models: The simplifying assump-
tions of the agency literature where GPs are modelled as income-maximising
rms, and the ad-hoc nature and assumptions of many empirical studies.
In particular, the model tried to operationalise patient choice, which plays
an important role in the political discussion, but about which few models
exist.
The simulations demonstrated how the impacts of possibly conicting
policy targets (quality and eciency) can be analysed within one and the
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same model. The model shows that more `shopping for GPs' could, while
reducing waiting times, actually lead to lower quality and consequently, to
lower patient utility. The underlying reason is that GPs might choose to
work less in an environment they perceive as unpredictable and unstable.
If policy values low waiting times higher, these negative eects might be
accepted, because more shopping is likely to lead to a more equal distribu-
tion of patients over GPs. The simulations also showed how the interactions
between payment system and patient behaviour might be analysed. In par-
ticular, in the light of these articial results, it could be argued, that - if
eciency and quality are equally weighted goals - the implementation of
more patient choice should be accompanied with more FFS-like elements.
The result of the simulations could also be interpreted in a dierent way.
Assuming that policy `wants' educated consumers behaving as rational as
the consumers in the BR-scenarios, the scenarios can be used as a thought
experiment of possible future paths. Consumers, prepared to make the best
choice, search for their preferred practice. They want to behave rationally
in the sense dened above, i.e. stick to the best GP and not shop around.
However, dierences between practices, e.g. in a certain region, are so
small or there is not enough reliable information, that it is too dicult to
distinguish between doctors' quality. It becomes impossible to nd the best
GP (this is represented by the RL scenarios). As patients keep searching
for better practices, quality levels fall because GPs see no reason why they
should raise eort for non-loyal patients. Thus, even if policy could reach
the objectives in one area - motivating consumers to exercise choice as a
means to raise quality - the actual achievement of this goal might lead to
unintended consequences.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis focused on adaptation in articial agents from dierent angles:
First, how simple and more complex approaches to learning and cognition
can be combined in an ACE framework; how simple and more complex
learning can be applied in various domains; and how a software can be
engineered that covers the implementation of this rather diverse set of issues.
Summary of results Chapter 2 showed that it is possible to learn about
the environment an agent lives in with very little a priori knowledge. The
main idea of the approach presented was an incremental search for the best
state-action mappings in the state space. Behaviour is learnt in a trial- and
error fashion using reinforcement learning, and then by mapping the action
selection probabilities to state descriptions. These mappings are similar to
simple rules. Which descriptions are generated depends on their relevance,
or what the agent `decides' to know about its environment. This way,
agents learn to distinguish between important and less important details of
the world they live in. A simple experiment illustrated how the algorithm
works. The BRA algorithm is dierent from many learning approaches in
ACE as it combines rule learning and reinforcement learning in a dynamic
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way. BRA is a general approach, and it can cover a variety of approaches in
the simulation literature. For example, it is very similar to learning classier
systems, but also able to represent very simple forms of learning as well.
Chapter 3 applied the algorithm to a model of statistical discrimination.
The aim was to build a bridge between theoretical game theory and the
classroom game conducted by Fryer Jr. et al (2005). It was shown that the
RL model is capable of reproducing the empirical results as well as the be-
havioural patterns observed in the experiment. A further parallel is that in
both simulations and experiment discrimination is rare. In the simulations,
no general rule or scenario was found that generated discrimination on the
average. In most cases, discrimination either did not evolve, or disappeared
in the longer run. In the samples where discrimination was observed, the
occurrence seemed path-dependent. In particular, if employers are liberal
in the beginning and dierences in worker productivity are persistent, em-
ployers adjust their hiring levels eventually and a discriminatory outcome
emerged.
Chapter 4 developed a RL specication of a communication network
model. In the base version, it became clear that RL produces similar re-
sults as theoretical predictions. It was furthermore shown that the simplest
possible RL model is sucient to produce that result. Using BRA, no plau-
sible mapping from player names to actions was found that was superior
than simple stimulus-response learning. Aggregate results did also not im-
prove. Comparing the RL model with an experiment from behavioural game
theory, it turned out that the model predicts the empirical results better
than the equilibrium prediction. This result has analogies to earlier research
in behavioural game theory, which often nds that the simplest model t
actual data and theoretical results reasonably well; sometimes even better
than more complicated models. What is dierent here is that the RL con-
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nections model can state this also for the more complex class of network
games.
In chapter 5, agents were much simpler. The purpose of the health care
simulations was to use agent-based modelling to investigate models of a
complex environment. The primary care sector can be seen as such com-
plex environment. Some authors already made a case for applying complex-
ity science tools in this area. The simulations looked at some hypotheses
that were formulated and, to a certain extent, tested empirically. Further
experiments highlighted the inuence of patient information and choice be-
haviour on health outcomes. The model served two purposes: First, it puts
BRA, although in its simplest form, into the context of a more complex
model. Second, it explored how ACE could be applied to primary care, for
which no other computational approaches exist so far. The results showed
that assumptions about patient behaviour inuence the simulation result
considerably. The main result here is that more consumer choice can lead
to worse health outcomes, as doctors have no incentives to provide person-
alised services to non loyal consumers. Since most debate about the benets
of consumer choice in health care is still driven by ideology, often based on
improvable facts about the benets of competition, an ACE model may be
a starting point for a more rigorous analysis of arguments in this area.
Limitations The motivation of this work was to generate aggregate out-
comes (sometimes also described with the term `emergence') like discrimi-
nation, health outcomes or network structures by adaptive algorithms. The
nature of complex systems and some denitions were introduced in the in-
troduction (see denitions 1 to 3). Of the three presented denitions, the
aspects covered in this work matches only the rst two. The agents were
goal directed (utility optimisers) and reacted to changes in their environ-
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ment; they are not active planners in order to achieve some (sub-)goals,
which would require at least some representation of plans and goals as well
as capabilities to reason about them. For the type of models discussed in
this thesis, this is not necessary. More precisely, the overall approach taken
here is based on simple types of learning. The basis of this approach has
been tied to existing concepts of bounded rationality. However, there are
cases where more complex models of cognition and goal-directed behaviour
are necessary. For instance, as Gilbert (2006) mentions, agents in team en-
vironments may need to hold cognitive models about their colleagues and
develop strategies to improve the performance of the team as a whole. Al-
though BRA provides a simple cognitive representation in the form of rules
and symbolic state descriptors, it cannot handle such cases. For example,
a network game with farsighted players as, e.g., in Watts (2002) or Deroian
(2003) is already dicult to represent with BRA, as agents would need an
idea of what networks might form, how other agents are likely to act and
so on.
The BRA approach is thus useful for classication problems or where
cases can be translated into such classications - hence it has a close re-
lationship to classier systems. The discrimination game in chapter 3 is a
representative application - employers have to classify two types of worker
agents and behave accordingly. In other domains, classication may simply
be not necessary. For example, the primary care model in chapter 5 can for-
mally be modelled with the framework, but since there are no classication
problems to solve, the mechanism reduces to simple RL. From a dierent
angle, chapter 4 showed that where classication (based on the labels of
players) is a model option, it might simply not add anything to the quality
of the model result.
Another limitation of this thesis is its relationship to empirical valida-
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tion. The models of chapters 3 and 4 were only loosely coupled to exper-
iments from behavioural game theory. The main interest was to develop
models with learning agents and to use BRA framework for this. The pri-
mary care model in its current form is too general to be tted to existing
data. More work to assemble the necessary data and to t the model struc-
ture to it is required rst.
Future work Future work should therefore focus on two aspects: The
empirical validation of the implemented models, and the development of
richer applied models to make better use of the BRA features. Looking back
at the main criticisms presented in the introduction, these are probably two
conicting goals. The richer the model, the more likely the results produced
with it are less general, and that it is only one of many models with which
the empirical fact can be explained.
Looking at validation, the following paths are possible: In the area of
network games, more models for similar games with endogenous network
structures can be devised where experimental data is already available; the
comparison with Conte et al (2009) is an initial step into this direction.
Model parameters could be calibrated in a way that produces a minimal
deviation from the actual, empirical outcome. This is certainly more di-
cult in a health care model that is inherently related to real-world processes.
Here, a main path will be the collection of appropriate data, e.g. on regional
levels, using this data rst for the specication of input parameters (geo-
graphical distribution, preferences, consumer types, etc.), and only then for
comparing articial with real results (e.g., comparison of mobility rates,
GP lists, waiting lists, etc.). To what extent this procedure is possible de-
pends on the availability of data. Another aspect of calibrating the model
to actual health systems is to map the various levels of real health systems
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better and to model the consequences that arise from there. The model
restricted health provision to individual doctors, however, dierent organi-
sational forms exist. For example, GPs are organised on the practice level;
Primary Care Trusts (PCT) organise practices and so on. Furthermore, the
model deliberately modelled GPs as self-employed; nevertheless, GPs could
act also (partially) as rms. So, under the PCT scheme, GPs can invest
their surpluses into their practices. This adds another dimension to the
utility function not covered in the model.
As empirical validation can add to the quality of the models discussed
in this thesis, so could more complex models make use of the features of
BRA. For instance, rule learning could be added to the primary care model:
Patients can learn to distinguish dynamically between doctors for dierent
illnesses and build rules which doctors or specialists to consider under dif-
ferent conditions. Conversely, doctors might learn rules in which area they
want to specialise, depending on the demand for certain health services.
With this, a model of provider specialisation could be built.
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Appendix A
A Scalable ACE Simulation
Software Framework
A.1 Introduction
This section describes the software framework with which the simulations
in the previous chapters have been implemented.
The major features of the framework gsim (for `generic simulation frame-
work') are: An interface for setting up a model in a declarative way (e.g.
objects and attributes, agent behaviour rules); an application programming
interface (API) which can be used to plug model-specic programmable
components; and the possibility to run many simulations simultaneously or
distribute a large simulation across a cluster of computers without the need
to modify any model code.
The motivation to develop this system was to nd a middle way be-
tween the exibility of a programming language, and out of the box sim-
ulation tools. It is a more specialised framework than simulation toolkits
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such as Swarm (Swarm 2010), Ascape (Ascape 2010), MASON (MASON
2010) or Repast (Repast 2010), because it not only provides a simulation
infrastructure (e.g., a scheduler or tools for generating graphs) and a set
of libraries useful for implementing models (e.g., genetic programming or
network libraries). It provides an integrated set of behaviours and learning
mechanisms that can be congured and require only little programming.
Another area where gsim is dierent from other simulation software is its
approach to scalability. In domains such as Articial Life, distribution of
simulations is usually based on algorithms that distribute the landscape
agents live on eciently. Large simulations are then partitioned in a way
that most communication happens locally, minimising the message trac
over the network which is the most serious bottleneck of distributed simu-
lations (see section A.3.2.1 for more details). Only few general distribution
approaches not being based on topography exist. For RePast, for exam-
ple, distribution has been implemented with the Terracotta framework in
the RePast Symphony project (The Repast Symphony Project 2010), (Ter-
racotta 2010), or with the High-Level-Architecture (HLA), a specication
for parallel systems (e.g. Minson and Theodoropoulos 2004; Cicirelli et al
2009). For a model to become distributed, such approaches require the
additional implementation or conguration of the objects that are to be
distributed over the cluster, or even a redesign of single-machine programs.
gsim proposes a dierent method which abstracts from framework-specic
programming and conguration.
This appendix describes the central components and software architec-
ture of the framework: Section A.2 presents how models are described (sec-
tions A.2.1 to A.2.2) and behaviour specied (sections A.2.3 and A.2.6).
Section A.3 describes the software architecture from a more technical and
point of view, including a description of how the system is scaled up to a
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distributed version (section A.3.2).
A.2 Model Representation System
A.2.1 The Frame Principle
Frames are a central concept of Articial intelligence (AI) for knowledge
representation and were rst described by Minsky (Minsky 1975). It is an
approach to represent classes of objects on dierent levels of abstraction,
down to their concrete realisations as objects.
A frame can be dened as a schema that describes an entity or a class
of entities by a collection of attribute-value pairs in a hierarchy of such
schemata. Attributes have variable character; they provide `slots'. The
slots can take a specic value ('llers') to describe a more concrete entity.
Attributes may be thought of having any type of ller, such as number
or strings, but in particular, other frames. Complex structures and rela-
tionships can be generated by nesting frames into each other (similar to
object-oriented concepts).
A central feature of the frame concept is inheritance. Entities of the
same type can be more or less specialised depending on their position in
the hierarchy. On the higher, abstract levels of a hierarchy, frames typically
specify only very general information, such as the type of slots they contain
and the possible llers for these slots. On lower, more concrete levels, slots
may be lled by more specic value ranges and default values. Default
attribute values describe a typical object of a class. For example, a vehicle
can be characterised by having a number of wheels. A car is a certain class
of vehicle, which has typically four wheels, so that using number 4 as a
default ller would be a sensible choice.
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While frames describe classes of entities at dierent levels of abstraction,
actual realisations of these classes are called `instances'. An instance de-
scribes an existing object with referral to its frame, for example `the green
car with four wheels'.
Using as an example the frame rm, gure A.1 illustrates this concept,
deriving concrete rms from it.
Figure A.1: Knowledge representation in gsim.
In gure A.1, the top level frame describes the possible values entities
of the type rm can have. On a more concrete level, media and transport
rms can be distinguished by applying default llers. On the instance level,
concrete rms are created from the default frames. In gsim, this process is
labelled `instanciation' to distinguish it from instantiation in object-oriented
programming.
The frame model in gsim gsim entities are organised by lists of at-
tributes and list of further frames. For simplication of the implementation,
both types of entities are kept separate. Attributes are simple name-value
pairs, and cannot contain frames.
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Entities are managed in their own environment, which implements the
schema hierarchy and manages value changes within that hierarchy. For
example, if a default value further up in the inheritance is changed, this
change is propagated down to all inheriting frames and all instances of that
frame. Any entity in gsim must be created via this environment. The
environment denes two special top-level frames: agent-class and object-
class. Any concrete simulation model must inherit from these entities.
As in the base concept, frames describe the possible value ranges and
default values. gsim makes some restrictions on the hierarchies that can be
generated. Only agent classes may contain further frames; object classes
are simple containers for attributes. Attributes can be of dierent types:
numerical attributes accept any numbers; string attributes any string value;
intervals dene a value range by a minimum and maximum value; similarly,
set attribute denes a list of allowed llers.
Figure A.2: The base agent frame in gsim (attributes are omitted).
Figure A.2 illustrates the agent-class. It only species frames for the
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behaviour and adds some default attributes (e.g. the attribute that contains
the operator of a condition); any other attributes and object classes would
be added depending on the simulation model. The behaviour itself is given
again by nested frames. A behaviour consists of a set of rules, which are
composed of conditions and refer to actions. The details are given in the
following section A.2.2.
During the process of instanciation, frames serve as a template for gener-
ating objects. Initially, the frame attribute defaults are used for the concrete
values in the instance's attributes. Similarly, default objects may be gen-
erated. After the instances are generated, the default values may then be
overridden with instance-specic values, or varied randomly (the prototype
implementation provides utility classes for this).
Thus, a large range of models can be described with such a generic
representation, and agent populations easily be generated and modied.
Models specialise the generic classes by adding new attributes and further
frames. If a simulation requires it, the addition or deletion of attributes on
the instance level is possible as well.
Due to the regularity of the representation, it is possible to specify a
simple language that declares the objects of a model, which at the same
time is capable of specify some simple dynamics by dening rules operating
on these descriptions. The following section A.2.2 presents this language,
and illustrates how it is applied to generate the actual programs that execute
agents in gsim.
A.2.2 Formal Description as Language
This section species the gsim entities and dynamics with the help of a
simple language. The notation is based on the Backus-Naur (BNF) form,
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a notation used to express context-free grammars. Context-free grammars
are often used in Computer Science to describe the syntax of programming
languages by production rules of the form V ! w, where V is a non ter-
minal symbol and w is a string consisting of terminals and/or non-terminal
symbols. Non-terminal symbols are enclosed in brackets `<>'. Terminal
symbols are character strings (enclosed in quotation marks). The character
`j' denotes a logical `or'. An asterisk `' denotes (zero or more) repetitions.
The operator ":=" denotes a production rule where the expression on the
left-hand side is replaced with the expression on the right-hand side. Subse-
quent replacements will thus resolve to a sequence of terminal symbols. The
operator `:=' denotes a production of the left-hand side to the expression
on the right-hand side (examples are given in section A.3.2.4). Expressions
in the following paragraphs are valid also for the succeeding paragraphs, i.e.
denitions in preceding sections are not redened when referenced in later
sections (e.g. character).
Common terminal symbols
character :: "a" | "b" | "c" | "d" | "e" | "f" | "g" |
"h" | "i" | "j" | "k" | "l" | "m" | "n" |
"o" | "p" | "q" | "r" | "s" | "t" | "u" |
"v" | "w" | "x" | "y" | "z"
digit :: "0" | "1" | "2" | "3" | "4" | "5" | "6" | "7" | "8" | "9" ;
Frame denition
<frame> := <entity-name> [<frame>*] <frame-list>*
<domain-attribute-list>*
<entity-name> := character*
<list-name> := character*
<frame-list> := <list-name> "("<entity-name>")" <entity-name>*
<domain-attribute-list> := <list-name> <domain-attribute>*
<domain-attribute> := <domain-attribute-name>
<domain-attribute-type>
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<domain-attribute-name> := character*
<domain-attribute-type> := <set-default>| <numerical-default> |
<numerical-interval-default> | <string-default>
<set-type> := "Set" <filler>* <string-default-value>
<numerical-type> := "Numerical" <numerical-default-value>
<numerical-interval-type> := "NumericalInterval"
<interval-default-value>
<string-type> := "String" <string-default-value>
<filler> := character*
<string-default-value> := character*
<numerical-default-value> := digit*
<interval-default-value> := digit* "-" digit*
As described above, frames are containers for attributes and further
frames. Domain attributes describe the type and default values of concrete
attributes such as string- or numerical attributes. Domain attributes and
contained frames are organised in lists. These lists may specify the type
of object they contain by referring to the name of the entity it is allowed
to contain instances of. Frames can inherit from an arbitrary number of
parent frames. Inheritance can create naming conicts, for example, lists
and entities with the same name in dierent parents. These conicts are not
resolved, i.e. unless a particular frame is referenced, it is undened which
object is returned on the lowest level.
Instance denition
<instance> := <entity-name> <frame> <attribute-list>*
<attribute-list> := <list-name> <attribute>*
<attribute> := <attribute-type> <attribute-name>
<attribute-name> := character*
<attribute-type> := <set-type>| <numerical-type> |
<numerical-interval-type> | <string-type>
<set-type> := "Set" <string-value>*
<numerical-type> := "Numerical" <numerical-value>
<numerical-interval-type> := "NumericalInterval"
<numerical-value>"-"<numerical-value>
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<string-type> := "String" <string-value>
<string-value> := character*
<numerical-value> := digit*
An instance is a concrete entity that can be generated by a frame. Any
attributes or contained instances must comply with the type and domain-
attribute restrictions set by its frame. An instanciation of a frame has a
reference to its frame, and is accessible at any time during the life cycle of
an instance.
Object class denition
<object-class> := <entity-name> <frame> <domain-attribute-list>*
Object-class is a top-level object in gsim. It is a derivation of a frame
that restricts the elements contained in that frame to attributes. An object
class may dene an arbitrary number of domain attribute lists that describe
the particular entity to be modelled.
Object denition
<object> := <entity-name> <object-class> <attribute-list>*
Analogous to instances, all gsim objects are derived from and refer to
its dening object class.
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Agent class denition
<agent-class> := <entity-name> <frame>* <object-class-list>*
<domain-attribute-list>* <behaviour-class>
<object-class-list> := <list-name> "("<entity-name>")" <object-class>*
<behaviour-class> := <entity-name> <frame> <action-class>* <max-nodes>
<update-interval> <revaluation-probability>
<revisit-costfraction>
<reactive-rule-class>* <adaptive-rule-class>*
<action-class> := <entity-name> <frame> <frame>* <action-java-class>
<action-java-class> := character*
<reactive-rule-class> := <entity-name> <frame> <condition-class>* "->"
<consequent-class>
<adaptive-rule-class> := <entity-name> <frame> <condition-class>*
<expansion-class>* "->"<consequent-class>*
<reward-variable>
<condition-class> := <entity-name> <frame> [<domain-attribute-spec>
<numerical-operator>
[domain-attribute-spec||<constant>]] |
[<object-class-spec> <operator>
[<constant> | <object-class-spec> |
<attribute-spec>]]
<domain-attribute-spec> := <list-name>"/"<domain-attribute-name>"/"
<attribute-value>
<object-class-spec> := <entity-name> <Frame> <object-class-list>"/"
<entity-name>"::"<list-name>"/"<domain-attribute-name>"/"
<attribute-value>|<object-class-list>"/"<entity-name>
<expansion-class> := <list-name>"/"<domain-attribute-name> |
<object-class-list>"/"<entity-name>::
<list-name>"/"<domain-attribute-name>
<max-nodes> := digit*
<update-interval> := digit*
<revaluation-probability>:= digit*
<revisit-costfraction> := digit*
<reward-variable-class> := <domain-attribute-spec>*
<constant-class> := digit* | character*
<numerical-operator> := "=" | ">" | ">=" | "<" | "<="
<operator> := <numerical-operator> | "EXISTS" | "NOT EXISTS"
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Agent-class is the top-level agent frame in gsim, and all models have to
derive their agents from this frame. Agent-class species further frames for
describing the base of agent behaviour, e.g. in conditions and actions.
Agent denition
<agent> := <entity-name> <agent-class>* <object-list>*
<attribute-list>* <Behaviour>
<object-list> := <list-name> <object>*
<behaviour> := <entity-name> <behaviour-class> <action>* <max-nodes>
<update-interval> <revaluation-probability>
<revisit-costfraction>
<reactive-rule>* <adaptive-rule>*
<action> := <entity-name> <action-class> <instance>* <action-java-class>
<reactive-rule> := <entity-name> <reactive-rule-class> <condition>* "->"
<consequent>
<adaptive-rule> := <entity-name> <adaptive-rule-class> <condition>*
<expansion>* "->"<consequent>* <reward-variable>
<condition> := <entity-name> <condition-class> [<domain-spec>
<numerical-operator>
[domain-spec||<constant>]] |
[<object-spec> <operator>
[<constant> | <object-spec> | <attribute-spec>]]
<attribute-spec> := <list-name>"/"<attribute-name>"/"
<attribute-value>
<object-spec> := <entity-name> <object-class-spec> <object-list>"/"
<entity-name>"::"<list-name>"/"<attribute-name>"/"
<attribute-value>|
<object-list>"/"<entity-name>
<expansion> := <list-name>"/"<attribute-name>
<list-name>"/"<entity-name>::
<list-name>"/"<attribute-name>
<reward-variable> := <attribute-spec>*
Agent is the instanciation of an agent class, analogously to the frame-
instance relationships described in the previous sections.
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A.2.3 Agent Behaviour
A behaviour groups dierent types of rules, which realise the dierent cases
of the framework described in chapter 2: Behaviour for full CBR or LCS-
type learning, behaviour implementing simple RL (element adaptive-rule),
and deterministic behaviour in the form of if-then rules (element reactive-
rule). Technically, all behaviour is based on production rules, having zero
up to an unlimited number of conditions, and one or more consequents.
Conditions are simple rst-order logic predicates using operators like equal
or smaller, and the existence-operators exists/not exist. The BRA algorithm
is applied by specifying optional `expansion' descriptors. These descriptors
specify the set of symbols and operators that constitute the propositional
set L in denition 4, i.e. the initial condition symbols on which the rule
generalisation and specialisation mechanisms work.
Conditions are patterns referencing attributes or objects of the agents.
They specify object and attribute value combinations that trigger the action
part of the rule, for example, `for all objects x with attribute y greater z
do : : : '. Here lies the major benet of the language specication: It is a
directive that generates patterns that serve as the input for the production
rule system.
Actions modify the state of the agent or initiate a conversation with
other agents. Model implementations must provide an action implementa-
tion extending the framework java class gsim.engine.behaviour.SimAction.
Actions may have a dynamically changing arbitrary number of arguments
referring to agent objects and attributes. These arguments are specied on
the frame-level. By this, it is possible to program a general action, and ap-
ply the action to a large number of unknown, dynamically changing object
instances and/or attributes. For example, an action `Sell' can implement
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the selling of an object in an agent's product list. Instead of programming
an action `Sell product X', referring to a product instance, a general ac-
tion for `Sell a product' can be implemented and parameterised with the
object-class that the product list holds. At runtime, the rule engine will de-
termine the product to be sold based on the condition and pass it as actual
parameter to the action.
The following paragraphs describe the gsim rule system in more detail.
Rules The core of the simulation system is the rule engine, based on the
rule system Jess (Sandia Labs 2010). Depending on the agent's current
state, the pattern matcher determines which rules are to be red. The
pattern matcher searches objects in the rule engine's knowledge base and
nds those combinations that match the objects described in the condition
part. In gsim, the knowledge base is constituted by the part of the agent's
state (dened as the objects and attributes of the agent) that is referred to
in the behaviour specication.
In a model specication, rules are typically specied on the frame level.
The state to be evaluated is given by the terms <object-class-spec> and
<domain-attribute-spec>. Pattern matching in case of an <object-class-
spec> follows the rule: For all objects of type <frame-name> with attribute
<attribute-name> and value<attribute-value> execute<consequent> [java-
class]. Several terms of <object-class-spec> and <domain-attribute-spec>
can be combined in one condition, and are interpreted as connected with
a logical `and'. During runtime, objects and attributes are bound to vari-
ables. The variable names are given by the names of the respective frame
and domain-attributes. If instances or attributes of the same type are refer-
enced several times in <object-class-spec> and <domain-attribute-spec>,
they are bound to the same variable. This way it is guaranteed that con-
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sequents are only triggered by concrete values of the same entity, and not
arbitrary combined instances that are found in the knowledge base.
From this pattern matching and variable binding logic three charac-
teristic cases of how and how often rules may become activated can be
distinguished: In case (1) an unparameterised consequent is red as many
times as instances in the condition are matched; in case (2) an unparame-
terszed consequent is red only once independent of the concrete matches;
and in case (3) a parameterised consequent is matched once by binding the
action parameters to the variables in the condition. The following examples
illustrate these cases:
1. A simple action may be activated many times depending on the ob-
jects in a list.
agent-class := Agent object-class-list-1 (object-class-1) behaviour-class-1
behaviour-class-1 := BehaviourClass1 rule-class-1
rule-class-1 := RuleClass1 condition-class-1 -> action-class-1
action-class-1 := DoSomethingClass1 executable.class.java
object-class-1 := AssetClass1 domain-attribute-list-1
condition-class-1 := ConditionClass1 object-class-list-1/object-class-1::
domain-attribute-list-1/AssetAttribute-1 = 0
This behaviour species a rule class that activates the rule instance of
RuleClass1 any time the AssetAttribute-1 of objects in the instance
list of object-class-list-1 equals 0.
2. The previous case means that an identical action is executed solely
depending on the number of objects in the list. As long as the list does
not always contain a singleton instance, this is probably not desirable.
Usually, it will be enough (or even required) that the rule is red only
once. For this, the EXISTS may be used. Using the specication
declared in case (1), this behaviour becomes:
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behaviour-class-2 := BehaviourClass2 rule-class-2
rule-class-2 := RuleClass2 condition-class-1 condition-class-2-> action-class-2
condition-class-2 := ConditionClass2 object-class-list-1/object-class-1::
domain-attribute-list-1/AssetAttribute-1 EXISTS
This rule rst tests whether the attribute exists and is 0. Technically,
it restricts the exists-test to those attributes with value 0, which is
redundant but has the eect that the rule is only red once.
3. If there can be more than one object in a list, the model typically im-
plies semantically that an action is activated for that particular object
- e.g., `if the product is green, sell it'. Using again the declarations
given above, this case is given by the following specication:
behaviour-class-3 := BehaviourClass3 rule-class-3
rule-class-3 := SalesRule condition-class-3 -> action-class-2
action-class-2 := Sell object-class-1 SellAction.java
condition-class-3 := ColourCondition object-class-list-1/object-class-1::
domain-attribute-list-1/AssetAttribute-1 = 1
In this example, the action has been parameterised with objects of
type object-class-1 (which could, say, represent a product, and the
attribute a code for a particular colour). Since the condition refers
also to objects of type object-class-1, the object instance matching
the condition is bound to the same variable as the object instance
passed to the action SellAction. The SellAction implementation then
knows which object actually matched the condition, and do something
appropriately with that object (e.g., sell it).
Adaptive Rules Adaptive rules are extensions of the simple rules de-
scribed in the preceding paragraph and are used to implement the dierent
types of learning described in chapter 2. Instead of one consequent, there
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are several, and the action to be executed is selected probabilistically. The
condition-part remains the same as in a simple rule.
Simple RL is given if there is no condition, and at least two consequents
are specied. Some action is always selected, and the reinforcement, given
by <reward-variable>, is updated.
CBR is given if at least one condition is specied and at least two con-
sequents are specied. RL then applies then only in certain situations.
CBR becomes dynamic when the <expansion> element is specied.
<expansion> refers to an attribute in the agent or one of its objects. This
attribute must be of type <numerical-interval> or <set-attribute> to dene
the value range within the state-space partitioning algorithm works.
In the current implementation, the value ranges of <expansion> ele-
ments have to be xed at setup-time; the disadvantage of this is that, as
mentioned in 2, the expansion process may operate on attribute ranges that
are irrelevant (for example, an initial value range 0-1000, where only val-
ues 0-10 can occur during the simulation). This makes the implementation
sensitive to the setup and the expected values. It is, however, quite easy to
extend the current mechanism to a more dynamic mode which is capable of
integrating new values and value ranges as they appear during a simulation,
making the algorithm more robust. The idea is as follows:
{ If no tree is developed at all: Simply add the root node with one
value or value range: If the attribute is a set-attribute, add exactly
the category. If it is numerical, construct an interval (e.g. for a value
x, construct a range from x  x=2 to x+ x=2, or simply from x to x).
{ If more than one level is developed: Select a child of the base rule at
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the deepest expanded level. Add the new category to this node, or
construct a new interval if the attribute is numeric. Up to the root
rule, add to all predecessors of the modied rule the new category
or modify the interval in an analogous way. The state value of the
modied nodes remains the same, i.e. the existence of the new value
does not aect current evaluations. As the new value is connected by
an `or' to the existing terms in the condition, this can be interpreted as
a null hypothesis that the new value does not inuence the well-being
of the agent at the current time step.
Parameters controlling the execution of the algorithm (e.g. the cost
of visiting nodes, the maximum allowed number of expansions and so on)
are given by <max-nodes> (parameter  in chapter 2), <update-interval>
( in chapter 2;  is currently xed with round(   1
4
)), <revaluation-
probability> ( in chapter 2) and <revisit-costfraction> ( in chapter 2).
These parameters are specied only once per agent, since they specify prop-
erties of an agent's mind.
The <reward-variable> (parameter p in chapter 2) element species
which attribute is used as a reward for the reinforcement learner. Typically,
a model will modify this variable as the result of a change in the agent's
state. The rule engine is responsible for mapping this value into the action
reward and later select an action accordingly.
The following example describes an adaptive rule that uses the attribute
player-type as the variable partitioning the state space, and the current
payo of the player as the reward variable:
agent-class := PDAgent player-list (player-name) attribute-list behaviour-class
player-name := PDPlayer domain-attribute-list-1
behaviour-class := PDBehaviourClass pd-rule-class
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pd-rule-class := PDAdaptiveClass expansion-class-1 -> action-class-1, action-class-2
action-class-1 := Cooperate models.pd.Defect
action-class-2 := Defect models.pd.Cooperate
expansion-class-1 := ExpansionClass1 player-list/player-name::
domain-attribute-list-1/NameAttribute-1 = A|B|C|D attribute-list/payoff
The rule engine will use the four possible attribute values A B C or D to
construct the initial rule: `player-type= (A or B or C or D)', and create spe-
cialisations during the simulation, e.g. player-type= (A or B)'. Depending
on the actual reward structure, selection probabilities will vary for dierent
specialisations as described in detail in chapter 2.
The expansion mechanism takes a path in which identical descriptors are
generated at dierent sections of the tree (this might be the case if there
are at least two attributes). Then the order at which the rules get activated
is random. Whichever rule is red rst is executed; the execution of any
other rules in the same time step is suppressed.
A.2.4 Agent Communication
Agent interaction is essential to ABM. In gsim, interactions require explicit
communication via messages. An agent A wanting to interact with agent
B sends a message with some content, which may trigger some activity in
agent B. Agent B sends a message back. In a minimal communication act,
this message ends the interaction, but also might trigger further actions
in agent A, who may continue talking to B and so on. This is called a
communication protocol. Each protocol is executed within a single time
step. Agents act without delay; that is, when the message is delivered, the
receiving agent reacts immediately.
As in any discrete simulation engine, gsim agents act sequentially. This
means that if agent B's turn is after agent A, agent B might change its state
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during the communication, but before it is actually its turn in the normal
execution order. gsim does not request or provide any rules that handle the
case where this conicts with the model logic. The modeller has to ensure in
the implementation that such side-eects are avoided or controlled. During
implementation of the models it was usually enough to apply state- and
reward updates before a cycle of activity. gsim's scheduling method allows
to partition agents into dierent roles which are executed separately (the
roles are given by extending agent classes; the actions of each extension
is executed in its own cycle). This way, the modeller can congure quite
atomic units of work to ensure a correct order of actions and corresponding
state updates.
As all agent activities are initiated by a rule consequent, communication
protocols can technically be seen as an action. The protocol is provided by
the modeller, extending some classes of the framework, and specifying it
as the consequent of a rule. gsim then takes care that the messages are
delivered appropriately to the involved agents.
A.2.5 Other Components
gsim provides the possibility to integrate custom procedures in the form of
special agents, which are called Application Agents (e.g. for data collec-
tion, or broadcasting messages to the whole agent population). Application
Agents have access to the complete model state, and are called before and
after the execution of a time step. They are, in principle, helper classes and
thus not represented as frames and instances, but are simple java classes
that can be extended by the modeller.
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A.2.6 Interfaces
In the previous section, gsim was described in terms of a context-free gram-
mar. Based on examples. This section shortly describes two actual in-
terfaces that have been built on this idea in the prototype. Modellers
can use either the java application programming interface (API) or XML
les to specify a model. It is furthermore required to use and extend cer-
tain classes of the framework to be a runnable gsim application, e.g. ac-
tion implementations. The full API is available at http://www.stephan-
schuster.net/gsim-docs/api-docs/index.html. The XML schema is available
at http://www.stephan-schuster.net/gsim-docs/schema/model.xsd.
An XML example Listing A.1 shows how an agent denition is set up
using the XML interface. It is part of a prisoner's dilemma model in which
agents have several visible tags, and may learn to discriminate based on this
information.
Listing A.1: XML example
<agent name="PDAgent" extends="GameAgent" >
<attribute-lists>
<list name="properties">
<Set name="own-tag" default="BLUE" >
<value>BLUE</value>
<value>GREEN</value>
</Set>
</list>
<list name="internal-state">
<Set name="current-strategy" default="">
<value>Cooperate</value>
<value>Defect</value>
</Set>
<Numerical name="payoff" default="0" />
</list>
</attribute-lists>
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<object-lists>
<list name="current" type="Player" />
<list name="known-tags" type="Tag" />
</object-lists>
<available-actions>
<action name="Defect" />
<action name="Cooperate" />
</available-actions>
<rl-nodes>
<rl-node name="RL-1">
<condition-nodes>
<condition-node param="known-tags/Tag::description/
characteristic" op="EQ" value="current/Player::list/
colour" />
<expand-node param="known-tags/Tag::description/
characteristic" />
</condition-nodes>
<action-nodes ref="Defect,Cooperate" />
<default-reward value="0.5" />
<selector value="softmax" />
<function variable="internal-state/payoff" update-lag="1"
alpha="0.08" />
<discount value="0.05" />
<averaging discount="0.1" />
</rl-node>
</rl-nodes>
</agent>
<objects>
<object name="Tag">
<list name="description">
<Set name="characteristic" default="BLUE" >
<value>BLUE</value>
<value>GREEN</value>
<value>YELLOW</value>
</Set>
</list>
</object>
<object name="Player">
<list name="list">
<String name="name" default="stephan" />
<Set name="colour" default="BLUE" >
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<value>BLUE</value>
<value>GREEN</value>
</Set>
</list>
</object>
</objects>
<actions>
<action name="Defect" class="models.pd.Defection" />
<action name="Cooperate" class="models.pd.Cooperation" />
</actions>
<system-agents>
<system-agent name="PairingGenerator" class="gsim.sim.agent.
gameagents.FullInformationPairingGenerator" />
</system-agents>
Listing A.1 describes an agent with several attributes in the<attributes>
section and objects in the <objects> section. An agent is described by its
name and colour. It has two object lists. The list `current' is a singleton list
containing the current other player (the selection of which is implemented
in the `PairingGenerator' ApplicationAgent which responsible for matching
players). The known-tags list is also singleton, and makes the tags dened
for the simulation known to the agent. Its attributes can then be referenced
in the behaviour part as variables. The java implementation of the actions
is given in the concluding <actions> tag. The agent has an adaptive rule.
The three attributes of the expansion element <Tag> can be expanded into
six dierent combinations. Following the variable binding rules described
in the previous section, of the dierent rules that may exist during run-
time, only that rule is activated where the characteristic attribute equals
the colour of the current player. The reward variable is given by the at-
tribute `internal-state/payo'. The reward is updated in a separate cycle:
PDAgent has is an extension of `GameAgent', the reward is updated in the
GameAgent role (not displayed here).
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API Listing A.2 indicates how the example lines in listing A.1 would be
implemented programmatically.
Listing A.2: API example
Core core = gsim.core.CoreFactory.getInstance().createCore();
//The environment is responsible for maintaining the agent- and
object hierarchy
DefinitionEnvironment env = core.create("PrisonersDilemma", new
java.util.HashMap());
//define the game agent here
AgentClassIF gameAgent = env.createAgentClass("GameAgent");
//[...]
//PDAgent inherits from GameAgent
AgentClassIF pd = env.createAgentClass("PDAgent", "GameAgent");
//define the object-lists for respective types
ObjectClass tag = env.getObjectClass("Tag");
pd.defineObjectList("known-tags", tag);
//[...]
//add some objects and attributes
DomainAttribute payoff =
new DomainAttribute("payoff", AttributeConstants.NUMERICAL);
payoff.setDefault("0");
pd.addAttribute("internal-state", payoff);
DomainAttribute ownTag = new DomainAttribute("own-tag",
AttributeConstants.SET);
ownTag.addFiller("GREEN");
ownTag.addFiller("BLUE");
ownTag.setDefault("BLUE");
pd.addAttribute("properties", domainAtt);
//[...]
//Define behaviour
BehaviourIF behaviour = pd.getBehaviour();
RLActionNodeIF rl = b.createRLActionNode("RL1");
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ConditionIF condition = rl.createCondition("known-tags/Tag::
description/characteristic", "=",
"current/Player::list/colour");
ExpansionIF expansion = rl.createExpansion("known-tags/Tag::
description/characteristic");
ActionIF consequent1 = b.createAction("Cooperate", "models.pd.
Cooperate");
ActionIF consequent2 = b.createAction("Defect",
"models.pd.Defect");
rl.addOrSetCondition(condition);
rl.addOrSetExpansion(expansion);
rl.addOrSetConsequent(consequent1);
rl.addOrSetConsequent(consequent2);
behaviour.addOrSetRLActionNode(rl);
pd.setBehaviour(b);
//define system-level objects, e.g.:
env.addApplicationAgent("Matcher", "gsim.sim.agent.gameagents.
FullInformationPairingGenerator");
Here, the main idea is that the attributes (which are simple name-value
pairs) of the agent are referenced by strings dening where they are located.
The behaviour is then composed by passing these specications. There is no
direct programming model, as, say condition.setLeftHandSide(tagObject),
etc. The gsim rule parser translates the specications into an executable
Jess program.
A.3 Software Architecture
The main logic of gsim is implemented in the representation system. It
provides the classes and interfaces necessary to build and run a model.
The representation system itself is part of larger software architecture that
provides the infrastructure for running simulations (section A.3.1.1), and its
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extension to a distributed simulation system for handling large simulations
(section A.3.2).
A.3.1 Base system
The base system describes the standalone software environment for running
gsim models.
A.3.1.1 Architecture and Design
Three layers can be distinguished. Here, the basic responsibilities and func-
tionality of each layer is shortly described.
Access layer This layer serves as the entry point and connects the mod-
eller with the denition and simulation layer. The modeller denes and
creates models either using the gsim API, or via the XML interface. After
dening the model in the environment, the model can be simulated. The
reference to the SimulationManager component is obtained via the gsim
API. The SimulationManager provides control method to start, stop, pause
or resume simulations. It is also possible to register event listeners that
handle events like the end of a simulation. Furthermore, the Simulation-
Manager component is used to access the current state of a simulation (i.e.
all agents at time t).
Denition layer This layer contains the implementation of the repre-
sentation system as described in section A.2. All frames and instances are
maintained in their own environment. The environment handles relation-
ships and inheritance. For example, if an agent-class is modied in the API,
the environment propagates the changes to all subclasses and instances of
this frame.
APPENDIX A. A SCALABLE ACE SIMULATION SOFTWARE
FRAMEWORK 277
Simulation layer This layer transforms the data structures of the rep-
resentation system into runnable code. The most important aspect of this
is the translation of the declarative structures into a rule-based program.
Furthermore, it contains the scheduler which executes the simulation in
discrete time steps. The SimulationContainer component provides a pos-
sibility to repeat a model several times. For this it creates the specied
number of model instances and schedulers (up to a maximum number of
parallel threads) and queues the remaining instances. It noties the Simu-
lationManager after the execution of the model has nished. It is possible
to partition a large simulation over a number of delegates running in their
own threads to speed up execution.
By default, gsim uses a database to store simulation data. Accessing
the storage is manged by data handler classes. The modeller congures the
data source, and provides extension classes of the data handlers that insert
the data into the database. The framework calls these handlers with the
congured database connection. It is also possible not to use a database.
Figure A.3 illustrates the components.
A.3.1.2 Implementation
The standalone system is implemented in the Java Programming language,
version 1.6. The core is the behaviour system that generates executable
code from the rule descriptions, for which the rule engine Jess (Sandia Labs
2010) is used. The standalone system does by itself not require a database.
For the model implementations of this thesis, PostgreSQL has been used.
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Figure A.3: gsim base architecture. Arrows denote both ows of control and
object references.
A.3.2 Distributed system
A.3.2.1 Basic Design Questions
Scaling up a standalone environment raises a number of questions and im-
plications usually not relevant for standalone social simulation systems:
Synchronisation Social simulations are typically run sequentially and
synchronously. This means that exactly one agent is executed at a time,
and each agent has at any time the same information about its own and
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its environment's state. Remaining with this mode of execution limits the
benets of a distributed execution of a model, since all nodes in a cluster
have to be synchronised, and performance might even degrade because of the
coordination overhead. In some types of models, it is possible to proceed
with dierent parts of the simulation in their own time, with no or only
eventual synchronisation. This approach is useful if the agents are mostly
independent and can be executed without much inuence on other agents,
or if clusters of interdependent agents can be identied and be separated
on distinct nodes. Such concepts have been applied in distributed Articial
Life simulations where agents are located on a two-dimensional gird, and
often act isolated and communicate rarely. It seems unsuitable for many
social simulations, since social systems inherently require communication,
interaction and shared information. Moreover, social simulations do not
always require a geographical environment.
Being a general framework, distributed gsim does not provide special
synchronisation algorithms for asynchronous execution. The only funda-
mental assumptions it builds on are (1) agents share the same time, and
(2) that the perceivable environment state is identical for all agents. The
framework guarantees that these conditions are satised at any time during
the simulation. Synchronisation itself happens indirectly by conguring how
messages are sent through the system, which is described in the following
paragraph.
Messaging The synchronisation of the overall state of a simulation has
consequences for the communication of agents in a distributed system. Since
gsim explicitly makes no assumptions about the distribution of agents over
the physical nodes, most agent-to-agent communication travels over the net-
work. One option to implement communication is (1) to send many small
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messages (e.g. for every single agent, messages are transmitted immediately
over the network to the receiver) and achieve a high degree of parallelism.
The disadvantage is a potential message overload and nodes becoming too
busy just processing messages. The system could even become slower than
standalone systems because the time to process messages exceeds the ben-
ets of parallel processing. In case of the other extreme (2), all messages
produced on one node could be bundled, so that nodes communicate across
the network, but not single agents. This approach minimises communica-
tion, but also limits the benets of parallel execution since most agents
located on one node have to wait for all agents on other nodes, even for
those who are not directly interacting with them.
The gsim approach is a solution between these extremes. Messages be-
tween agents are bundled. The modeller can congure how many messages
are collected before being sent o, or switch the mechanism o. In the lat-
ter case, all messages of the node are collected and sent over the network
only after all agents in the node have (case (2)). Case (1) is achieved by
setting the bundling threshold to 1, which results in each agent message
being immediately dispatched to the receiver.
In any distributed system, messages can get lost; servers break down or
similar network failures occur. gsim does not provide a recovery mechanism,
and also no built-in security to prevent failures due to communication or
computation overload. Only some basic conguration parameters allow to
control the workload, for example, the maximum number of concurrently
running simulations, and the size of simulation partitions. An optimised
conguration depends on the cluster the framework is running on, and has
to be tuned by the modeller. As an illustration, on a cluster with two nodes
with Pentium IV processors, a restriction to 30 parallel small simulations
was found to be a reasonable upper limit.
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Data collection Data collection in standalone applications typically it-
erates over agents in the agent container, computes statistics of interest
and displays it either to the user, or stores it in les or a database. In a
distributed system, this data has to be collected from dierent nodes and
sent over the network before computations are possible. This may lead to
performance or memory problems for large data sets. Using a database,
gsim provides a congurable caching mechanism that delegates the compu-
tation of statistics to a separate thread or even node. Each node stores its
current state in a database table, while a dedicated thread reads the data
and can then do computations on it. This is not visible to users, so that
no particular attention has to be paid whether data of only a few dozens or
several thousand agents is collected.
A.3.2.2 Architecture and Design
In the distributed version, the components of the standalone simulation
system are replicated over a cluster of servers. Some central services exist
uniquely in the cluster: The simulation clock, a resource manager control-
ling the number of parallel executing simulations, and a central registry for
conguration entries and the IP addresses of the servers currently available
in the cluster. The nodes of the cluster are coordinated by a mixture of
direct remote procedure calls and messages where parallelization is impor-
tant.
Environment and model container objects act as master. Instead of
handling agents themselves, they delegate calls to the appropriate delegate,
either directly, or by sending a message to the cluster:
{ The Environment master receives a request from the access layer to
create a number of agents, and the number of delegates to be created.
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The master then creates the delegates and allocates the same number
of agents to each of them.
{ When a simulation is started, the SimulationContainer receives a ref-
erence to the Environment master and creates one or more (if more
than one model run is requested) master models.
{ The Model master holds a reference to the Environment master. It
creates the runnable agents and distributes them to number of dele-
gates dened by a partition size parameter.
In general, gsim uses direct (remote) references and synchronous calls
where possible and asynchronous messaging only during runtime. In the
setup stage, most communication happens directly. Furthermore, some ad-
ministrative tasks during a run can be calls by reference. Fetching the
simulation state, for example, happens by (remote) referencing the Model
delegates on the dierent nodes. To prevent too heavy memory usage, the
state can be loaded in chunks. Sometimes, remote calls are not feasible
anymore. For example, data collection for a very large simulation is time
intensive and should be forked into a separate thread on a dynamically cho-
sen node in the cluster (otherwise the simulation proceeds very slowly just
for computing statistical information). Communication with this process
happens via messages over a special channel, as it is not known where the
process is located.
Asynchronous processing is used for the following cases:
{ Coordinating the several master and slaves: Time in the cluster pro-
ceeds synchronised. The Model master is responsible for assuring that
a whole model instance is proceeding at the same time. The Model
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master receives a signal from the global clock and sends a message to
its delegates requesting the execution of the next step. Each delegate
sends back a nished-message after executing all its agents.
{ Agent-to-agent communication: Agent-to-agent communication fol-
lows a congurable protocol to achieve a compromise between message
processing load and serialisation of action sequences. More precisely,
the protocol follows the following steps: An agent starting a conver-
sation sends a starting message. The model delegate collects these
messages until the bundling threshold is reached or all agents have
produced their messages. The delegate then sends the messages to
the cluster. All nodes in the cluster receive the message bundle and
lter out those messages that address agents located at them. The
receiving delegate then immediately executes the agents' responses
and collects them. When the threshold is reached, or at latest after
the last agent has responded, the messages are again distributed over
the network. The response message content may be null when the re-
ceiver agent ends the conversation or contain an answer if the protocol
consists of several steps. In the latter case, the sending of messages
continues until all conversations are ended (by sending null content).
This usually also ends the execution of a step.
{ Accessing the current state: The Model master is accessible by system
agents supplied by the modeller. Several methods to enquire about the
current state exist, for example, retrieving all agents in a simulation.
To access the global state, the master sends a state-request message
to all delegates and waits until it has received the expected number
of answers. The result can then be returned to the requesting client.
{ Data caching: For large simulations, the model delegates dump their
APPENDIX A. A SCALABLE ACE SIMULATION SOFTWARE
FRAMEWORK 284
current state into a database cache. Whenever data handlers are called
to process the simulation state, the Model master sends a message
containing the data handler and the reference to the cache entries to
a message receiver, which does the actual computation. At the same
time, the master can proceed with the simulation.
A.3.2.3 Implementation
A central feature of the system is that it builds on available standards and
open source frameworks. In particular, it uses the Java Enterprise Edition
(JEE) specication (Sun Corporation 2010c) that has become a widely used
standard for distributed applications using the programming language Java.
JEE is the general notion for several sub-specications - for example, the
Servlet API for building dynamic web-applications; a messaging specica-
tion for synchronous and asynchronous communication over the network;
or Enterprise Java Beans for (synchronous) remote procedure calls. Several
open-source software projects implement these standards and are provided
in an application server. For distributed gsim, the famous open source ap-
plication server JBoss (The JBoss Community 2010a) was chosen. While
earlier JEE versions had the reputation of being very complex and dicult
to manage, in recent years substantial modications have been introduced
simplifying development signicantly. Software engineering principles like
Aspect Oriented Programming or dependency injection (e.g. Irwin et al
1997; Nene 2005) follow a philosophy of inversion of control. The result is
that much infrastructure and low level work that formerly had to be imple-
mented or congured by the developer is now provided by the application
server provider. As a consequence of these developments, it has become
much easier and straightforward to extend a single-machine software to a
distributed system with minimal eort for developing the necessary infras-
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tructure.
gsim is a very pragmatic approach. The idea was to minimise own
developments and to nd a way of utilising existing open-source software to
the largest extent possible. This allowed the researcher to implement the
system alone. The following paragraphs shortly describe the components
provided by the application server, and the major features and steps that
have to be implemented to extend from the standalone to a distributed
version of the software.
Standards and technologies used
Enterprise Java Beans (Sun Corporation 2010a; EJB) EJB is a
technology based on the Java standard for remote method invocation, us-
ing the Remote Method Invocation protocol (Sun Corporation 2010d; RMI).
In RMI, code is divided into server code and client code. A special compiler
generates stubs and skeleton classes that handle the receiving and dispatch-
ing of method calls depending on the underlying network protocol. EJB
builds on this base technology, simplies its use, and provides additional
features and services that are common to distributed applications, such as
transaction handling or session management (e.g. by passivating or remov-
ing objects).
Java Messaging Service (Sun Corporation 2010b; JMS) JMS is a
specication of a messaging middleware. JMS can be used for both syn-
chronous and asynchronous messaging; in gsim the asynchronous mode is
the most important, since the major motivation is to achieve parallel exe-
cution and loose coupling of server nodes. At the core of a JMS system is a
server to which message producers and message consumers connect, i.e. it
is a centralised system where the server handles the receiving and distribu-
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tion of messages. Communication can be point-to-point or topic based. In
the point-to-point model, one message producer sends messages to a queue,
which are consumed by exactly one listener. In the topic model, several
consumers listen to incoming messages. In gsim, mostly the topic approach
is used. For example, the central clock service publishes step messages to
which all running models react, or the Model master sends coordination
messages to a single topic to which all delegates are connected. Because
JMS is centralised, scalability is limited. The more messages are produced
(e.g. by adding new nodes and/or running more models in parallel), the
higher the load on the server, and the system may slow down or even run
out of memory. gsim uses JBoss messaging, a clustered JMS server that
distributes the load over all participating nodes, so that the messaging load
may increase in parallel with the number of servers.
JBoss Cache (The JBoss Community 2010b) is a proprietary ser-
vice based on JGroups (JGroups 2010). JGroups is a toolkit for multicast
communication and can be used to create groups of processes on dier-
ent computers that coordinate by sending messages. It provides various
features such as group member detection and membership events such as
notication about joined, left or crashed members and similar services. A
major advantage of the toolkit is that the node names or IP addresses need
not be known in advance. JBoss Cache uses this protocol for a distributed
caching mechanism. The cache is, in principle, a tree structure that can be
discovered in the local network, and into which information can be stored
by the group members. In gsim, this service is used to register new nodes as
they enter the network, unregister them when they are killed, remark their
current load (used by gsim to distribute the workload), and to store related
cluster-wide information.
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PostgreSQL (PostgreSQL Global Development Group 2010) By
default, a PostgreSQL database system is used to store persistent data.
The JBoss application server requires a database for JMS. gsim also stores
data relevant for simulations in the database, for example, information for
handling the scheduling of simulations, caching the simulation state, etc.
Moreover, models typically store their data into a database, for which the
same database can be used.
Extension of the base architecture
The main idea of gsim is to provide the same API to the modeller inde-
pendent of the standalone or clustered mode. Where the system runs is
congured by a single parameter. Of course, if the simulation is very large,
the modeller has to take this into account when designing data access meth-
ods, how to parameterise parallel execution and so on.
From an implementation point of view, dierent implementations for
the environment, simulation container and model containers, as well for the
messaging component are provided. Their realisation is now based on EJB
and JMS technologies.
The main dierence exists with respect to the management of a dis-
tributed simulation:
The cluster consists of n nodes. In each node, the same version of gsim
is deployed. New nodes may be added dynamically. Removal, however,
is more critical when simulations are running as gsim does not provide a
failover mechanism for running simulations. Messages or objects in the
cluster may get lost and prevent the nishing of simulations.
There is one central service that controls the scheduling of simulations
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by setting an upper limit of parallel running models. It also provides the
simulation clock (a service that issues messages at a certain interval). gsim
server jobs, and their dependent objects (environment, simulation contain-
ers, model masters and delegates), are controlled by the server. If the user
does not explicitly destroy objects created by him on the server, the server
does this after a specied idle-timeout.
Simulations run asynchronously and autonomously in the server. The
user sends a simulation model as a batch job and may disconnect. The
server executes the simulation on the modeller's behalf. Reconnect to ac-
cess or control the simulation is, therefore, also handled via JMS, since
the references to the remote objects on the server are lost once the user
disconnects.
Figure A.4 illustrates the architecture of the distributed system. To the
environment and model components, delegates are added. The delegates
are distributed over the available nodes in the cluster. Communication and
control are mediated via the JMS server. The client API may then be
located on a dierent computer.
A.3.2.4 Examples
The previous section made clear that perfect parallelization is dicult to
achieve with the minimal (and restrictive) assumptions gsim makes about
the location and communication structures of the agents. A messaging
procedure has been presented that compromises between messaging over-
head and maximal parallelization. Comparing simulations in distributed
and standalone mode showed that the distributed version outperforms the
desktop application at any stage, and that computing time increases at a
atter rate as the number of agents grows.
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Figure A.4: Distributed architecture. White areas mark client components, gray
server components. Server side components are distributed over n nodes, splitting
representation and runtime over possibly n physical locations. Communication
happens indirectly via messaging (JMS), or directly via remote method invoca-
tions (RMI). RMI connections typically represent object references, while JMS
connections ows of control (arrows).
Figure A.5 illustrates this with a toy model with minimal communica-
tion. In the model, agents meet other agents and play a prisoner's dilemma.
The communication act consists of sending each time step n messages from
a central coordinator agent to n agents telling each single agent with which
player they interact. Action happens in an isolated way, i.e. there is no
agent-to-agent communication.
An example for a more complex simulation, including the sending of
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Figure A.5: Simulation examples I. In this example, the number of servers is
constant as the number of agents increases.
many messages is the GP model of chapter 5. First, a model with over 3000
complex agents was hardly possible to run on a single machine with 2 GB
of working memory. The results of chapter 5 were obtained (depending on
availability) with up to ve nodes. Figure A.6 shows some more comparative
example runs with 1000 patient agents on one to four nodes. It shows rst an
increase in performance as the second and third nodes are added. However,
the benet of the fourth nodes diminishes. A likely reason for this is the
relatively small number of agents, so that additional communication begins
to outweigh the benets of further load distribution.
The game simulations of chapters 3 and 4 represent a dierent use case
of the system. The number of agents was very small (20 at maximum).
Distributing the agents of single simulations on the cluster would not speed
up the simulations (communication overhead), but the distributed version
was used to execute the numerous required repetitions in parallel. In this
scenario, agent communication remains local as in the standalone system,
but coordination of the repetitions is realised over the network (the Simu-
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Figure A.6: Simulation examples II. In this example, the number of agent is
held constant, and servers added.
lationContainer creates several Model masters on dierent nodes), speeding
up the simulation process.
A.4 Conclusion
This appendix described the architecture and implementation of a software
framework for simulating agent-based models. The framework was used to
implement all models described in this thesis. The location of the source
code of the framework as well as the models is listed in appendix D.
At its core is the implementation of the BRA algorithm described in
chapter 2. Models using individual learning methods can easily build on this
mechanism to implement deterministic behaviour, simple RL, and complex
rule learning.
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The software provides also the technical infrastructure to scale the sys-
tem up, thus enabling the simulation of many thousand agents in reasonable
time scales. It provides an API that abstracts from the fact whether the
software is run in distributed or standalone mode. This makes it relatively
easy to transform simple models into large-scale simulations.
These two features distinguish the gsim approach from most available
modelling frameworks (e.g. Repast 2010; Ascape 2010; Cio-Revilla et al
2004), which often require both the implementation of behaviour strategies
as well as a re-implementation of parts of the model to distribute it (e.g.
Cicirelli et al 2009; Minson and Theodoropoulos 2004).
Appendix B
Details of the Statistical
Discrimination Model
The following tables show some summary measures for the simulation runs
of model variants I and II (chapter 2, section 3.5.2).
293
APPENDIX B. DETAILS OF THE STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION
MODEL 294
Table B.1: Average discrimination in model variant I. Discrimination is dened
as the dierence between employment levels of the high and low employment
group. Each row represents averages of 5 simulation runs.
f() avg. st. deviation maximum minimum
discrimination
0.0789 0.0587 0.0596 0.1603 0.0130
0.1275 0.0352 0.0236 0.0626 0.0071
0.1571 0.0452 0.0441 0.1031 0.0013
0.1681 0.0393 0.0249 0.0687 0.0031
0.1762 0.0829 0.0514 0.1367 0.0239
0.2192 0.0495 0.0324 0.0849 0.0078
0.2301 0.0380 0.0406 0.1086 0.0077
0.2317 0.0510 0.0535 0.1374 0.0005
0.2339 0.0356 0.0158 0.0600 0.0225
0.2435 0.0472 0.0401 0.1079 0.0145
0.2559 0.0493 0.0193 0.0703 0.0184
0.2610 0.0451 0.0233 0.0710 0.0098
0.3064 0.0592 0.0421 0.1285 0.0140
0.3119 0.0449 0.0157 0.0657 0.0272
0.3305 0.0433 0.0661 0.1604 0.0044
0.3567 0.0461 0.0157 0.0701 0.0280
0.3610 0.0573 0.0228 0.0772 0.0193
0.3708 0.0267 0.0243 0.0692 0.0108
0.3855 0.0529 0.0386 0.1121 0.0199
0.4076 0.0444 0.0320 0.0817 0.0073
0.4191 0.0476 0.0279 0.0674 0.0005
0.4337 0.0299 0.0124 0.0446 0.0137
0.4469 0.0502 0.0335 0.0933 0.0092
0.4558 0.0330 0.0308 0.0862 0.0113
0.4604 0.0714 0.0565 0.1533 0.0042
0.4767 0.0189 0.0214 0.0555 0.0008
0.4839 0.0450 0.0124 0.0595 0.0272
0.5245 0.0246 0.0246 0.0638 0.0024
0.5348 0.0306 0.0242 0.0687 0.0055
0.5465 0.0741 0.0612 0.1466 0.0108
0.5647 0.0261 0.0156 0.0476 0.0098
0.5679 0.0421 0.0305 0.0713 0.0018
0.5773 0.0235 0.0188 0.0564 0.0084
0.5827 0.0260 0.0287 0.0751 0.0046
0.5996 0.0506 0.0256 0.0893 0.0201
0.6188 0.0542 0.0421 0.1212 0.0114
0.6191 0.0259 0.0141 0.0451 0.0068
0.6233 0.0634 0.0475 0.1189 0.0105
0.6505 0.0296 0.0141 0.0480 0.0106
0.6817 0.0589 0.0316 0.0928 0.0209
0.6836 0.0373 0.0242 0.0770 0.0125
0.6991 0.0314 0.0300 0.0636 0.0014
0.7021 0.0477 0.0211 0.0626 0.0113
0.7066 0.0291 0.0151 0.0532 0.0165
0.7667 0.0443 0.0496 0.1320 0.0154
0.7964 0.0360 0.0340 0.0796 0.0056
0.8396 0.0419 0.0362 0.0847 0.0018
0.8561 0.0294 0.0228 0.0548 0.0023
0.9041 0.0572 0.0398 0.1164 0.0057
0.9314 0.0352 0.0198 0.0545 0.0096
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Table B.2: Average discrimination in model variant II. Discrimination is dened
as the dierence between employment levels of the high and low employment
group. Each row represents averages of 5 simulation runs.
f() avg. st. deviation maximum minimum
discrimination
0.1542 0.0263 0.0244 0.0637 0.0035
0.1585 0.0654 0.1112 0.2622 0.0003
0.1933 0.0247 0.0125 0.0426 0.0090
0.2738 0.0757 0.0984 0.2484 0.0096
0.2756 0.0301 0.0244 0.0622 0.0119
0.2865 0.0296 0.0242 0.0667 0.0113
0.3075 0.0410 0.0332 0.0848 0.0067
0.3484 0.0386 0.0229 0.0632 0.0125
0.3554 0.0625 0.0545 0.1423 0.0031
0.3716 0.0372 0.0473 0.1213 0.0076
0.3885 0.0505 0.0368 0.0901 0.0016
0.4104 0.0563 0.0701 0.1776 0.0073
0.4139 0.0781 0.0796 0.1984 0.0075
0.4276 0.0343 0.0387 0.0787 0.0007
0.4339 0.0391 0.0383 0.0966 0.0029
0.4495 0.0186 0.0080 0.0259 0.0066
0.4572 0.0515 0.0422 0.1231 0.0167
0.4672 0.0521 0.0460 0.1271 0.0180
0.4713 0.0386 0.0225 0.0650 0.0132
0.4782 0.0379 0.0296 0.0744 0.0094
0.4865 0.0489 0.0397 0.1141 0.0079
0.5001 0.0709 0.0633 0.1408 0.0044
0.5063 0.0348 0.0173 0.0563 0.0194
0.5112 0.1344 0.0853 0.2577 0.0166
0.5113 0.0418 0.0198 0.0743 0.0224
0.5244 0.0410 0.0545 0.1366 0.0067
0.5260 0.0425 0.0172 0.0610 0.0240
0.5451 0.0555 0.0658 0.1717 0.0149
0.5465 0.0193 0.0288 0.0698 0.0005
0.5519 0.0662 0.0780 0.1802 0.0004
0.5677 0.0552 0.0332 0.0932 0.0102
0.5778 0.0822 0.0626 0.1657 0.0127
0.5910 0.1112 0.0355 0.1583 0.0806
0.6219 0.0460 0.0242 0.0719 0.0155
0.6301 0.0774 0.1135 0.2753 0.0003
0.6482 0.0473 0.0462 0.1032 0.0009
0.6610 0.0534 0.0439 0.1032 0.0065
0.6624 0.0347 0.0158 0.0564 0.0184
0.6634 0.0824 0.0841 0.2266 0.0146
0.7107 0.0397 0.0393 0.1045 0.0042
0.7779 0.0765 0.0526 0.1291 0.0033
0.7954 0.0384 0.0331 0.0936 0.0082
0.8031 0.0904 0.0774 0.1834 0.0067
0.8284 0.1032 0.0746 0.2125 0.0320
0.8290 0.0603 0.0325 0.0934 0.0251
0.8431 0.0484 0.0382 0.1089 0.0140
0.8574 0.0202 0.0199 0.0554 0.0093
0.8588 0.0479 0.0216 0.0771 0.0198
0.9208 0.0459 0.0247 0.0749 0.0218
0.9312 0.1099 0.1208 0.3141 0.0232
Appendix C
Variance Analysis for the
Primary Care Model
One way ANOVA, computed with OpenStat.
Variable labels for the group variables (variable name is scenario):
1 - BR-3/FFS
2 - BR-3/Capitation
3 - BR-6/FFS
4 - BR-6/Capitation
5 - RL-3/FFS
6 - RL-3/Capitation
7 - RL-6/FFS
8 - RL-6/Capitation
=====================================================================
ONE WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS
Dependent variable is: wait, Independent variable is: scenario
---------------------------------------------------------------------
SOURCE D.F. SS MS F PROB.>F OMEGA SQR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
BETWEEN 7 4144.04 592.01 29.74 0.00 0.30
WITHIN 458 9117.10 19.91
TOTAL 465 13261.14
---------------------------------------------------------------------
296
APPENDIX C. VARIANCE ANALYSIS FOR THE PRIMARY CARE
MODEL 297
MEANS AND VARIABILITY OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE FOR LEVELS OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
---------------------------------------------------------------------
GROUP MEAN VARIANCE STD.DEV. N
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 9.63 32.61 5.71 60
2 13.94 30.45 5.52 60
3 11.64 16.91 4.11 60
4 14.07 36.44 6.04 60
5 6.65 6.31 2.51 60
6 9.22 15.94 3.99 60
7 5.15 5.31 2.30 60
8 8.81 12.13 3.48 60
---------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 9.98 28.52 5.34 466
---------------------------------------------------------------------
TESTS FOR HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCE
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Hartley Fmax test statistic = 6.86 with deg.s freem: 8 and 59.
Cochran C statistic = 0.23 with deg.s freem: 8 and 59.
Bartlett Chi-square = 91.64 with 7 D.F. Prob. > Chi-Square = 0.000
---------------------------------------------------------------------
FISHER'S (PROTECTED) LEAST SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE TEST
---------------------------------------------------------------------
GROUP MEAN GROUP MEAN DIFFERENCE FISHER LSD SIGNIFICANT?
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 9.626 2 13.944 4.319 1.601 YES
1 9.626 3 11.636 2.010 1.601 YES
1 9.626 4 14.070 4.445 1.601 YES
1 9.626 5 6.652 2.973 1.698 YES
1 9.626 6 9.224 0.402 1.601 NO
1 9.626 7 5.146 4.480 1.608 YES
1 9.626 8 8.810 0.815 1.608 NO
2 13.944 3 11.636 2.308 1.601 YES
2 13.944 4 14.070 0.126 1.601 NO
2 13.944 5 6.652 7.292 1.698 YES
2 13.944 6 9.224 4.720 1.601 YES
2 13.944 7 5.146 8.798 1.608 YES
2 13.944 8 8.810 5.134 1.608 YES
3 11.636 4 14.070 2.434 1.601 YES
3 11.636 5 6.652 4.984 1.698 YES
3 11.636 6 9.224 2.412 1.601 YES
3 11.636 7 5.146 6.490 1.608 YES
3 11.636 8 8.810 2.826 1.608 YES
4 14.070 5 6.652 7.418 1.698 YES
4 14.070 6 9.224 4.846 1.601 YES
4 14.070 7 5.146 8.924 1.608 YES
4 14.070 8 8.810 5.260 1.608 YES
5 6.652 6 9.224 2.572 1.698 YES
5 6.652 7 5.146 1.507 1.704 NO
5 6.652 8 8.810 2.158 1.704 YES
6 9.224 7 5.146 4.078 1.608 YES
6 9.224 8 8.810 0.414 1.608 NO
7 5.146 8 8.810 3.665 1.614 YES
NOTE! Familywise error rate may be greater than alpha
---------------------------------------------------------------------
=====================================================================
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ONE WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS
Dependent variable is: effort , Independent variable is: scenario
---------------------------------------------------------------------
SOURCE D.F. SS MS F PROB.>F OMEGA SQR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
BETWEEN 7 0.04 0.01 59.99 0.00 0.47
WITHIN 458 0.05 0.00
TOTAL 465 0.09
---------------------------------------------------------------------
MEANS AND VARIABILITY OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE FOR LEVELS OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
---------------------------------------------------------------------
GROUP MEAN VARIANCE STD.DEV. N
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 0.98 0.00 0.00 60
2 0.98 0.00 0.01 60
3 0.98 0.00 0.00 60
4 0.98 0.00 0.01 60
5 0.96 0.00 0.02 60
6 0.96 0.00 0.01 60
7 0.96 0.00 0.01 60
8 0.95 0.00 0.02 60
---------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 0.97 0.00 0.01 466
---------------------------------------------------------------------
TESTS FOR HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCE
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Hartley Fmax test statistic = 115294120037.52 with deg.s freem: 8 and 59.
Cochran C statistic = 0.31 with deg.s freem: 8 and 59.
Bartlett Chi-square = 1608.00 with 7 D.F. Prob. > Chi-Square = 0.001
---------------------------------------------------------------------
FISHER'S (PROTECTED) LEAST SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE TEST
---------------------------------------------------------------------
GROUP MEAN GROUP MEAN DIFFERENCE FISHER LSD SIGNIFICANT?
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 0.980 2 0.976 0.004 0.004 NO
1 0.980 3 0.980 0.000 0.004 NO
1 0.980 4 0.976 0.004 0.004 YES
1 0.980 5 0.963 0.017 0.004 YES
1 0.980 6 0.960 0.020 0.004 YES
1 0.980 7 0.960 0.020 0.004 YES
1 0.980 8 0.955 0.025 0.004 YES
2 0.976 3 0.980 0.004 0.004 YES
2 0.976 4 0.976 0.000 0.004 NO
2 0.976 5 0.963 0.013 0.004 YES
2 0.976 6 0.960 0.016 0.004 YES
2 0.976 7 0.960 0.017 0.004 YES
2 0.976 8 0.955 0.021 0.004 YES
3 0.980 4 0.976 0.004 0.004 YES
3 0.980 5 0.963 0.017 0.004 YES
3 0.980 6 0.960 0.020 0.004 YES
3 0.980 7 0.960 0.021 0.004 YES
3 0.980 8 0.955 0.025 0.004 YES
4 0.976 5 0.963 0.013 0.004 YES
4 0.976 6 0.960 0.016 0.004 YES
4 0.976 7 0.960 0.016 0.004 YES
4 0.976 8 0.955 0.021 0.004 YES
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5 0.963 6 0.960 0.003 0.004 NO
5 0.963 7 0.960 0.003 0.004 NO
5 0.963 8 0.955 0.008 0.004 YES
6 0.960 7 0.960 0.001 0.004 NO
6 0.960 8 0.955 0.005 0.004 YES
7 0.960 8 0.955 0.005 0.004 YES
NOTE! Familywise error rate may be greater than alpha
---------------------------------------------------------------------
=====================================================================
ONE WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS
Dependent variable is: referral_rate, Independent variable is: scenario
---------------------------------------------------------------------
SOURCE D.F. SS MS F PROB.>F OMEGA SQR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
BETWEEN 7 3.46 0.49 884.98 0.00 0.93
WITHIN 458 0.26 0.00
TOTAL 465 3.71
---------------------------------------------------------------------
MEANS AND VARIABILITY OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE FOR LEVELS OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
---------------------------------------------------------------------
GROUP MEAN VARIANCE STD.DEV. N
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 0.81 0.00 0.02 60
2 0.99 0.00 0.04 60
3 0.91 0.00 0.02 60
4 0.99 0.00 0.03 60
5 0.80 0.00 0.01 60
6 0.99 0.00 0.02 60
7 0.81 0.00 0.02 60
8 1.00 0.00 0.02 60
---------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 0.92 0.01 0.09 466
---------------------------------------------------------------------
TESTS FOR HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCE
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Hartley Fmax test statistic = 7.24 with deg.s freem: 8 and 59.
Cochran C statistic = 0.28 with deg.s freem: 8 and 59.
Bartlett Chi-square = 70.53 with 7 D.F. Prob. > Chi-Square = 0.000
---------------------------------------------------------------------
FISHER'S (PROTECTED) LEAST SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE TEST
---------------------------------------------------------------------
GROUP MEAN GROUP MEAN DIFFERENCE FISHER LSD SIGNIFICANT?
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 0.808 2 0.988 0.180 0.008 YES
1 0.808 3 0.910 0.102 0.008 YES
1 0.808 4 0.991 0.183 0.008 YES
1 0.808 5 0.804 0.004 0.009 NO
1 0.808 6 0.995 0.187 0.008 YES
1 0.808 7 0.805 0.003 0.009 NO
1 0.808 8 0.999 0.191 0.009 YES
2 0.988 3 0.910 0.078 0.008 YES
2 0.988 4 0.991 0.003 0.008 NO
2 0.988 5 0.804 0.184 0.009 YES
2 0.988 6 0.995 0.007 0.008 NO
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2 0.988 7 0.805 0.183 0.009 YES
2 0.988 8 0.999 0.011 0.009 YES
3 0.910 4 0.991 0.081 0.008 YES
3 0.910 5 0.804 0.107 0.009 YES
3 0.910 6 0.995 0.085 0.008 YES
3 0.910 7 0.805 0.105 0.009 YES
3 0.910 8 0.999 0.089 0.009 YES
4 0.991 5 0.804 0.187 0.009 YES
4 0.991 6 0.995 0.004 0.008 NO
4 0.991 7 0.805 0.186 0.009 YES
4 0.991 8 0.999 0.008 0.009 NO
5 0.804 6 0.995 0.191 0.009 YES
5 0.804 7 0.805 0.002 0.009 NO
5 0.804 8 0.999 0.195 0.009 YES
6 0.995 7 0.805 0.189 0.009 YES
6 0.995 8 0.999 0.004 0.009 NO
7 0.805 8 0.999 0.194 0.009 YES
NOTE! Familywise error rate may be greater than alpha
---------------------------------------------------------------------
=====================================================================
ONE WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS
Dependent variable is: utility_1, Independent variable is: scenario
---------------------------------------------------------------------
SOURCE D.F. SS MS F PROB.>F OMEGA SQR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
BETWEEN 7 152.53 21.79 1670.86 0.00 0.59
WITHIN 7992 104.23 0.01
TOTAL 7999 256.76
---------------------------------------------------------------------
MEANS AND VARIABILITY OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE FOR LEVELS OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
---------------------------------------------------------------------
GROUP MEAN VARIANCE STD.DEV. N
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 0.62 0.00 0.05 1000
2 0.61 0.00 0.05 1000
3 0.64 0.00 0.03 1000
4 0.61 0.00 0.04 1000
5 0.44 0.01 0.11 1000
6 0.29 0.02 0.16 1000
7 0.45 0.02 0.16 1000
8 0.29 0.04 0.19 1000
---------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 0.49 0.03 0.188000
---------------------------------------------------------------------
TESTS FOR HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCE
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Hartley Fmax test statistic = 47.98 with deg.s freem: 8 and 999.
Cochran C statistic = 0.34 with deg.s freem: 8 and 999.
Bartlett Chi-square = 5811.61 with 7 D.F. Prob. > Chi-Square = 0.001
---------------------------------------------------------------------
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FISHER'S (PROTECTED) LEAST SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE TEST
---------------------------------------------------------------------
GROUP MEAN GROUP MEAN DIFFERENCE FISHER LSD SIGNIFICANT?
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 0.616 2 0.611 0.006 0.010 NO
1 0.616 3 0.638 0.021 0.010 YES
1 0.616 4 0.612 0.005 0.010 NO
1 0.616 5 0.440 0.177 0.010 YES
1 0.616 6 0.289 0.327 0.010 YES
1 0.616 7 0.454 0.162 0.010 YES
1 0.616 8 0.287 0.330 0.010 YES
2 0.611 3 0.638 0.027 0.010 YES
2 0.611 4 0.612 0.001 0.010 NO
2 0.611 5 0.440 0.171 0.010 YES
2 0.611 6 0.289 0.322 0.010 YES
2 0.611 7 0.454 0.157 0.010 YES
2 0.611 8 0.287 0.324 0.010 YES
3 0.638 4 0.612 0.026 0.010 YES
3 0.638 5 0.440 0.198 0.010 YES
3 0.638 6 0.289 0.348 0.010 YES
3 0.638 7 0.454 0.183 0.010 YES
3 0.638 8 0.287 0.351 0.010 YES
4 0.612 5 0.440 0.172 0.010 YES
4 0.612 6 0.289 0.323 0.010 YES
4 0.612 7 0.454 0.158 0.010 YES
4 0.612 8 0.287 0.325 0.010 YES
5 0.440 6 0.289 0.151 0.010 YES
5 0.440 7 0.454 0.014 0.010 YES
5 0.440 8 0.287 0.153 0.010 YES
6 0.289 7 0.454 0.165 0.010 YES
6 0.289 8 0.287 0.003 0.010 NO
7 0.454 8 0.287 0.168 0.010 YES
NOTE! Familywise error rate may be greater than alpha
---------------------------------------------------------------------
=====================================================================
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Table D.1: Executable models
Name Description URL Date
gsim JBoss server with gsim.jar and models
(optimised for windows platform) http://www.stephan-schuster.net/gsim/framework/gsim-windows-0.1.zip 09/09/2010
DynamicProcess Utility used for computing stochastic
stable networks (jar library) http://www.stephan-schuster.net/gsim/DynamicProcess/dp.jar 09/09/2010
PrimaryCare The primary care model http://www.stephan-schuster.net/gsim/models/PrimaryCare/gp.zip 09/09/2010
Networks-1 The network base model http://www.stephan-schuster.net/gsim/models/Networks1/net-base.zip 20/06/2011
Networks-2 The network BRA model http://www.stephan-schuster.net/gsim/models/Networks2/net-bra.zip 09/09/2010
Discrimination The discrimination model http://www.stephan-schuster.net/models/Discrimination/discrimination.zip 05/01/2012
Table D.2: Source code
Name Description URL Date
gsim Sources of the gsim framework http://www.stephan-schuster.net/gsim/framework/src.zip 09/09/2010
DynamicProcess Sources of the DynamicProcess jar-le http://www.stephan-schuster.net/gsim/DynamicProcess/src.zip 09/09/2010
PrimaryCare Source of the primary care model http://www.stephan-schuster.net/gsim/PrimaryCare/src.zip 09/09/2010
Networks-1 Sources of the network base model http://www.stephan-schuster.net/gsim/models/Networks1/src.zip 20/06/2011
Networks-2 Sources of the network BRA model http://www.stephan-schuster.net/gsim/models/Networks2/src.zip 09/09/2010
Discrimination Sources of the discrimination model http://www.stephan-schuster.net/gsim/models/Discrimination/src.zip 05/01/2012
